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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the ontology of the cyborg body and the politics inherent 
to cultural manifestations of that image, and focuses on the links between glass 
and human-machine integration, while tracing the dangerous political affinities 
that emerge when such links are exposed. 
In the first chapter, the cyborg’s persistent construction as a cultural 
Black Box is uncovered using the theories of Bruno Latour and W. Ross 
Ashby.  It examines why the temptation to explore the cyborg solely through 
close readings of contemporary incarnations leads only to confusion and 
misreading.  The second chapter builds on the work of the first by placing the 
cyborg within its proper historical context, and provides a detailed examination 
of the period in which the cyborg was not only named, but also transformed 
into a physical possibility with an existent political agenda.  It then investigates 
the phallogocentricity, hyper-masculinity, and inherent racism of the cyborg 
body, and demonstrates how representations of human-machine integration 
reinforce the pre-existing racist, hetero-normative, patriarchal hegemony of the 
Cold War. 
The discussion then explores the issue of the emergent property in the 
cyborg body; specifically, the figure’s persistent construction as a ‘body of 
glass.’  It demonstrates how cyborgs are not only associated with objects like 
the mirror, but also how that figure is tied to visual motifs such as the double 
or doppelganger.  Accordingly, the theories of Jacques Lacan are employed to 
elucidate the issues that arise when one of the most pervasive images in 
Western culture also doubles as a reflector.  The final chapter seeks to expand 
upon the framework provided by Lacan, and examines the cyborg not as a 
mirror, but as a portal.  Subsequently, this section challenges not only the 
cyborg’s current status as a posthuman figure, but also current theoretical 
assumptions which frame the cyborg as the point of transition from humanism 
to posthumanism. 
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Introduction: The Children of Uranium: Warhol, Weaponry and the 
Evolution of Postmodern American Identity 
 
“After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and 
mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding.”
 1
 
0.1 Light 
 
In a secure section of the New Mexico desert stands an obelisk of black lava.  
At nearly 15 feet high, the item is paltry in comparison to any existing 
counterparts, whether ancient or modern, and does not loom over the 
surrounding countryside so much as scar it like an ugly pile of cobbled rocks 
(Figure 1).  On a purely aesthetic level, the sheer awkwardness of the object is 
more than just apparent, it is blinding given the context in which it was built, 
because with a shape both cone-like and inelegant, the heap itself not only 
seems grossly incongruous when stacked against the alkali landscape, but also 
totally alien and inappropriate when considering the sterility and solemnity of 
the site itself.  This is the Trinity marker, the epicenter of (what was) an 
irradiated wasteland, and the spot “WHERE THE WORLD’S FIRST 
NUCLEAR DEVICE WAS EXPLODED ON JULY 16, 1945.”
2
Officially, the firing circuits closed at 05:29:45 that morning, causing 
an implosion so violent, and so visually brilliant, its reflection could be seen on 
the surface of the moon.
3  Isidor Isaac Rabi, a Nobel Prize winning physicist 
entrenched at Los Alamos since the beginning of the project, watched the 
event from a position over 10 miles away.  When describing the test almost 25 
years later, Rabi would recall “an enormous flash of light, the brightest light I 
have ever seen or that I think anyone has ever seen.  It blasted; it pounced; it 
bored its way right through you.  It was a vision…seen with more than just the 
eye.  It was seen to last forever.”
4  Rabi’s recollection is extraordinary as the 
image of perpetual whiteness not only marks a new beginning—one which 
unfortunately, is now associated with the cheap sentimentality of a so-called 
                                                 
1 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994), p. 1. 
2 The sign attached to the Trinity marker reads in all capitals: “TRINITY SITE: WHERE THE 
WORLD’S FIRST NUCLEAR DEVICE WAS EXPLODED ON JULY 16, 1945.  ERECTED 
1965, WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, J. FREDERICK THORNLIN, MAJOR 
GENERAL U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING.” 
3 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 
pp. 670, 672. 
4 Isidor Isaac Rabi, Science: The Center of Culture (New York: World Publishers, 1970), p. 
138.   7
‘second dawn’—but also a kind of obsolescence; a complete erasure of 
everything as Trinity transforms the world into a vision of emptiness without 
end.
5  In many ways, this is the “landscape of snows”, the “dumb blankness” 
described by Melville, and embodied by his whale.
6  This is the “colorless, all-
color of atheism from which” everyone shrinks, because the sight is both 
terrifying and sublime, empty and yet “full of meaning”.
7
In reality, the flash lasted for no longer than two seconds, and was 
replaced by a colossal roar accompanied by “great swirls of flame.”
8  These 
swirls rose in a narrow column to a height of nearly 41,000 feet, the top of 
which mushroomed outward, covering the sky in a churning cloud of colour 
that was either “mint green,” “brilliant purple,” or “bright…spectral blue”.
9  
However, the image of a “lime green” sky would repeat itself yet again in the 
early 1960s when a massive Hydrogen bomb was detonated over the Pacific, in 
a spot near the Hawaiian Islands.
10
Although considerably weaker than its successors, the heat generated 
by the blast in New Mexico was sufficient to scorch a pine board at 2,000 
yards, while the energy produced in the centre was so enormous it not only 
vaporized the mass of steel girders upon which the device was placed, but also 
melted the earth at its base; fusing the surrounding sand into a huge plate of 
murky green glass.
11  This glass, also known as Trinitite, is now almost gone.  
Today only fragments remain, sold as “Atomite” or “Alamogordo glass” to the 
rock collectors and bomb enthusiasts that scour eBay.  The rest was bulldozed 
                                                 
5 Ferenc M. Szasz uses the image of a second sunrise to describe the effects of the Trinity Test, 
see; The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 
1945 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press). 
6 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick, or The White Whale (Boston: The Page Company, 1920), p. 
186 
7 Ibid.  Indeed, “like [the] willful travelers in Lapland who [refused] to wear colored and 
colouring glasses upon their eyes, so the wretched infidel[s]” un/lucky enough to survive 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, also “[gazed themselves] blind at the monumental white shroud that 
[wrapped] all the prospect around [them].” 
8 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atom Bomb, p. 673. 
9 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), p. 227.  A 
ballistics expert described the blast as “bright…blue” while Frank Oppenheimer maintains the 
resulting cloud appeared a “brilliant purple” (Rhodes, 673, 675).  David Wade, a 9 year old 
resident of the nearby town, Socorro, said that his father “was looking out [the window at the 
time of the blast] and said the sky turned a mint green.”  Claire Marshall, “The Bomb that 
Changed the World,” BBC NEWS, Accessed 10 April 2006: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4689983.stm
10 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime, p. 234. 
11 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atom Bomb, p. 677.   8
by the Army in the years that followed, and buried under tons of dirt and 
concrete until the crater itself disappeared completely.  Equally, this official 
movement toward secrecy, or erasure, or forgetting also applies to that sense of 
astonishment that accompanies every atomic event, because unlike the vast 
power of the bomb, the vibrancy and sheer range of colour produced by such 
flashes are now all but forgotten.  Their brilliance expunged from the 
collective memory and removed from aesthetic representations.  Their 
variations in shade reduced to a blinding white light followed only by hues of 
red and orange that foreshadows the coming flames.  The “green glass sea” is 
also lost; referenced solely by a children’s book of the same name.
12  
Apparently, the aftermath is not the point; only the event and the sublime 
image of the blast itself, which ironically, has now been greatly diminished by 
partial depictions of that very scene. 
With the evidence expunged, and the land superficially restored, the 
Trinity site was then capped with the aforementioned obelisk in 1965, and 
opened to the public on only two days a year; the first Saturday in April and 
October.
13  Pilgrims who manage to make the trip during this 48 hour window 
are confronted with a thing more burial mound than memorial; an eyesore 
which has since become a tombstone complete with epitaph.  Seen in this way, 
the object seems to exploit every one of its inherent aesthetic sins to great 
effect, because each blemish not only contributes to a kind of gravestone, but 
perhaps more disturbingly, they constitute a marker which stands like a gross 
premonition of Kubrick’s ebony monoliths in 2001.  Indeed, like the trio (or 
trinity) of mystical things which Keir Dullea and friends found standing on the 
earth, buried in the moon, and floating out in space, this pile of black rock 
marks both a dramatic socio-political change, and one of humanity’s most 
spectacular evolutionary turns—that of Adam into Atom.
14
On a political level, the implosion at Alamogordo certainly qualifies 
as a point of no return.  Moreover, it represents a kind of vanishing point for 
the remainder of the 20
th century, as if the light thrown out at 05:30 not only 
illuminated the entire American desert, but also the whole future of the 
                                                 
12 Ellen Klages, The Green Glass Sea (New York: Viking Juvenile, 2006). 
13 For more on tourism and the Trinity site see The White Sands Missile Range website: 
http://www.wsmr. army.mil/pao/TrinitySite/trndir.htm
14 2001: A Space Odyssey, dir. Stanley Kubrick (MGM, 1968).   9
Western world.  After all, the shadows cast by the bomb are long and dark, 
while the light released through the hands of Oppenheimer and Groves can still 
be seen to this very day.  George W. Bush and his continuing attempts to 
resurrect the strategic theories of Edward Teller and the fallacy of Star Wars is 
only the most recent example, as are the latest efforts by New Labour to renew 
the UK’s now obsolete nuclear deterrent, otherwise known as Trident; itself a 
rather eerie, if inadvertent homage, to the original trio of Trinity.
15  This is 
“Echoland.”
16
In biological terms, nuclear weapons are the most “compact, 
efficient, inexpensive, [and] inexorable mechanisms of total death” ever 
conceived.
17  Their collective power is so staggering that in 1982 the World 
Health Organization stated that in the case of a “major” nuclear event an 
estimated two billion people would die as a result.
18  Alarmingly, this figure 
was released before “detailed studies appeared about the potentially 
widespread disaster of nuclear winter”, a climactic phenomenon which would 
cause the death toll to rise even higher until it eventually peaked with our 
ultimate extinction.
19
The rise of such a dangerous socio-political system, in which the 
stakes are nothing less than total annihilation, has clearly had a profound 
impact on the Western psyche.  As one writer declared over twenty-five years 
ago: “Versions of [this] nightmare have haunted mankind for 37 years”.  The 
most obvious examples are the endless parade of books and films that either 
explicate or explore the dangers inherent in such a terminal form of political 
brinksmanship.
20  One of the most common cultural narratives continues to 
centre on the image of an accidental evolutionary offshoot; on human bodies 
                                                 
15 The number three makes another appearance in Britain’s newest nuclear deterrent, since the 
country’s latest atomic enforcers comprise a trio of submarines scheduled for completion in 
2007: the HMS Astute, the HMS Ambush, and the HMS Artful. 
16 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 13. 
17 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atom Bomb, p. 779. 
18 The use of “major” is somewhat bizarre given that any nuclear war could never be seen as 
minor.  Yet, perhaps Rhodes and the WHO are inadvertently adopting the terminology of the 
Reagan administration, and their notion of a “limited nuclear war”, in which (presumably) 
only a few hundred million would die, as opposed to everyone, everywhere.  James Kelly, 
“Thinking About the Unthinkable,” Time (29 March 1982).  Accessed 23 April 2007: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,953406-3,00.html
19 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atom Bomb, p. 779. 
20 “Living with Mega-death,” Time (29 March 1982). Accessed 23 April 2007: 
http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,953408-2,00.html  10
made horribly toxic by the everlasting light of the atomic.  In 1954, Godzilla 
surfaced slowly from the seas of Japan, and with it a crystallized obsession 
with atomic destruction, and/or radioactive mutation in American Sci-Fi 
cinema.
21  To quote pop culture scholar, Christopher Frayling: 
 
Them! (1954), a huge box office success for Warner Brothers, was the film 
that established the rules of the game: the combination of a quasi-
documentary cinematic style with a story about atomic tests in the New 
Mexico desert leading to the creation of giant mutant ants…was evidently 
a winning one.  The film even included a suitably apocalyptic biblical 
epigram: “And there shall be destruction and darkness over creation.  And 
the beasts shall rule over the earth.”
22
 
Despite their impeccable timing and impressive cultural savvy the producers of 
Them! were only half right.  It is not darkness, but light, both visible and 
invisible, that rules over this new world, that dominates this freshly made 
creation in which the specter of mutation not only haunts the hills overlooking 
America’s deserts, but also the oceans enclosing Japan.
23  Seemingly, at the 
centre of the blast, while death is consistently absolute, on the periphery, the 
margins, in that penumbra between the living and the lifeless, exist the 
mutants, the undead; the vampires who could not be slain by the killing light of 
Western science.  These are the burned bodies that populated Hiroshima after 
the explosion had subsided, their skin erupting into open sores as the city 
burned.  And these are the templates for the giant insects and imaginary 
monsters that not only stalk the rim of every irradiated zone, but which in their 
monstrosity, also reflect cultural anxieties over modernity’s apparent war 
against bodily integrity (Figure 2).  In fact, perhaps the most powerful and 
lingering consequence left by the legacy of Los Alamos, the Nevada Proving 
Ground, and their numerous radioactive centres, is not the precarious political 
                                                 
21 It is interesting that both Japan and the United States should develop a near identical cultural 
reaction to the atom bomb in the years following WWII.  Godzilla is easily one of Japan’s 
most recognizable exports, and is also a victim of atomic testing. 
22 Christopher Frayling, Mad, Bad, and Dangerous: The Scientist and the Cinema (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2005), pp. 199-200. 
23 Numerous films have followed in the wake of Them!.  The Hills Have Eyes (2006)—a 
remake of the 1977 Wes Craven film—and its sequel The Hills Have Eyes II (2007), are 
virtual copies of Them!.  Instead of mutant ants, the beasts in these films are cannibalistic 
inhumans with a severe rape fetish; people mutated into amoral monsters by the transformative 
powers of the bomb.   11
climate of the Cold War, but their subsequent and repeated assaults on the 
stability of human ontology. 
 
0.2 Atoms 
 
J. Robert Oppenheimer once said that it “did not take atomic weapons to make 
war terrible” nor did it “take atomic weapons to make Man want peace…But 
the [atom] bomb was the turn of the screw.  It has made the prospect of future 
war unendurable.  It has led us up those last few steps to the mountain pass; 
and beyond there is a different country.”
24  Obviously, the prospect of a future 
war has been nothing if not tolerable.  American conflicts in Korea and 
Southeast Asia, where nuclear annihilation was always considered a plausible 
alternative, are a testament to this fact, as are the continued political posturing 
of newly emerging nuclear states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, 
and Iran.
25  In many ways, the ability and the willingness to destroy humanity 
has always been the preferred political currency for those who wish to enter 
and/or dominate the stage of international politics.
26  The trick is to survive the 
onslaught. 
                                                 
24 Cited in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 778. 
25 Writing in 1981, Daniel Ellsberg, observed that “every president from Truman to Reagan, 
with the possible exception of Ford, has felt compelled to consider or direct serious 
preparations for possible imminent US initiation of tactical or strategic nuclear warfare, in the 
midst of an ongoing, intense non-nuclear conflict or crisis.”  To cite just one example provided 
by Ellsberg, and elaborated here by scholar, Zia Mian; “the US military seriously considered 
using tactical  nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. Declassified documents show that in 
February 1968, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff considered the question of ‘whether 
tactical nuclear weapons should be used’ if it looked like the Vietnamese might succeed in 
their attack on the US troops at Khe Sanh. He asked US commanders in Vietnam to look for 
targets ‘which lend themselves to nuclear strikes’. The documents show that senior military 
commanders argued that ‘military prudence alone requires that we do some detailed planning,’ 
set a planning process in motion, and considered the ‘type and location of tactical nuclear 
weapons available and best suited to the purpose.’  Nuclear weapons were eventually not used 
in Vietnam. General Westmoreland, the commander of US forces in Vietnam, later argued that 
the use of nuclear weapons could have forced the Vietnamese to surrender, and drew an 
analogy with the atomic bombing of Japan. Other people, and not just in the US, have had 
similar dreams of what the proper use of nuclear weapons might achieve.”  For more see: 
Daniel Ellsberg, “The Call to Mutiny,” Protest and Survive, ed. E.P Thompson and Dan Smith 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), Accessed 13 November 2007, ellsburg.net: 
http://www.ellsberg.net/content/view/52; Zia Mian, “America, Iran and the Nuclear Option,” 
Economic and Political Weekly (May 16, 2006), Accessed 13 November 2007: 
http://www.zmag.org/content/ showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10282. 
26 Today, there are 9 states with nuclear weapons capabilities; The United States, Russia, 
United Kingdom, China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.  Of those 9, only 5 
are signatories to the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  India, Pakistan, and 
North Korea are not part of the NPT.  Israel certainly has nuclear weapons, although it has 
never publicly acknowledged its own capabilities.  Iran, on the other hand, is believed to be   12
On the other hand, no matter how inaccurate Oppenheimer’s original 
speech ultimately proved politically, the validity of his statement continues to 
persist ontologically, albeit unintentionally, because even though his 
“mountain pass” never led to an international body politic predicated upon 
peace and mutual understanding, it certainly ushered in a new appreciation of 
what was, what is, and what could become human.  Subsequently, the Father 
of the atom bomb is absolutely correct when his speech is applied to 
forthcoming research in the medical sciences, as well as to future 
representations of the human body throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, because even if Oppenheimer’s “turn of the screw” swiftly proved 
itself a literal dead end, his work, and the effects thereof, have instead led us to 
a different set of steps, where beyond there is a different body. 
Trinity, on the other hand, marks a definitive turn.  More specifically, 
and at the risk of repetition, it marks the point of no return.  Because not only 
does the implosion at Los Alamos signify a socio-political rupture in which 
Superpowers emerge with super-powers, but perhaps also the beginning of 
Post-modernity, and more dubiously, the “end of history” and of all things 
everywhere.
27  Such a dramatic remark is more than just eager hyperbole.  Nor 
is it merely descriptive of what could be construed as an extreme case of 
cultural fatalism brought on by the devastating threat of atomic weaponry.  On 
the contrary, it is a more accurate account of the world to come than even the 
endless parade of theoretical ‘endings’ to which I refer.  Since the real-life 
trinity of Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki seemed to prompt the 
creation of a consumer culture obsessed with grand finales.  As Frederic 
Jameson writes, the remaining decades of the 20
th century were 
                                                                                                                                           
developing atomic weaponry, but is as yet, a non-nuclear power.  Iranian officials and 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in particular, have repeatedly stressed that Iran “is simply 
doing what it is allowed to do.”  After all, under the NPT “a country has the right to enrich its 
own fuel for civil nuclear power, under inspection from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).”  See: “Iran and the Nuclear Issue,” BBC NEWS.com, 6 November 2007, 
Accessed 13 November 2007: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 4031603.stm.  Note: to 
date, only one country has voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons capability.  In the early 
1990s, South African President F.W. de Klerk ordered the dismantling of the country’s atomic 
arsenal.  For more see: David Albright, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” MIT 
website (March 14, 2001), Accessed 13 November 2007: 
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_01spring/albright.htm
27 Frederic Jameson, “’End of Art’ or ‘End of History’,” The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings 
on the Postmodern, 1983-1998 (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 73-93; Jacques Derrida, “The Ends 
of Man,” Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Hemel Hempstead, England: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 109–136.   13
 
marked by an inverted millenarianism in which premonitions of the future, 
catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by senses of the end of this 
or that (the end of ideology, art, or social class; the crisis of ‘Leninism,’ 
social democracy, or the welfare state, etc., etc.); taken together, all of 
these…constitute what is increasingly called postmodernism.  The case for 
its existence depends on the hypothesis of some radical break, or coupure, 
generally traced back to the end of the 1950s or the early 1960s.
28
 
The end of art, the end of history, the end of the human; all are under threat, or 
seen as inexorably doomed.  As if the world itself was slowly being erased by 
the all-encompassing, all-expunging white light thrown out by the beginning of 
the nuclear age.  Indeed, despite their sometimes dubious validity, each ending 
reinforces the overwhelming sense that we can never go back. 
After all, even though a majority of contemporary cultural theorists 
trace the origins of postmodernity to the end of the 1950s, we must always 
remember that the America governed by both Eisenhower and Kennedy would 
not exist without Oppenheimer and Groves, Teller and Ulam, Wernher von 
Braun and Operation Paperclip.
29  Postmodernism is not simply a case of 
rebellion, in which the younger generations of the mid to late 20
th century 
“confront” high-modernism “as a set of dead classics”.
30  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  
movement constitutes a concerted effort to articulate and reflect a new world 
order; one driven by M.A.D.(ness), contained by Sputnik, surveyed by all, and 
shattered by events that “weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”
31  
As Jameson notes, the “postmodern is…the force field in which…‘residual’ 
and ‘emergent’ forms of cultural production…must make their way.”
32  
Presumably, the previous models from which these residues derive are no 
longer valid or existent, because the epoch which allowed them to grow is now 
gone.  After Trinity there are no reparations.  The body cannot be repaired.  
                                                 
28 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), p. 1. 
29 Operation Paperclip was the code name under which the United States government secretly 
extradited Nazi scientists after the end of WWII.  For further reading see: Tom Bower, The 
Paperclip Conspiracy: The Battle for the Spoils and Secrets of Nazi Germany (London: 
Michael Joseph Ltd, 1987); John Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War and the Devil’s 
Pact (London: Penguin, 2004). 
30 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 4. 
31 Ibid, p. 4.  For more on Sputnik’s role as a container see: Marshall McLuhan, “At the 
moment of Sputnik the planet became a global theater in which there are no spectators but only 
actors,” Journal of Communication 24.1 (Winter 1974), pp. 48-58. 
32 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 6.   14
The earth is salted and we are changed.  As one U.S. Naval officer put it when 
visiting Nagasaki in September, 1945 (Figure 3): 
 
A smell of death and corruption pervades the place…The general 
impression, which transcends those derived from the evidence of our 
physical senses, is one of deadness, the absolute essence of death in the 
sense of finality without hope of resurrection.  And all this is not localized.  
It’s everywhere and nothing has escaped its touch.  In most ruined cities 
you can bury the dead, clean up the rubble, rebuild the houses and have a 
living city again.  One feels that is not so here.  Like…Sodom and 
Gomorrah, its site has been sown with salt and ‘Ichabod’ written over its 
gates.
33
 
American art production following the end of World War II certainly 
reflects this sense of irrevocable alteration, because unlike Léger or his peers 
in the 20s and 30s, painting no longer seems concerned with “vaster 
[realities]”, “ultimate [truths]”, or the restoration of the self.
34  Rather, the 
singular representation of a meaningful subject—and I mean that in every 
sense of the word—is replaced by the endless replication of “dead objects”.
35  
Frederic Jameson’s iconic analysis of Vincent Van Gogh’s A Pair of Boots 
(1887) and Andy Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes (1980) illustrates this chasm 
between the modern and its ‘post’ exceeding well.  Characterizing the 
transition from one moment to the other as an apparent loss of voice, in which 
disconnection is the primary player: 
 
Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes evidently no longer speaks to us with any 
of the immediacy of Van Gogh’s footgear…I am tempted to say that it 
does not really speak at all.  Nothing in this painting organizes even a 
minimal place for the viewer, who confronts it at the turning of a museum 
corridor or gallery with all the contingency of some inexplicable natural 
object.  On the level of content, we have…what are far more clearly 
fetishes, in both Freudian and Marxian senses…a random collection of 
dead objects hanging together on the canvas like so many turnips, as shorn 
of their earlier life world as the pile of shoes left over from Auschwitz…
36
 
In 1959, Alain Resnais dramatized this sense of aesthetic alienation in 
Hiroshima mon amour.
37  Entering the Peace Memorial Museum with 
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35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
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staggered jump-cuts he captured human figures obscured from the waist up as 
they strolled past the remains of garden stones, rock walls, melted Coca-cola 
bottles, and human skin.  Like Jameson’s turnips, these are objects as “shorn of 
their earlier life world as the pile of shoes” Resnais employed so vividly when 
filming the corridors of Auschwitz in 1955 (Figure 4).
38  To quote one of the 
earliest exchanges between Elle and Lui: 
 
Elle: I saw people walking round.  People walk pensively past 
photographs, reconstructions, since there is nothing else.  Photographs, 
photographs, reconstructions, since there is nothing else.  Descriptions, 
since there is nothing else.  Four visits to the museum in Hiroshima…It 
was hot in the Place de la Paix.  Ten Thousand degrees in the Place de la 
Paix.  That I know… 
Lui: You saw nothing in Hiroshima.  Nothing.
39
 
Despite the utter imprecision inherent in using such a term, the ‘soul’ 
has been scooped from the Image and replaced by a sense of emptiness and 
alienation that is ultimately rooted in Jameson’s “public History” of “blood, 
torture, death, and terror.”
40  Roots, which incidentally, we consistently strive 
to forget, ignore, dismiss, and/or expunge at the expense of our own past.
41  
What remains is a sense of flatness; or, what Jameson refers to as, “a new 
depthlessness, which finds its prolongation in contemporary ‘theory’ and in a 
whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum”.
42
                                                 
38 Nuit et brouillard, dir. Alain Resnais (1955). 
39 Hiroshima mon amour, dir. Alain Resnais (Argos Films, 1959).  For critical responses to 
Hiroshima mon Amour see: Bernard Pingaud, “Le temps – Dialectique de la mémoire et de 
l’oubli,” Tu n’as rien vu à Hiroshima (Bruxelles: Institut de Sociologie, 1962), pp. 89-112; 
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40 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pp. 6, 5.  
Note: I use ‘Image’ with a capital ‘I’ to denote the idea of the image, as opposed to one 
specific instance of imagery. 
41 As Claudia Springer explains: “Even our experience of space and time…has been 
transformed under postmodernism.  Time has collapsed into a perpetual present, in which 
everything from the past has been severed from its historical context in order to circulate anew 
in the present, devoid of its original meanings but contributing to the cluttered texture of our 
commodified surroundings.  The result…is historical amnesia, a lack of knowledge about the 
past that, in its pathological form, resembles the schizophrenic’s inability to remember 
anything and consequent inability to sustain a coherent identity” Claudia Springer, Electronic 
Eros: Bodies and Desire in the Postindustrial Age (London: Athlone Press, 1996), p. 40. 
42 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 6.   
Interestingly, Jameson then ties this sense of “depthlessness” and forgetting to a feeling of the 
sublime, writing: “…a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our relationship to public   16
Of course, nowhere is this connection more explicit than in the early 
pop art of Andy Warhol, because even though later pieces like Diamond Dust 
Shoes perfectly embody the qualities of the postmodern era, Warhol’s 
continual reproduction—and perhaps obsession!—with celebrities, 
commodities, sexuality, and death consistently speak to the origins of this new 
epoch, and to the body it produced.  As such, Jameson might be adamant that 
there is often “no way to complete the hermeneutic gesture and restore to these 
oddments [the]…larger lived context” from which they came, but in relation to 
much of Warhol’s early work, he is also wrong.
43  The Brillo pads, Campbell’s 
soup cans, green Coca-Cola bottles, Maytag savings signs, hot water heaters, 
Heinz tomato ketchup boxes, and Kellogg’s Corn Flakes packages produced in 
the early 1960s are more than just reproductions of “the great billboard 
images…[that] explicitly foreground the commodity fetishism of a transition to 
late capital.”
44  Instead, they constitute a reflection on the endless bric-a-brac 
coveted by—and orbiting around—the American nuclear family.  In fact, 
whether deliberate or inadvertent, Warhol’s Green Coca-Cola Bottles not only 
recall the “bouquets of bottle tops” created in Hiroshima in 1945 and filmed by 
Resnais in 1959, but also reconstruct those objects repeatedly, as if the factory, 
and perhaps the artist himself, were fruitlessly striving to understand and 
expunge the trauma of the atomic weaponry through the endless recreation of 
the same empty products (Figure 5).  Apparently, simulacrum seems to soothe 
and anesthetize, as well as alienate. 
Warhol’s replicas and silk-screened reproductions do not depict 
loose, unfastened, or free floating products.  Nor do they reproduce natural 
produce.  They are duplicates of bottles and boxes; objects processed by 
industry, and hermetically sealed under the pretence of protection.  They are 
physical coffers fashioned from wood and paint, or images rendered depthless 
by a system of production modelled on the American factory.  As such, all are 
containers consciously devoid of content.  Moreover, they are the husks that 
constitute the hollow centre of a culture founded on the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                           
History and in the new forms of our private temporality, whose ‘schizophrenic’ structure 
(following Lacan) will determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the more 
temporal arts; a whole new type of emotional ground tone…which can be best grasped by a 
return to older theories of the sublime”. 
43 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 8. 
44 Ibid, p. 9.   17
containment (Figure 6).
45  Indeed, in a fashion typical of Warhol, and perhaps 
of the postmodern, these are the containers contained by assortments of ever-
larger containers, since the Brillo boxes, Coke bottles, and Corn Flakes packets 
are continually enclosed by the borders of a slightly more expansive, but no 
less confining series of shells.  As Alan Nadel writes, 
 
shortly after the bomb initially exploded upon American consciousness…a 
national narrative developed to control the fear and responsibility endemic 
to possessing atomic power.  The central motif of that narrative was 
‘containment,’ in which insecurity was absorbed by internal security, 
internationalism by global strategy, apocalypse and utopia by a Christian 
theological mandate…
46
 
centred on the newly emerging network of independent breeding units 
otherwise known as the nuclear family.
47  To put it simply, the Brillo box is 
enclosed by the conjugal and familial limits of the new American home, which 
acts as the “universal” vessel for “democratic values,” which is controlled and 
contained by a “cult of domesticity” meant to “form a political and social 
container for the sexual energies of post-Word War II teenagers and young 
adults,” which is in turn “congruent to and commensurate with [U.S.] foreign 
and domestic policy [for] containing communism.”
48  All of which is enclosed 
one final time by the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957; a spheroid satellite 
that not only circumscribed the earth with repeated orbits, but also managed to 
contain the globe—metaphorically speaking—within its highly polished 
aluminium shell. 
Thus, in a rather strange, but overwhelming piece of Warholian irony, 
these bottles, boxes, and cereal packets comprise the empty core nestled at the 
heart of America’s impossibly huge Russian doll.  In fact, the Brillo box and 
Father appear to be the primary components comprising the nucleus of this 
                                                 
45 All of Warhol’s supermarket reproductions, such as the package of Brillo Pads, were hollow 
containers made from wood and paint.  Like all of Warhol’s work, interiority is consistently 
denied.  There is only the surface; content is not the point. 
46 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic 
Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 14. 
47 The term ‘nuclear family’ was originally coined in 1949 by American anthropologist, G.P. 
Murdock; marking the self-contained familial model to which it refers as a post-WWII 
invention.  For further reading on the history of the nuclear family see: G.P. Murdock, Social 
Structure (New York: MacMillan Co., 1949); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American 
Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988). 
48 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic 
Age, pp. xi, 117.   18
newly formed but confining America.  After all, consumer goods now stand 
beside nuclear weapons as the standard by which to measure the strength and 
prosperity of a democratic society, while the Laws of the white Father 
ceaselessly control the policies and procedures of both the home and the 
homeland (Figure 7).
49  Here, product becomes political panacea, while Adam 
is literally relabelled as Atom.  Subsequently, it seems both relevant and 
appropriate that the most recent exhibition of Warhol’s work should be 
branded SUPERNOVA, since the word connotes more than just stars, 
celebrity, and self-destruction, but also endings, emptiness, and a blinding 
white light, which although alluring, absolutely obliterates everything it 
illuminates.
50
In this sense, perhaps Peter Greenaway and Saskia Boddeke are right.  
Perhaps, we did abdicate our place in the chain of being over 60 years ago, by 
breaking away from the Father of all Men, in order to become the “Children of 
Uranium.”
51  Such a theory would certainly explain a prolonged obsession 
with the fragility and ontology of the human body over the last half century, 
and add some much needed context to continuing debates regarding the past, 
present, and possible future of the purely biological form.  It could also explain 
why this debate has recently been resurrected by a seemingly collective 
Western will after almost ten years of dormancy and/or stagnation, because 
even though a solid theorem elucidating the recent resurgence of prefixes such 
                                                 
49 The political roll of these products is emphasized by Richard Nixon’s bizarre debate with 
Nikita Khrushchev at the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow, where, as Elaine 
Tyler May writes: “Nixon extolled the virtues of the American way of life, while his opponent 
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point out the vulnerability of the United States in the event of a nuclear war between the 
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available in the atomic age.”  Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the 
Cold War Era, pp. 16-17.  For an excellent reading on the kitchen debate see: Beatriz 
Colomina, “Enclosed by Images: Architecture in the Post-Sputnik Age,” CTRL [SPACE]: 
Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother, ed. Thomas Y. Levin, Ursula Frohne, 
and Peter Weibel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 322-337. 
50 “Andy Warhol/Supernova: Stars, Deaths, and Disasters, 1962-1964,” Art Gallery of Ontario, 
curator David Cronenberg (July 8–October 22, 2006).  This exhibition was organized by the 
Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, USA, and traveled throughout North America. 
51 “The Children of Uranium,” Change performing Arts webpage, Accessed 18 April 2007: 
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as  posthuman,  transhuman, and inhuman continues to remain elusive, the 
elements which gave rise to this transformation on July 16, 1945 still manage 
to persist.  Furthermore, the recent revival of ontological uncertainty—at least 
in the Western world—could relate to the renewed threat of nuclear 
proliferation by so-called ‘rogue states.’  Producing a power shift that has 
initiated a newer, and seemingly, far more precarious version of the Cold War, 
in which almost every person with a claim on their respective countries seems 
capable of pressing the proverbial red button.  Ultimately, this latest 
resurgence probably stems from a blend of three elements, in which nuclear 
radiation, genetic manipulation, and environmental damage recombine to fuel 
pre-existing cultural anxieties over the stability—and possible death—of the 
human and humanism. 
Yet, whatever the reasons, and whatever the medley of fears and 
desires that these reservations reflect, all we really know is that texts which 
represent the present body, and which prophesize the future-human, continue 
to persist.  And that a vast majority of the scholarship designed to explicate 
this phenomenon consistently fails to produce any real insight, because most is 
written either with a sense of naiveté that borders on embarrassing, or in turn, 
assigns qualities to the present and potential body almost arbitrarily, in order to 
facilitate a personal and/or political agenda.
52  Whether deliberate or 
inadvertent, complacent or combative, all articles are derived directly from the 
ingrained—but invisible!—construction of “technology as…white 
mythology.”
53  As Joel Dinerstein writes: 
 
Technological progress has long structured Euro-American 
identity…[functioning] as a prop for a muted form of social Darwinism—
either ‘might makes right,’ or ‘survival of the fittest.’  Here is the techno-
cultural matrix: progress, religion, whiteness, modernity, masculinity, the 
future.
54
 
                                                 
52 To quote one overly enthusiastic PhD student: “At numerous gigs around Wellington [New 
Zealand] I played my drums and, under the lights, in the midst of sound, in the middle of 
rhythm…I theorized my relation to the drums, my becoming rhythm, the abstract-machine of 
player, stick and skin, my self as purely a conduit for other phyla.” Grayson Cooke, “Human-
1/ Cyborg-0: A Personal History of Human-machine Relation,” Nebula 3.1 (April, 2006), pp. 
19-20, Accessed 2 December 2006: http://www.nobleworld.biz/images/Cooke.pdf
53 Joel Dinerstein, “Technology and its Discontent: On the Verge of the Posthuman,” American 
Quarterly 58.3 (September 2006), p. 571. 
54 Ibid   20
Certainly, the transformations began by Trinity fall into this mould, as do our 
continuing attempts to explain the trajectory of those changes, since we 
consistently omit all references to any plausible point of origin.  Whiteness, 
hegemony, history, theology; all are seemingly irrelevant when describing a 
future wistfully devoid of such difference and dogma.  It is therefore 
immaterial that the genesis of this new postmodern, posthuman, and 
supposedly post-gendered epoch can be traced backward to a vanishing point, 
100 feet above the desert, on the outskirts of the Promised Land.
55  Indeed, 
even Donna Haraway, whose “Cyborg Manifesto” serves as the blueprint for 
all explorations of human-machine integration, is ultimately guilty of such 
assumptions, writing: 
 
This [essay]…is an effort to contribute to socialist-feminist culture and 
theory in a postmodernist, non-naturalist mode and in the utopian tradition 
of imagining a world without gender, which is perhaps a world without 
genesis, but maybe also a world without end.
56
 
Under this rubric, it is apparently inconsequential that staggered groups of 
privileged white men not only stood in awe before the production of such 
sublime radiance, but also meditated over a light stamped with the name of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.  As Haraway continues only a moment 
later: “The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of 
mud and cannot dream of returning to dust.”
57
Such dramatic and overreaching statements are clearly mistaken, as 
are the works of artists, writers, roboticists, and inventors who consistently 
ignore and/or elide the presence and consequences of a very bloody and 
problematic public History.  All are guilty of such historical disconnection, and 
all are complicit in a kind of revisionism based on omission, since well known 
figures like StelArc, Diane Greco, Hans Moravec, and Ray Kurzweil 
continually make either: a) no reference to any sort of techno-human lineage; 
or b) start “with the abstract idea of [the] Cyborg”, the human, and the 
posthuman, “and then [try] to work out [their idyllic] implications” without 
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56 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in 
the Late Twentieth Century,” Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature 
(London: Routledge, 1991), p. 150. 
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situating their arguments against a stable point of origin.
58  Thus, as N. 
Katherine Hayles writes: “Anything that [these terms] might be taken to mean 
becomes what [they] in fact [mean], as if the free play of the signifier 
translates instantaneously and effortlessly into physical and social realities.”
59  
By ignoring the genesis of the post, trans, and inhuman, or at least their point 
of crystallization within Western culture, in order to uphold some arbitrary 
notion that cyborg bodies and their related identities reject all reference to their 
roots, we are consistently reinforcing the concept of technology as white myth, 
as well as sabotaging the primary goal of such work.  Namely: positive social 
change through the formation of sense.  To put it simply, one must know the 
past in order to understand the realities of the present, as well as the 
possibilities for the future.  To do otherwise, is to “[theorize] in a void”, to 
produce no answers or even inklings, only circle upon circle, dizziness and 
disorientation as we attempt to advance without light, knowledge, memory, or 
myth.
60
 
0.3 Flashpoints 
 
At best, conjectural tomes exploring the limits of the present and potential 
human falsely define their arguments in relation to what writer R.W.B. Lewis 
calls, the “restoration of Adamic perfection, knowledge, and dominion, a 
return to Eden.”
61  Kurzweil, StelArc, and Joel Garreau happily embrace such 
a myth, although they seem to accept it either carelessly or unknowingly.
62  
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While Haraway, Hayles, Greco, and Elaine L. Graham constantly reject such a 
story in order to construct another narrative in direct opposition to 
representations of Eden and the Enlightenment.  As Haraway once remarked 
during an interview with Constance Penley: 
 
It’s the problem of being in the belly of the monster and looking for 
another story to tell…At a certain point you ask if there isn’t another set of 
stories you need to tell, another account of an unconscious.  One that does 
a better job of accounting for the subjects of history.
63
 
Unfortunately, Haraway’s theory establishes a very limiting and monolithic 
binary.  One which ironically, does not account for the “subjects of history”, 
nor the incredible reach with which those subjects are capable, because even 
though her “Manifesto” remains an extremely valuable call to technological 
arms for both women and non-whites, Haraway continually misreads the 
metaphor at the heart of her paper in the name of defiance, insubordination, 
revolution, and resignification.  Adam or not-Adam, these are the choices, and 
like all black and white articulations of enormously complex concerns, this too 
is erroneous, restrictive, and damaging.  To quote Marshall McLuhan in a 
slightly different context: “To give both sides…tends to ignore the possibility 
that there may be more sides than two.”
64
The following dissertation is an attempt to explore the complexities 
inherent within Western constructions of new human identities.  In particular: 
Euro-American representations of the cyborg body.  It will not offer solutions 
or seek to create new myths designed to liberate or enslave, but will instead 
chart the social, cultural, and political consequences of the only relevant 
cyborg story.  Namely: metamorphosis in the 20
th century.  Having said that, 
however, the arguments do not deal with myths of animal-human collusion, 
even though such stories speak to the existence of a parallel narrative, which 
interconnects with the following in the space of the cosmetics, pharmaceutical, 
and military laboratory. 
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Moreover, this project will not point a way out of the quagmire 
created by cyborg theory produced over the last thirty years.  Too much of that 
has already been done, and with little success, but will instead map the myth of 
human-machine integration in order to discern the complex political cargo 
which both infuses and surrounds the idea.  Subsequently, the arguments will 
draw on a wide variety of sources from a wide range of mediums; including 
literature, art, film, sculpture, and architecture.  In addition, it will reference 
and employ a selection of relevant theories from a number of theorists in order 
to elucidate the paper’s key points.  As a result, the arguments will remain 
unhindered by adherence to one particular viewpoint or philosophy, in the 
hopes that such an approach will release the work from the potential disaster of 
narrow thinking, as well as open the subject up to the possibility of wider 
cultural connection. 
The entry point of this discussion is an examination of the near-
sacrosanct nature of the cyborg’s body, and Western culture’s subsequent 
construction of that body as an opaque black box.  In taking this step, we will 
follow the critical methodology set out by Bruno Latour, who states that all 
facts, no matter how tidy, stem from a period of intense uncertainty, in which 
facts themselves do not necessarily emerge as truth, but instead have truth 
conferred upon them through general consensus from a relevant community.  
Subsequently, the basis of this dissertation derives from the following 
questions: when was the image effectively produced?  Why is it now 
considered subversive?  What are cyborg politics, and upon what are they 
based?  What is the ontology of the cyborg, and how does that affect not only 
its representation, but also its political affinities? 
To better investigate these queries, the following work is subdivided 
into three parts.  The first deals with the historical circumstance that not only 
produced contemporary understandings of the cyborg body, but which, even 
now, continue to inform representations of that image.  The second part 
investigates the political affinities of both that particular figure and time 
period, while the third and final section explores the body’s consistent links to 
glass and the mirror.  As such, history will precede theory so that any ensuing 
analysis will be substantiated by, as well as grounded in, historical fact.   24
Moreover, the numerous photographs, film stills, and reproductions 
found in the text have been packaged together at the end of the work.   
Although moving back and forth from paragraph to picture might be seen as 
inconvenient or disorienting, it is also important that these images remain 
juxtaposed so that the connections between them can be more easily 
recognized and understood.  It is also significant that certain literary works 
within this dissertation serve not just as textual examples, but also as 
theoretical tools for the lucid explication of especially difficult, or even 
intangible ideas.  Subsequently, Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) 
has been integrated throughout the text so that the author’s prose can 
consistently illuminate some of the cyborg’s more pressing features.  The same 
principle also applies to the rather extensive footnotes which characterize this 
work, because even though some are relatively large, each demonstrate that the 
images and ideas contained herein have consequences beyond the arguments 
discussed. 
However, of the many relevant films, novels, and art pieces available, 
this dissertation only discusses a handful, and “for every privileged event” or 
text “examined in detail, I ignore countless more”.
65  The only suitable excuse 
springs from the work of historian Alan Nadel, who writes: 
 
These omissions were not simply caused by space constraints, although 
given my topic I certainly could never escape those…even infinite space 
would provide enough space.  History is a cipher for omission, and the 
process of representation is never one of proportionality, but of 
narrativity.
66
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Part 1: Cyborgs in the Making 
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1: Explosive Propositions: Cyborgs, Sudden Death, and the 
Issue of Textual Examination 
 
“What is a historical fact?  It is after the fact.”
67
 
1.1 Appearance 
 
In the desert beyond the limits of L.A., in a landscape part real and part 
realistic, bolts of lighting flash and curl, blasting outward from a central nexus 
until the air itself ruptures and congeals into the glassy spectre of a silver 
sphere (Figure 8).  Abandoned by time, or America—or is it Hollywood?—this 
mirrored ball sits on a readymade set of burning bushes and scorched earth.  Its 
movie-produced material dropped amid a hail of fire and light as if the object’s 
cleverly crafted corpus was designed to mimic the particulars of a specific 
man-made spectacle.  Producing a recreation that (totally) recalls a vision of 
“that weird peeled eyeball exploding over the desert”; that violent burst of 
atoms and light, which like Wallace Stevens and his Jar, once forced the whole 
world to rise, surround, and submit.
68
At the heart of this computer generated simulation sits the naked but 
flawless form of Arnold Schwarzenegger.  Reborn and returned to us for the 
third time, Schwarzenegger arrives as the Terminator.  The infamous cyborg 
who for twenty years has not only been configured as the Germanic hypocenter 
of an American will to power, but also as a harbinger who drags behind him 
the conjoined spectre of atomic Armageddon, and the purity of Aryan physical 
perfection.  Schwarzenegger is not simply the face of a looming but fictional 
techno-revolution, but the mythical echo of the Manhattan Project, Operation 
Paperclip, and their factual legacies of American techno-supremacy. 
As the smoke clears, and the lightning subsides, a figure slowly rises 
from a crater surrounded by fire.  Beyond the rim, Joshua trees blaze and pop, 
while inside the sealed limits of the circle itself, the sand has been superheated 
into a warped plate of murky grey glass.  With his cyborg body now safely 
resurrected on the jagged shards of a broken mirror, Schwarzenegger stands, 
stares, and strides beyond the camera frame; the newly made silicate now 
crunching beneath his feet.  Reprogrammed and ready to kill, or maybe this 
                                                 
67 Laurence Rickels, The Vampire Lectures (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999), p. 1. 
68 Don DeLillo, Underworld (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 51.   27
time just to maim, he appears just as he has countless times before; biceps 
straining; ready to pose.  His relentless T-101 punched out like yet another 
duplicate in an endless stream of uncontrollable cyborg simulacra.  Bodies, 
which like the endless products of postmodernity, and the promised apocalypse 
of the Cold War, are not necessarily evidence of inevitable de-centering, but 
perhaps more crucially, figures and events which warn against the inherent 
devastation that comes from the manufacture of one centre too many.  1984, 
1991, and (finally?) 2003; in the desert between L.A. and Las Vegas, between 
the Ocean and Alamogordo, stalk the embodied specters of the bomb.
69  
Characters that not only manufacture metaphors and secrets, both open and 
invisible, but armored things that perpetuate a series of intertwined cultural 
narratives, whose very connections are consistently overlooked by the 
dominant myths of American history.  As author Don DeLillo notes in his 
1997 novel, Underworld: “What secret history are they writing?  There is the 
secret of the bomb and there are secrets that the bomb inspires, things even 
[Hoover] cannot guess”.
70
 
1.2 Alert 
 
Inevitably, all cyborg theory is based on a single certifiable fact: that a cyborg 
is a hybrid of machine and organism.  As such, everything comes from this 
seemingly secure point of reference, because while speculations regarding the 
cyborg’s political leanings, as well as its evolutionary and philosophical 
implications are varied and uncertain, the basic structure of the cyborg has 
always been protected, locked, absolute, its ontology generally ignored; its 
entire existence and the politics therein based upon a belief in one simple 
equation: Organic + Inorganic = Cyborg.  On the surface, reliance on such a 
theorem seems stable enough.  Its validity is almost incontestable.  Yet, taking 
the structure of the cyborg as a certainty is not without serious consequence, 
because by solely investigating the cultural repercussions that spring from the 
union of organic and inorganic, and by extension, ignoring the relationship 
between those components, cyborg scholars have missed a profound point.   
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That ultimately, it is not only simplistic to assume the combination of two 
binaries will result in the creation of a new and revolutionary whole, but more 
importantly, that it is also dangerous to presume cyborgs somehow elide our 
suspicions, because they do not fully occupy either of those binaries.  Man and 
machine mix and merge, but the processes which give rise to such a potent 
synthesis of the living and the lifeless are somehow lost in its manufacture. 
After all, Haraway describes the cyborg as a figure which has made 
“thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and 
body, self-developing and externally designed.”
71  While others like Jonathan 
Goldberg have expanded upon those ideas to suggest that such ambiguities not 
only demand current conceptions of the body be refashioned to accommodate 
this new ontological equality, but actually “displace the question of sexual 
difference, [by marking] it [as] elsewhere and otherwise.”
72  Power, gender, 
self, and Other; all are apparently irrelevant in a world where bodies lose all 
sense of boundary.  The ideal somehow subverting the real as Haraway’s 
“traditions of ‘Western’ science and politics…of racist, male dominated 
capitalism” mysteriously dissolve in the continuing merger of white man and 
war machine.
73  The problems of liberal humanism ostensibly nullified in the 
representation of its ‘post,’ as if a body predicated upon disjunction and 
fracture could forever shatter the image of cohesion normally generated by the 
Ego, and thereby dislocate the body itself from previous conceptions of the so-
called ‘natural hierarchy’ by purporting a subjective stance that views the 
social, cultural, political, psychological, and even the physical qualities that 
make up humanity, as disembodied, transferable, negotiable.  Here, the body of 
the cyborg, poster child for the posthuman, successor to the subjects of the 
Enlightenment, and apparent death knell to the Age of Reason, seemingly 
elides all descriptions of Man and his place, in favour of a far more inclusive 
discourse about the Human and its limits.  As Elaine L. Graham writes: the 
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cybernetic evokes a “human subject dismantled and demolished; a human 
whose integrity is violated, a human identity whose boundaries are breached 
from all sides’…by a technology that encroaches, invades and dismembers.”
74  
The penetrative and decidedly invasive nature of bio-mechanical integration 
somehow appealing to the basest part of human desire, as the act of 
amalgamation extends the Terminator’s promise of immortality, superiority, 
and the potential for both unlimited power and endless pleasure, to only those 
smart enough to appreciate the venture.  Behold the glib irony of the pop artist, 
and what is now almost certainly, the sincere battle-cry of the contemporary 
futurist: “I want to be a machine.”
75
Like the muscled figure of Schwarzenegger’s Terminator, the public 
face of such Darwinian ideals is always the same.
76  People are either 
improved through the integration of mechanical appendages, or replaced by 
brand new shells made of untarnished steel.  In the latter case, personal 
consciousness is liberated from the limitations of the body, as the remaining 
“meat” is discarded in favour of that which is not only beautiful, but also 
powerful, perfect, and permanent.  The individual’s corporeal existence now 
bordering on the fantasy of ethereal omnipresence, as the embodied subject is 
continually discarded in lieu of biology’s increasing obsolescence.  Roboticist 
Hans Moravec maintains that a neural network of electric sparks constitutes 
the only true and/or relevant component comprising both personal 
consciousness, and its resultant humanity.
77  Comparatively, scientist Andy 
Clark insists that the brain itself has outgrown its “biological skinbag”, and 
that such a dynamic and self-contained system cannot be “bound and 
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restricted”—at least not anymore.
78  Indeed like Moravec, Clark “thinks of 
himself less ‘as a physical presence than [as]…a kind of rational or intellectual 
[apparition].’”
79  Similar ideals also spring from figures like Ray Kurzweil, 
who also believe in the frictionless transfer of personal subjectivity, and 
authors such as William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and their throng of Sci-Fi 
followers, whose cyberpunk protagonists are often nothing more than 
phantoms; ghosts who willingly trap themselves inside the endless landscape 
of the virtual.
80  In the words of Haraway: 
 
Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean 
because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of 
the spectrum…People are nowhere near so fluid, being both material and 
opaque.  Cyborgs are ether, quintessence.
81
 
Given the consistency of such representation, human-machine amalgamations 
are comprised not just of skin and alloy, circuits and signals, images and 
Lacanian “imaginaries,” but parallel to the cyborg’s contemporary 
manifestation as super-powered killing machine, they are also ‘bodies of light’ 
consistently endowed with no more substance than a spirit, but all the powers 
of a sorcerer, or a god.  In fact, whether a person is transfigured into an ‘angel’ 
both luminous and ethereal, or replaced by ‘tank’ both commanding and 
corporeal, what follows is not only identical, but also inescapable as the 
ensuing transformation consistently signifies a misguided attempt to achieve a 
stainless existence.  A kind of evolutionary peak in which all flaws are 
expunged and all limitations transcended, as if the future of the human now 
held the perfection of heaven itself; forever marking the incredible potential of 
participatory evolution with a distressing mixture of religious excitement and 
fervent confusion.  To quote the Dutch-American abstract painter, Willem de 
Kooning, on the spectacle unleashed by Los Alamos, Hiroshima, and 
Nagasaki: 
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some people think that the light of the atomic bomb will change the 
concept of painting once and for all.  The eyes that actually saw the light 
melted out of sheer ecstasy.  For one instant, everyone was the same 
colour.  It made angels out of everybody.
82
 
Today, such persistent affirmations are becoming near-clichés; tired phrases 
expressing worn-out ideas all drawn from the same superficial beginnings.   
Because despite the current and correct impulse to recognize the relationships 
between two poles previously thought of as separate, most research 
investigating the connections between the body and technology, the mind and 
the machine, still fails to explore the nature of organic-inorganic integration 
beyond that of a simple surface reading.  Privileging manner over method, 
potential over politics, ideal over real; presenting only the utopian perspective, 
as the vast majority of contemporary cyborg scholarship continues to focus 
solely—and wrongly!—on the figure’s supposedly subversive effects on the 
social systems found in both material reality and modern fiction, rather than 
the decidedly dangerous consequences derived from the culture’s consistent 
representation of cyborg origins and their resultant ontology.  Sexuality and the 
socio-political consequences of late capital, these are the issues at hand; falsely 
rendering the merger immaterial, since all that matters are the visible results. 
Hence, while cybernetics is certainly a combination of biological and 
mechanical, and while its effects on the culture are certainly worth studying, 
one must acknowledge that a truly viable reading of the man-machine can 
never be produced if one simply assumes the image is nothing more than the 
sum of its parts.  In short, without a serious investigation of those parts, such a 
reading can only produce a serious misreading. 
Ironically, the primary metaphor for such assumptive reasoning flows 
directly from the science of cybernetics.  More specifically: from the theory of 
‘black box’ thinking and its ensuing expression of complex systems as a single 
but simple variable.  The term ‘black box’ refers to a device or system when 
that object or arrangement is viewed primarily in terms of its input and output 
characteristics.  As such, the black box is ultimately a fiction designed to 
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simplify complex systems so that its nature and effects can be explained, 
manipulated, and understood.  Even prior to the theory’s eventual articulation 
in the mid 20
th century, black boxes have not only had a profound influence on 
the way in which we view the world, but also in how we explore and describe 
it, because just as the engineer or the physicist segments vast amounts of data 
into tidy units of measurement, so are huge systems of information and history 
thrust into cultural signs both verbal and visual. 
Pioneering British cyberneticist, W. Ross Ashby, has done more than 
most to develop and implement the idea of blackboxing within the science of 
cybernetics.  For, as well as devoting a lengthy section to the subject in An 
Introduction to Cybernetics (1956), he is also responsible for the Law of 
Requisite Variety, and the invention of the Homeostat.  The former is a lasting 
theoretical tool which has since become “the most famous (and some would 
say only successful) principle of cybernetics recognized by the 
whole…Systems Science community”, while the latter is a black box in 
physical form that randomly reconfigures itself in response to received inputs, 
and is a device which Norbert Wiener would later describe “as one of the great 
philosophical contributions of the present day.”
83  However, in the context of 
this discussion, we can ignore Ashby’s technical innovations and instead focus 
on his theoretical models.  Thus, when writing on the concept of black box 
thinking in 1956 Ashby explained its use as such: 
 
Were the engineer to treat bridge-building by a consideration of every atom 
he would find the task impossible by its very size.  He therefore ignores the 
fact that his girders and blocks are really composite, made of atoms, and 
treats them as his units…It will be seen therefore that the method of 
studying very large systems by studying only carefully selected aspects of 
them is simply what is always done in practice.
84
 
The cyborg is of course no exception to the pervasive and problematic use of 
such a system, because the field which gave rise to such a pervasive and 
problematic self is also based on the use of those constructions.  Indeed, 
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articulations of that self would become incomprehensible without such 
profound simplification, because even when like materials are combined to 
create an overall whole, generalizations are essential for completion and 
understanding.  Thus, to extend and slightly skew the words of French 
intellectual, Bruno Latour: 
 
no matter how controversial [the cyborg’s] history, how complex [its] inner 
workings, how large the commercial or academic networks that hold [the 
image] in place, only [its] input and output count.  When you [turn] on 
your computer it runs the programs you load; when you compare nucleic 
acid sequences you start from the double helix shape 
 
And when you investigate the socio-political effects of the cyborg body you 
begin with the aforementioned equation.
85
Such a perspective is extremely misleading, not to mention 
damaging, because it leaves the cyborg itself safe from examination, and 
creates a very large question mark at the base of its supposed study: a query 
which, according to Ashby, is supposedly irrelevant in the field of cybernetics, 
and apparently by extension, within contemporary cyborg theory: 
 
Many a book has borne the title “Theory of Machines”, but it usually 
contains information about mechanical things, about levers and cogs. 
Cybernetics, too, is a “theory of machines”, but it treats, not things but 
ways of behaving. It does not ask “what is this thing?” but “what does it 
do?”
86
 
Unfortunately, Ashby’s query leads only to fallacy when solely applied to the 
image of the cyborg body, because by inferring ontology from perceived 
actions, instead of investigating origin and structure from available 
representations, cyborg scholars produce only guesswork and estimations.   
After all, the body of the posthuman is more than just a thing or an object.  It is 
also an idea, a concept, and more importantly an inherently unstable, 
politically loaded cultural metaphor that can produce an equal number of 
readings and misreadings as there are people deciphering that metaphor.  As 
such, one must not ask “what does it do,” but rather, “what is this thing, and 
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how does that affect what it does,” in order to ground any subsequent analyses 
in something besides faith, or historical inertia. 
Naturally, the latter question is not an easy one to answer.  Like all 
black boxes, a cyborg cannot and should not be opened, at least not after that 
particular device has been sealed through its emergent status as accepted fact.  
To do so is to invite disaster, because just as Latour uses the image of a DNA 
molecule to illustrate the chaotic complexities inherent in all dark structures, a 
cyborg will also, if unlocked, suddenly release the countless intricacies 
contained therein.  Allowing them to rush out, overwhelm, and obscure any 
attempt at a cohesive analyses, since conventional theoretical assumptions 
regarding the cyborg’s structure, liminality, and political leanings are 
completely undermined as soon as one chooses to dissect the image in order to 
understand its ontology.  Like the multiple hybrids and would be messiahs that 
attack the Terminator, visible penetration of the cyborg is not only tantamount 
to releasing chaos incarnate, but its ensuing detonation is also an echo, 
producing broken bodies which act as yet another reminder of what can happen 
when one delves too deeply into the explosive space of the man-machine; 
progeny of the bomb.  For as it was with Pandora’s Box, just as it is with every 
subsequent back box, the cyborg reads: “DANGER: DO NOT OPEN.”
87
 
1.3 Access 
 
Consider representations of cyborg death both filmic and writerly, or the point 
at which its skin is pierced by some outside force.  In Ridley Scott’s Blade 
Runner (1982) “skinjobs” screech and convulse after gunfights with Deckard, 
while in Robocop 2 (1990), the protagonist is not only blown apart on screen, 
but his insides are scattered across most of the city block where his body is 
destroyed.  In T2: Judgment Day (1991), the surface of Schwarzenegger’s 
newest enemy is breached irreparably by Arnold’s inferior T800.  Blasting the 
evil cyborg in all directions as its body is transformed into an open and 
distended wound.  Moreover, Schwarzenegger’s Terminator then kicks his 
opponent into an open vat of boiling steel where it not only screams and 
thrashes wildly, but also cycles through every form it has ever assumed before 
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melting away completely into nothing.  The subject’s detonation allowing 
whatever truth that lay in the centre of that self to disappear completely, as the 
body is burnt up or mutilated at the instant of exposure.
88  Take the death of 
Pris Stratton, the cybernetic double of the android, Rachael Rosen, in Philip K. 
Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep: 
 
[Deckard] fired…as…she dashed toward him.  The android burst and parts 
of it flew; he covered his face and then looked again, looked and saw the 
laser tube which it had carried roll away, back onto the stairs; the metal 
tube bounced downward, step by step, the sound echoing and diminishing 
and slowing.
89
 
Deckard fires, Pris explodes, and everything that burst forth from her body at 
the moment of death is obscured by the spectacle itself.  Her very form blown 
to bits, leaving only the phallus she had assumed in life to pop out, fall, and 
clink slowly into the dark. 
Here, in that moment where the body is breached, representations of 
human-machine integration will either: a) spew incessantly; b) convulse 
violently; or c) simply detonate in reaction to a perceived violation.
90  I n  
almost every case, the results are catastrophic, or at the very least grotesque, 
often culminating in an explosive reaction which reveals very little and 
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obscures even more.
91  This risk of sudden disclosure is the danger inherent in 
all black boxes.  It is also part of their power, because in breaching the surface 
of such a construction, one not only releases every doubt, every debate, and 
every difficulty which first prompted the production of such a device, but also 
the many social biases and political issues instilled by the era in which that box 
was produced.  In such a scenario, breaching the surface in order to expose or 
understand is anything but revealing, because by disclosing the image’s 
internal make-up, one is merely transforming an already established system 
into something chaotic, unintelligible, and completely uncontrollable.  To 
recall Latour, historical “context” and socio-political “content” do not simply 
“merge” in the image of an exploding body, but also burst forth and flow 
endlessly at the first sign of puncture.
92
The 1973 novel Gravity’s Rainbow by Thomas Pynchon contains one 
of the more remarkable cases of a crazed, damaged, and/or explosive cyborg 
body, as well as one of Western culture’s more oblique references to human-
machine integration, as the idea itself is masked behind an obscure visual 
known only as the “Schwarzgerät”.
93  Literally, the term translates as ‘black 
device,’ and is the centre of yet another unknown; specifically, Pynchon’s 
reinterpretation of the V2 Rocket.  An object both real and fictitious, with 
proportions both mythic and mysterious, producing a weapon that is not simply 
a Schwarzgerät in its own right, but also a container containing the contents of 
yet another container.  Its matryoshka-like structure not only recalling, but also 
prefiguring both the coming culture of the Cold War, and the missiles which 
facilitated the globe’s transformation into a far larger version of London near 
the end of World War II.  As Pynchon writes: 
 
[The Rocket] comes as the Revealer.  Showing that no society can protect, 
never could—they are as foolish as shields of paper…Before the Rocket 
we went on believing, because we wanted to.  But the Rocket can 
penetrate…We can’t believe Them anymore.  Not if we are still sane and 
love the truth.
94
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Pynchon’s V2 comes to us “as the Revealer.”  It proves that “nowhere is safe,” 
that nothing is certain, and that society itself is a mere “structure of lies” 
designed to comfort those it cannot protect.
95  Indeed, like its future 
incarnation in the shell of the ICBM—child of Trinity, descendant of 
Germany—the Rocket also revels in assaulting the validity of an existing, but 
now obsolete perception of human ontology.  The notion of worldwide 
rehabilitation and even social resurrection under the nightmare of Armageddon 
now deemed an invalid form of hope.  The Rocket can penetrate.  It destroys 
without effort. 
Given the sense of devastation and irreparable damage caused by the 
missiles launched from Peenemünde, it should be no surprise that the nihilistic 
qualities of Wernher Von Braun’s innovations should also apply to the Rocket 
itself, because even though the missile comes to us as the Revealer, ironically 
enough, it also refuses to be revealed.  Since the elements ensconced within its 
interior, and the mysteries controlling its operation, are destroyed at the 
moment of disclosure.  Its contents irreversibly obscured at the point of 
revelation.  Like the image of a blast crater, there is no object in the centre of 
that devastation.
  96  No answer to the unknown hole inside the Rocket’s 
checkered shell.  There is only the “aftermath,” since any breach to an existing 
V2 yields nothing but wreckage orbiting an empty pit.
97  Everything is 
exposed in a single instant.  Expelling mass sections of knowledge and power 
that mix and collide violently before they too dissipate under the “powdery 
wipe of Nothing’s hand.”
98  Recall the futile efforts of Tyrone Slothrop, as he 
searches fruitlessly for the centre of the Schwarzgerät: 
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It’s nothing he can see or lay hands on—sudden gases, a violence upon the 
air and no trace afterward…a Word, spoken with no warning into your ear, 
and then silence forever.  Beyond its invisibility, beyond hammerfall and 
doomcrack, here is its real horror, mocking, promising him death with 
German and precise confidence, laughing at all of Tantivy’s quiet 
decencies…no, no bullet with fins, Ace…not the Word, the one Word that 
rips apart the day…
99
 
Despite the Schwarzgerät’s inherent volatility, there is a way to 
investigate the ontology of any black box without risking the construction’s 
total annihilation, because if the cyborg is indeed a similar device, then any 
meaningful analysis of the man-machine should employ a methodology 
appropriate to such a construction.  As Ashby writes, “[i]n our daily lives we 
are confronted at every turn with systems whose internal mechanisms are not 
fully open to inspection, and which must be treated by the methods 
appropriate”.
100  Even though Ashby remains largely silent on the issue of 
“appropriate” inspection, especially in relation to metaphorical or non-
technical manifestations of the black box, it is Latour who identifies the 
necessary methodology, lauding a technique which avoids any potential chaos 
by moving backward in time, to a point before closure, before certainty, before 
the elements surrounding the creation of a specific fact colluded into a named 
structure with definitive actions and characteristics.  As Latour declares: 
 
The impossible task of opening a black box is made feasible (if not easy) 
by moving in time and space until one finds the controversial topic on 
which scientists and engineers are busy at work.  This is the first decision 
we have to make: our entrance into science and technology will be through 
the back door…not through the more grandiose entrance of ready made 
science.
101
 
By stepping through “the back door of science in the making,” we can bear 
witness to the cyborg’s construction, and thereby watch something akin to 
‘cyborgs in the making.’  Indeed, by using Latour’s method we can expose and 
understand the cultural framework by which that body was created, and more 
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importantly, account for the social values and political ideals that were instilled 
prior to the subject’s eventual closure.
102
Even Gravity’s Rainbow, a book published almost fifteen years before 
Science in Action, follows the trajectory described by Latour, since the secrets 
of Pynchon’s missile are not disclosed until the end of the novel.  Creating a 
‘moment of truth’ in which the reader is not only allowed to view the industrial 
assembly of the final V2, but also encouraged to experience the moments prior 
to its eventual closure in the most appropriate manner possible.  Pynchon 
depicts the coming revelation as if it were an explosion in reverse, exposing 
the Schwarzgerät’s interior, and the disparate parts of Rocket 00000, as the bits 
of a broken missile seem to collapse in on one another, falling “in a 
geographical way, a Diaspora running backwards, seeds of exile flying 
inwards in a modest preview of gravitational collapse, of the Messiah 
gathering in the fallen sparks”, until eventually, time and space recede in, 
toward the instant of birth, otherwise known as “pre-launch.”
103
The ensuing scene reveals far more than just the origins of the Rocket 
itself, but also the pseudo-erotic rituals of a ceremonial rebirth focused through 
the overtly political lenses of racial purity, biological supremacy, masculine 
sexuality, and most importantly, the image of death both ‘little’ and ‘mega.’  
For the Schwarzgerät within Pynchon’s V2 is not black at all, but rather a 
white man, wrapped in white film, lodged in the centre of a white womb.  He 
is more than just a human payload, but also the racial epicentre of Western 
society.  The beating heart of a racist, patriarchal, humanist culture, placed 
inside the parabolic arc of a proto-typical ICBM.
104  Moreover, he is a body 
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firmly prefigured not only as the technological prelude to the coming Cold 
War, but also as a manifestation of the immense ‘wargasms’ that will 
inevitably follow.
105  Pynchon’s black box represents a black future.  The end 
of everything facilitated—funnily enough—by the apparent hyper-sexuality of 
a Western white man.  Pynchon writes: 
 
A giant white fly: an erect penis buzzing in white lace, clotted with blood 
or sperm.  Deathlace is the boy’s bridal costume.  His smooth feet bound 
side by side, are in white satin slippers with white bows…The golden hairs 
on his back, alloyed German gold, pale yellow to white, run symmetric 
about his spine, run in arches fine and whirled…Each freckle or mole is a 
precisely-set anomaly in the field…He is gagged with a white kid 
glove…The glove is the female equivalent of the Hand of Glory, which 
second-story men use to light their way into your home: a candle in a dead 
man’s hand, erect as all your tissue will grow at the first delicious tongue 
flick of your mistress Death.  The glove is the cavity into which the Hand 
fits, as the 00000 is the womb into which Gottfried returns.
106
 
Cavities are filled, throats are gagged, and vessels both biological and 
mechanical are slowly packed with their corresponding payload.   
Homoeroticism abounds but then so does the far more conventional spectre of 
heterosexual intercourse, exposing the Schwarzgerät as something that is not 
simply penetrative, and therefore highly sexualized, but more problematically, 
as an object which assumes the qualities of both a penis and a recently 
ejaculated pool of semen.  Each of which are sealed inside the form of a much 
larger phallus, as if the material amalgamation of man and machine were 
analogous to that of an empty gun transforming into a “cocked” and loaded 
weapon.  Like a bullet sliding into the chamber of a corresponding pistol, 
phallus penetrates phallus until both are primed for an act of explosive 
ejaculation. 
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Clearly, the V2 and its interlocking Schwarzgerät are more than just 
innocuous manifestations of the cybernetic body, but also highly provocative 
images loaded with very specific racial affinities, sexual signifiers, and 
political leanings.  Associations that unfortunately, do not conflate, confuse, 
subvert, and/or reassemble what we think of as social reality or lived 
experience, nor provide “new way[s] to conceive of power and identity.”
107  
On the contrary, Pynchon’s Rocket merely reinforces what so many cyborg 
theorists are desperately trying to escape.  Namely: the old phallogocentric 
ideologies of patriarchal oppression and racial supremacy.  Elements that 
would almost certainly have remained obscure, if not for Pynchon’s return to a 
point before “the open controversies” of human-machine integration were 
transformed into the closed construct of a sealed black box.
108  T o  d o  
otherwise is to “poke about” as Slothrop does, desperately striving to 
reconstruct an image from its own waste without any clue as to how the 
original once looked.
109
Like the plot of Gravity’s Rainbow, World War II is also our starting 
point.  Ground 00000 for the V2, the nuclear age it would eventually spawn, 
and the creature they would both generate.  After all, it was the work of 
Norbert Wiener and his contemporaries during the early 1940s, which laid the 
foundation for the burgeoning field of cybernetics.
110  The scientific basis that 
would later form the theoretical core of the living cyborg, or the sealed 
Schwarzgerät we have subsequently labeled as such.  Thus, like early 
articulations of the Gothic body, and their subsequent “ruination of traditional 
constructs of human identity at the fin-de-siecle”, the Second World War, and 
the period immediately following, represents a time in which the stability and 
integrity of the human were transformed into subjects akin to the psychotic, the 
mutant, and “the abhuman.”  Or, what Kelly Hurley refers to specifically as, 
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“the body metamorphic and undifferentiated.”
111  Bear in mind, even though 
prior manifestations of the cybernetic also dealt with similar issues regarding 
the ontological erosion of organic and inorganic, and although Liberal-
Humanist concepts regarding the human form were already weakened by the 
influence of industrialisation, as well as the wartime horrors of 1914-1919.  It 
was the dangerous combination of world-ending politics and eye-melting mega 
death that instigated the necessary collusion of science and culture, human and 
machine, ideal and real, into a singular image purporting a singular purpose.  
From Schwarzgerät to Schwarzenegger, it was the epoch’s potent combination 
of sex, death, and unimaginable violence that not only initiated the cyborg’s 
spectacular production, but also its near disappearance in the popular 
imagination: its ubiquity thereby facilitating the image’s ensuing transparency.  
As Slavoj Zizek writes: 
 
the proper place to begin [any analysis] is the very beginning, more 
precisely: the point just prior to it, the ultimate stage of 
‘prehistory’…where things are still visible [and] which, a moment later 
become invisible.
112
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2: Mutual Orientation: Science, Cybernetics, and the 
Bodies of the Cold War 
 
2.1 Porous Boundaries 
 
Cybernetics was created in the early 1940s to encompass control and 
communication in the animal and the machine, and is a science born from the 
need “to create and assist” in the mechanization of “military tasks previously 
performed by human beings.”
113  As Paul Edwards writes in his book, The 
Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, 
 
complete automation of these activities—such as aiming antiaircraft guns 
or planning air defense tactics—was not a realistic possibility in the 1940s 
and 1950s.  Instead computers would perform a task while humans, often 
in intimate linkage with the machines, did the rest.
114
 
For such an amalgam to be successful, man-machine “integration required that 
people and machines be comprehended in similar terms, so that human-
machine systems could maximize the performance of both components.”
115  
As such, “a general mathematical theory of self-regulating mechanisms, [was 
designed to] transcend the boundary via the concept of feedback”; specifically, 
the concept of negative feedback or “circular self-corrective cycles, in which 
information about the effects of an adjustment to a dynamic system is 
continuously returned to that system as input,” so that it can then instigate and 
regulate the next adjustment.
116  Any person operating a system built under the 
guidance of cybernetics was now seen as an indivisible component of that 
exchange; man and machine operating as one, linked together as 
interpenetrated systems sharing information and energy.  Subsequently, 
scientific ideas regarding the differences between organic and inorganic were 
no longer governed by words like ‘alive’ or ‘inanimate’, because “a uniform 
behaviouristic analysis [was now] applicable to both machines and living 
organisms, regardless of…complexity.”
117  Such a science meant that people 
and machinery could be studied, adjusted, integrated, and transformed in 
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exactly the same ways, because the broad classes of behaviour governing the 
biological and the mechanical were now identical, due in large part to the 
articulation and use of black box theory. 
The use of the black box and other cybernetic principles had a number 
of significant socio-political impacts.  The most important being the essential 
transformation of the human body into an incredibly porous form filled with 
huge metaphorical holes through which data and energy could be transferred 
and shared with all sorts of mechanical counterparts.  Due to Wiener’s science 
and Ashby’s ideas, there were no longer any clear distinctions separating 
objects living and dead, animate and inanimate, because the material 
boundaries which contained each were now irrelevant under both the systems 
of cybernetics and the gaze of the cybernetician.  A combination which not 
only effaced the objects themselves, since both human and machine were 
symbolically transformed into a pair of indistinguishable constructions, but one 
which also produced a major conceptual shift in our subsequent understanding 
of each part.  After all, under such a scenario, relationship supersedes 
everything as the black boxes contained therein are essentially transformed 
from two distinct ontological entities, into a single conduit designed for 
connection and exchange.  As Ashby writes: 
 
The theory of the Black Box is merely the theory of real objects or 
systems, when close attention is given to the question, relating object and 
observer, about what information comes from the object, and how it is 
obtained.  Thus, the theory of the Black Box is simply the study of the 
relations between the experimenter and his environment, when special 
attention is given to the flow of information.
118
 
If the analysis ended here then most formulations of both cyborg ontology and 
cyborg politics would be indisputable.  Their logic based in sound reasoning 
and historical fact, because under such a system any material barriers 
separating human from machine would become meaningless, and thus any 
previous concepts regarding the ontology of either would be utterly destroyed.  
Concordantly, the physical boundaries which define and separate all things 
would continue to erode until the disparities divorcing each soon became non-
existent or immaterial; their corporeal autonomy now subordinate to the data 
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flowing between them.  Subsequently, contemporary theories declaring the 
cyborg a subversive figure, or correspondingly, as humanity’s evolutionary 
heir, would become feasible, because when examined through a cursory 
understanding of cybernetics the cyborg suddenly has the potential to alter not 
only what we think of as ‘human,’ but to also revolutionize the political values 
inherent to that human form.
119  Such integration could render all humanist 
ideas about the supremacy of ‘Man’ obsolete, since “any imagined state of 
purity and fixity” would in turn, become “a fiction.”
120  Thus, the body would 
no longer be considered impenetrable or whole, nor its form impervious to 
change or alteration, because any clear delineation between “agent and object, 
external and internal, organic and artificial” would no longer exist.  To 
paraphrase Elaine L. Graham: “We [could] no longer rely…on such 
distinctions to demarcate the normatively ‘human’ as an enclave against the 
non-human.”
121
Unfortunately, a number of cultural theorists have ended their analyses 
here, and proposed that the growing influence of digital computing, along with 
the exponential increase in technological growth, both in medicine and 
manufacturing, have led to the death of the Liberal-Humanist subject.   
Essentially stating, that ‘Man’ as a socio-political entity died with the 
pacemaker, since according to scholars like N. Katherine Hayles, “the age of 
the human has [now] given way to the posthuman.”
122  Thus, just as Classical 
“theories of representation and language, of the natural orders, and of wealth 
and value” changed entirely “from the nineteenth century onward,” so have 
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their humanist successors at the end of the 20th.
123  Moravec, Hayles, Gray, 
and Graham; each assert that the conceptual framework, which Michel 
Foucault once traced back to the Enlightenment, is now crumbling due to its 
alleged subversion by newer theories drawn from more aggressive 
technologies.
124
However, such a reading is also shallow and simplistic, because even 
though the study of production has indeed given way to the investigation of 
reproduction—of simulacra—and although the effects of cybernetics have 
infected and permanently sullied the purely biological, nothing has changed.  
Rather than succumbing to erasure, “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge 
of the sea”, the porous bodies currently saturating Western culture still 
exemplify the same problematic political affinities, as well as the same social 
inequalities championed by their more ‘solid’ humanist predecessors.
125  
Indeed, if the cyborg is a gauge by which to measure such a massive social 
shift, and if cybernetic principles are the means by which cyborgs are made, 
then life has only become more entrenched in the values we are supposedly 
learning to escape. 
After all, any analysis, no matter how brilliant, is meaningless when 
one discounts the influence of history, when one ignores the context by which 
the object being analyzed was actually produced.  To do so is to examine 
cyborgs and cybernetics in a vacuum, to not only treat the image and the 
science as separate, but to also see them as beings outside of time, and to 
therefore ignore the many social, political, and cultural repercussions that each 
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structure carries with it.
126  Like all black boxes, cyborgs and the science that 
spawned them, are intimately linked to the time in which they were created, 
and are thus perfect reflections of the many fears and desires permeating their 
particular birthing points.
127  They can never be disconnected from their initial 
context, because their bodies both possess and propagate the values and ideals 
of the time in which they were produced.  To ignore that, is to ignore the 
essence of the subject itself. 
 
2.2 Malleability 
 
Despite its inception during WWII, Wiener’s science did not come to full 
fruition until the 1950s when the United States began to use cybernetics in the 
fight against Communism.  It was America’s overwhelming need to effectively 
combat and contain Soviet aggression that propelled cybernetics to the 
forefront of the country’s military applications: a role which led to the 
formulation of the first material cyborg, as well as the subsequent production 
of innumerable cyborg-like bodies. 
For example, in 1960 phonetic doubles, Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan 
S. Kline published their paper, “Cyborgs and Space.”  Written at the height of 
the Soviet-American Cold War, this was a time not only coloured by 
intimidation and paranoia, but also by the very real threat of nuclear 
Armageddon, and more importantly, by the need to acquire and maintain every 
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kind of advantage at absolutely any cost.
128  Bear in mind, the world is fifteen 
years into the biggest political struggle in history, and America is at a terrible 
disadvantage, because in less than two decades the Soviet Union has not only 
transformed itself into a viable military and economic superpower, but has also 
managed to beat its more established counterpart in almost every area that 
matters.  The Soviets have the bomb and the prestige of being the first country 
in space, as well as an apparent ideological edge as more and more Third 
World countries begin to adopt revolutionary governments based on Socialist 
principles.
129  Moreover, two years into the future, the struggle for global 
domination between Capitalism and Communism would prove nearly 
cataclysmic, as each governmental system tested their resolve against the 
other, during the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In the words of Robert S. 
McNamara: 
 
Like most Americans, I saw Communism as monolithic.  I believed the 
Soviets and the Chinese were cooperating in trying to extend their 
hegemony…At the time Communism still seemed on the march.  Mao 
Zedong and his followers had controlled China since 1949 and had fought 
with North Korea against the West; Nikita Khrushchev had predicted 
Communist victory through ‘wars of national liberation in the Third World, 
and had told the West, ‘We will bury you.’  His threat gained credibility 
when the USSR launched Sputnik in 1957, demonstrating its lead in space 
technology.  The next year Khrushchev started turning up the heat in West 
Berlin.  And now Castro had transformed Cuba into a Communist 
beachhead in our Hemisphere.  We felt beset and at risk…I did not see the 
Communist danger as overwhelming, as did many people on the right.  It 
was a threat I was certain could be dealt with, and I shared President 
Kennedy’s sentiment when he called on America and the West to bear the 
burden of a long twilight struggle.  ‘Let every nation know,’ he said in his 
inaugural address, ‘whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any 
foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.’
130
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Of course, timing, as comedy reminds us, is also everything, and 
considering the publication date of “Cyborgs and Space,” as well as a state 
sanctioned mind-control programme already well under way by this point, one 
could surmise that perhaps one of those “burdens” was the destruction of their 
own bodies in the frantic search for a new kind of American; a superior 
American; one who is not subject to the frailties of biology, or the dangers of 
his environment.  After all, when surrounded by uncertainty and “beset” by 
enemies, America under the Cold War became an extremely dangerous and 
tumultuous place.  It was a nation driven not only by the quest for military 
superiority, but also by the desire for supreme dominance in every sector of 
un/civilized life; whether it be social, moral, cultural, political, psychological, 
or even biological.  Behold NASA’s promise of participatory evolution, as 
theorized by Clynes and Kline: 
 
If man attempts partial adaptation to space, instead of insisting on carrying 
his whole environment…with him, a number of new possibilities appear.  
One is then led to think about the incorporation of integral exogenous 
devices to bring about the biological changes which might be necessary in 
man’s homeostatic mechanisms to allow him to live in space qua 
natura.
131
 
At best, such endeavors are nothing but general self-interest cloaked in the 
guise of international improvement; an ambitious act of imperialism in a time 
of increasing confinement.  At worst, however, they constitute an almost 
ruthless attempt to circumvent the course of natural evolution by artificial 
means; a process which demands a rate of biological change that can only be 
described as “breathtaking.”
132  Clynes and Kline continue: 
 
                                                 
131 Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline, “Cyborgs and Space,” p. 30. 
132 John F. Kennedy, “Man, Moon, Decade,” Rice University, Houston Texas (May 25, 1961), 
Accessed 30 August 2007: http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/er/seh/ricetalk.htm.  As Kennedy 
declares: “No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you 
will, the 50,000 years of man¹s recorded history in a time span of but a half-century.  Stated in 
these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced 
man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover them…Christianity began less than two 
years ago.  The printing press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this 
whole 50-year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power…Last 
month electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available.  Only 
last week did we develop…nuclear power, and now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in 
reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.  This is a 
breathtaking pace, and such a pace cannot help but create new ills as it dispels old, new 
ignorance, new problems, new dangers.”   50
The problems which exist in space travel are many and varied…In some 
cases, we have proposed solutions which probably could be devised with 
presently available knowledge and techniques.  Other solutions are 
projections into the future which by their very nature must resemble 
science fiction.  To illustrate, there must be more efficient ways of carrying 
out the functions of the respiratory system than by breathing, which 
becomes cumbersome in space.  One proposed solution for the not too 
distant future is relatively simple: Don’t Breathe!
133
 
From a postcolonial perspective, it is difficult to ignore not only the paper’s 
political subtext, but also its potentially racist undercurrents.  To “breathe” is 
to be dependant, and if ‘we’ as Americans can eliminate dependency, we can 
also eliminate weakness.  In doing so, we can better subjugate our Communist 
enemies through the relentless expansion, and exploitation of, parts unknown 
or unclaimed.  Furthermore, and perhaps more ominously, we can also recreate 
or reconfigure the human body as superhero, and thereby not only assume a 
position of biological superiority, but also one of total moral authority; a stance 
which would not simply redefine the concept of normalcy, but also reconstruct 
the standards of what is generally considered genetically acceptable.
134
Their repeated emphasis on both ‘naturalness’ and ‘heredity’ is 
anything but comforting, because even though Clynes and Kline assure the 
reader that significant alteration of the human body will not result in the 
creation of a monstrosity, their assertions still echo the underlying ideals of 
racial purity and physical perfection fuelling another set of monstrous acts 
from only two decades before.  As David Thomson writes when describing the 
cybernetic Ash from Ridley Scott’s Alien (1979): 
 
Ian Holm, now, rises to his greatest moment in the film, not just a robot but 
a defective robot.  ‘You can’t,’ he tells her.  ‘It’s a perfect organism, its 
structural perfection is matched only by its hostility.’  Lambert sees the 
bizarre Kinship.  ‘You admire it,’ she says.  Ash admits he admires the 
purity, the absence of conscience or considerations of morality.  It is in his 
performance, here, that we detect the possible soul of a machine, the desire 
for the new level of life to be recognized, or appreciated.
135
 
Subsequently, despite assertions that the cyborg itself was originally conceived 
as “a human enlargement of function”, as an evolutionary tool that could 
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liberate what is best in humans from the slavery of machines so that “robot-
like problems are taken care of automatically and unconsciously, leaving man 
free to explore, to create, to think, and to feel.”
136  And despite their optimism 
that the incorporation of these cybernetic components would forever change 
humanity without altering our “heredity” as a species, the fact remains that to 
engineer a person so that he or she may float about happily in the vacuum of 
space, is to create a creature that is not only outside the realm of humanity, but 
also beyond the bounds of basic Western morality.  In fact, rather than 
liberating what is best in humans from the slavery of machines, this form of 
artificial advancement guarantees instead the subjugation of the ‘human spirit’ 
to the ideological concerns of the day, since the motivations which drive the 
cyborg come from a time and place where utopian dreams about the 
enlargement of the human soul have absolutely no relevance to the culture at 
large. 
For instance, Michel Foucault’s theories on the “administration of 
bodies and the calculated management of life” due to the subsequent 
emergence of biopower and biopolitics, achieves here only nightmarish 
implications.
137  Imposing upon the individual far stricter limitations than even 
he could have imagined, since machine integration serves as yet another 
method by which the state can exert control over the lives of both its soldiers 
and its citizens.  Bear in mind, even though posthuman proponents believe that 
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such integration frees us from the constraints of biopower, and thus from the 
imposed “institutional forms which shape one’s activity into [predetermined] 
patterns” of behaviour, such a conviction is simply untrue.
138  Instead, 
representations of the posthuman cyborg body repeatedly reinforce those 
constraints by solidifying state power over both human bodies and bodily 
space.  It is the government, the military, and perhaps more insidiously the 
corporate world, who are urging us to change.  Thus, while the possibility of 
producing a free self unbounded by institutionalized thinking, as well as more 
overt forms of governmental oppression certainly might exist, such a 
significant subjective stance is also buried to the point of non-existence 
beneath another more powerful need. 
 
2.3 Truth 
 
Even prior to the publication of “Cyborgs and Space,” human-machine 
integration was already becoming the norm in military bases and installations 
throughout America’s sphere of influence.  Vast computer networks developed 
under the guise of strategic air defense, and constructed using the principles of 
cybernetics, were manned and operated by men who viewed everything 
through the glow of a monitor.
139  Radar beeps replaced the physical sensation 
of watching a plane rocket through the sky, while an abstracted language born 
from this same technology seeped into every kind of meaningful discourse; 
from the terms used to describe a potential atomic holocaust, to the easy 
communication used between friends: 
 
Turgidson: What’s cooking on the old threat board?  Nothing!  Nothing at 
all?  I don’t like the look of this Fred.  Alright, tell you what you better do 
old buddy, you better give Elmo and Charlie a blast and bump everything 
up to condition red, and standby to blow her.  I’ll get back to you.
140
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Real terms like “threat board” and “condition red,” parodied in the 1964 film 
Dr. Strangelove, continually refer to an computerized command structure still 
central to the smooth operation of even today’s military (Figure 9).  More 
specifically, they refer to a structure that is so insular and so obsessed with the 
need for ever-more efficient means of communication among its members that 
the discourse exemplified by the speaker has little to do with anything 
happening in the material world, since language itself has been persistently 
stripped until nothing remains but a series of call signs.  These signs constitute 
a small collection of linguistic markers, each of which were “taken from [and 
deemed appropriate by] a general list of over 1000 ‘highly intelligible’ 
common words…[used] in battlefield communication.”
141  Resulting phrases 
such as “Come in Delta Zero, do you read?” convert “natural language into a 
technology, a code or cipher device”, designed to increase efficiency within 
war-time systems.
142  As a result, communication itself is transformed, because 
language is no longer about the transfer of meaning and ideas, but rather about 
the dispatch and reception of cryptographic programmes, and the processing of 
received data.
143  In effect, words themselves begin to eschew reality 
altogether by turning inward toward the technological practice that recreated 
them: 
Navigator: Target orange reference checks.  Target distance, eight miles. 
Co-Pilot: Roger, eight miles.  Telemetric guidance computer into orange 
grid. 
Bombardier: Telemetric guidance computer into orange grid. 
Navigator: Target distance, seven miles.  Correct track indicator minus 
seven. 
Co-Pilot: Roger, seven miles.  Set GPI acceleration factor. 
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Bombardier: GPI acceleration factor set. 
Navigator: Target distance, six miles 
Co-Pilot: Roger, six miles.  Pulse ident transponder active…
144
 
This type of linguistic alienation—or indeed fetishization depending on your 
perspective—is a significant event in relation to the human mind, because it 
not only forces the brain to think in radically different ways, but also 
transforms the manner in which people interact with one another, and relate to 
their environment.  After all, if a new dialect is introduced into a group’s 
speech patterns their cognitive processes will change as well; especially if that 
pattern is grounded in a specific practice rather than conventional linguistic 
ideas regarding the accurate representation of things.  Thus, when the very 
nature and purpose of language is changed to accommodate new technologies, 
as well as new methods of human-machine interaction, communication 
becomes irrevocably myopic as opposed to potentially expansive, since 
language itself is now crushed into a kind of binary code.  Forcing it to not 
only become part of the total circuit connecting man to machine, but in the 
case of the Cold War, also part of the panoptic, computerized, command, 
control, and communication (C3I) systems dominating the West’s political 
landscape.
145
This reduction and eventual eradication of human language not only 
becomes one of the many symptoms indicative of ever-increasing 
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technological integration among the military, but in turn, also highlights a 
drastic diminution of function within Clynes and Kline’s articulation of the so-
called “human soul.”  Contrary to their previous claims regarding that soul’s 
positive “enlargement” through cyborg bodies and cybernetics systems, such a 
myopic discourse only serves to limit individual expression, thought, 
imagination, feeling; while at the same time, prompting individuals to become 
even more alienated from the reality of their actions.  Facilitating a process 
which not only seeks to translate all meaning flawlessly, but to also render the 
act of thought itself absolutely moot, since the reception of received 
information is now designed to trigger only action.  Indeed, within a language 
that has no danger of misinterpretation, there can be no connotation, no critical 
thinking, and therefore no imagination inherent to any verbal transaction.  In 
their place, there is only an inflexible cipher: a denotative code that cannot be 
misinterpreted.  There is only the ‘truth.’
146
“[C]ybernetics has…[always] proceeded along lines that sought to 
understand the human being as a set of informational processes”.  As N. 
Katherine Hayles notes, once “information was defined as a probability 
function and thus as a pattern rather than a presence, cyberneticists argued that 
humans were essentially patterns and could be encoded into information 
without losing anything important.”
147  For example, in 1950, the principal 
founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, suggested it was theoretically possible 
to telegraph the body of a living person from one location to another without 
risk of distortion.  Declaring: “the individuality of a body is that of a flame 
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rather than…a stone.”  It is “a form” and a pattern, as opposed to a “bit of 
substance.” 
 
This form can be transmitted or modified and duplicated…there is no 
absolute distinction between the types of transmission which we can use 
for sending a telegram…and the types of transmission which 
are…theoretically possible for transmitting…a human being.
148
 
While Wiener’s theories are clearly preposterous, at least in practical terms, 
factual manifestations of the human body as a malleable and compliant 
medium were—and remain—all too real.  Moravec, Clark, Kurzweil, and 
Garreau; even now, intellectuals purport a vision of the self that perpetuates a 
version of Wiener’s hypothesis.  As if cybernetics, a field which has always 
“sought to understand [the individual] as a set of informational processes,” had 
somehow succeeded beyond all measure; influencing an entire culture with 
utopian dreams of unlimited potential through the benevolent use of science 
and technology.
149  In fact, Western manifestations of what I can only call the 
‘negotiable body,’ have ceaselessly extended beyond the writings of a few 
fantasists and self-proclaimed prophets, as this much lauded, but ultimately 
problematic group of like-minded futurists, is merely the last bastion for a 
methodology long since discredited on the grounds of gross misconduct.   
Schemes begun by governments both just and corrupt—although who can tell 
the difference—and plans, which in their present form, mimic only the most 
incredible aspects of contemporary science fiction, in order to dispel a dreadful 
history of human waste that has continually characterized their use.  The 
extremes of Eric Hobsbawm’s “short 20
th Century” redressed and repaired 
without reference to prior horror.
150
After all, thirty-eight years after Wiener’s initial hypothesis, and 
coincidentally the proto-beginnings of American mind control, Hans Moravec 
postulated that in the not-too-distant future, it will not only be desirable, but 
also necessary to download human consciousness into the hard skull of a 
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“shiny new robot.”
151  Proposing that a person’s memory, subjectivity, and 
experience are not intrinsically anchored to the sensory capabilities of the 
flesh, but are instead the sole products of some intangible design imprinted 
upon the brain.  Their existence, mere elements of a “pattern” that provides a 
person with nothing less than identity, intelligence, essence, and personal 
consciousness.  As Moravec writes, “The rest is mere jelly.”
152  The 
subsequent depreciation of embodied experience, and perhaps too of human 
life as a whole, becomes increasingly disturbing as science displaces the 
significance of human sense perception.  Promoting a dream of the self that 
endorses above all, a clear division between mind and body, between what is 
“essential” and what is “meat,” and perhaps more tellingly, between what is 
hard, powerful, potent, and ultimately escapist, and what is weak, flabby, 
flaccid, and perhaps all too real—and/or human—for its own good.  Like 
government sanctioned experimentation from decades before, Moravec and his 
ilk also profess an affinity for the production of empty heads.  Men and women 
transformed into compliant puppets whose strings must be pulled and cut for 
the benefit of all; their bodies mere “husks” from which the mind is wiped, so 
that something new and decidedly inhuman can stand and act in its stead.
153  
Behold Moravec’s delight at the nightmare of transmigration, an act of 
brainwashing which goes far beyond anything ever dreamed of by the agencies 
of organized Intelligence: 
 
The surgeon’s hand sinks a fraction of a millimeter deeper into your brain, 
instantly compensating its measurements and signals for the changed 
position…Layer after layer the brain is [stimulated], then excavated.   
Eventually your skull is empty, and the surgeon’s hand rests deep in your 
brainstem.
154
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Vacant heads filled only by the power of a near omnipotent hand.  The image 
evokes the devastating techniques of Drs. Sydney Gottlieb and Donald 
Cameron, the Sleep Rooms of Montreal’s McGill University, and the varied 
projects of MKULTRA.
155  Each is easily recalled through Moravec’s 
unintended homage to the psychiatry of the CIA, and the beginnings of a 
particularly brutal form of MAD science.
156  The results of which are not the 
posthuman dream of bodily transmigration, but the terrible reality of mass 
victimization. 
Officially April 13, 1953 marks the moment where it all began; the 
date “on which the coordinated MKULTRA project was approved by [CIA 
director] Allen Dulles”.
157  It also signifies the start of an ensuing obsession 
with both the “reorganization” and “reorientation” of the human mind for the 
purposes of confession, control, and the invisible execution of “executive 
actions” through the production of “broken men.”
158  These were ordinary 
people remade into unwitting assassins.  Men and women triggered and 
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controlled by masters from afar, as they went about the business of killing.
159  
Their brutal victimization forcing in turn, a kind of auto-assisted evolutionary 
leap into the realm of the monstrous—the domain of Frankenstein—as the 
suicidal politics of Mutually Assured Destruction guaranteed the real-life 
manufacture of the Manchurian Candidate, and forever sutured the image of a 
shattered and systematically reassembled subject to the dubious politics of the 
cyborg body.  Bear in mind, projects BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOCKE, and 
CHATTER: 
 
[Each] was ‘coordinated with…similar research work…aimed at 
developing, what was in effect, a human robot.’  The work was carried out 
by the CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence and was officially described 
as intending to ‘exploit, along operational lines, scientific methods and 
knowledge that can be utilized in altering the attitudes and beliefs, thought 
processes, and behavior patterns…This will include the application of 
tested psychiatric and psychological techniques, including the use of 
hypnosis in conjunction with drugs.’
160
 
In all, there were 149 separate initiatives “funded under MKULTRA.”
161  Most 
were studies on the truth-telling effects of specific drugs such as marijuana and 
LSD, while others were considerably more bizarre, often veering into the 
sphere of mind-bending parody through the production of cyborg cats and 
dogs, and the ensuing development of exploding monkeys.  Seemingly, like all 
systems and social structures governing the disparate factions of humanity the 
world over, animals and the environment are also unwitting victims of the 
West’s rampant paranoia, as logic disintegrates under the perpetual stress of 
imminent nuclear annihilation.  “A lot of money was spent,” as Victor 
Marchetti, a special assistant to Allen Dulles recalls.  “They slit this cat open, 
put batteries in him, wired him up.  The tail was used as an antenna.  They 
made a monstrosity.”
162
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Unfortunately, “the cybernetic construction of the posthuman has 
systematically downplayed or erased the issue of embodiment in ways that 
have yet to happen in other critiques of the liberal humanist subject,” 
especially in realms such as “feminism and postcolonial theory.”
163  However, 
nearly forty-five years after the end of World War II, Haraway contradicts the 
history of cybernetics—its use and misuse—by stating that cyborg politics “is 
the struggle for language and the struggle against  perfect communication, 
against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly,” and that cyborgs 
are, first and foremost, revolutionary figures which reject their inherent 
centrality in order to align themselves with the margins of society.
164  Yet how 
can this be, when the creation of the cyborg not only paralleled the decidedly 
“Phallogocentric” production of truth, but was in turn, also responsible for that 
“dogma’s” success?
165  Furthermore, how can an image so rooted within the 
political discourse and cultural paranoia of the Cold War suddenly turn into 
something it never was; friend of the oppressed, ally for the ‘Other,’ and a 
model for resistance against a reigning hegemony?  It cannot, at least not 
without leaving a very detectable trail through every successive representation 
of the cyborg body.  As such, it did not, because as a general rule no such trace 
can be found anywhere within Western popular culture. 
Of course, Haraway argues that visible traces do exist, and that feminist 
science fiction authors like Anne McCaffrey, Octavia Butler, and James 
Tiptree Jr., also known as Alice B. Sheldon,  prove her theories about the 
cyborg body and its allegedly subversive ideologies.
166  Moreover, she states 
that since these writers have, in her opinion, formulated a viable alternative to 
the conventions of the Western narrative; namely, a story arch that refuses 
“individuation, separation, the birth of the self, the tragedy of autonomy, the 
fall into writing”; that by extension, all cyborgs must follow this same path.
167  
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In fact, Haraway asserts that human-machine integration as a whole is a 
mixture rooted within liminal space; a subjective base that not only aligns the 
image with communities that have been pushed to the margins of society, but 
also with the inclusive ideologies and resistant politics of those marginalized 
communities.  Specifically: the tactics of subversion, power through literacy, 
and solidarity by means of affinity.
168
However, this is simply not the case when it comes to the vast majority 
of cyborg bodies represented throughout 20
th century popular culture, because 
despite the creature’s jarring synthesis of organic and inorganic components, 
the cyborg is not a liminal being.  Its politics and history are simply too strong 
to discard.  Rather, they are elements which surround, penetrate, and bind the 
image to the hegemonic centre of the civilization in which it was generated.  
As such, the small and relatively ghettoized field of feminist science fiction is 
not the most accurate means by which to measure the meaning of this 
particular body, because however valuable a genre it may be, the authors 
within that genre do not present an image that admits the problematic nature of 
its own history, and which, in so doing, contends with that history.  Instead, 
Haraway’s examples present an idealized version of the cyborg body and its 
politics.  One that provides the culture with something to aspire to and work 
toward, but which does not carry the same level of meaning and influence as 
its more vicious, well-known, and subsequently, more culturally reflective and 
relevant cyborg cousins.  After all, the overwhelming majority of human-
machine amalgamations manifest themselves as the exact inverse of those 
listed by Haraway, often reflecting the cold brutality of other, more 
representative cyborg-like characters, such as the insistent, unremitting, and 
glass-eyed Colonel Joll of J.M. Coetzee’s, Waiting for the Barbarians.
169  As 
Coetzee writes: 
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Father, do you see this gentleman [Joll]?  This gentleman is visiting us 
from the Capital.  He visits all the forts along the frontier.  His work is to 
find out the truth.  That is all he does.  He finds out the truth.  If you do not 
speak to me you will have to speak to him.  Do you understand?
170
 
Like Joll, cybernetics is a cold shrine to the truth.  It is a house of code, of 
understanding, and of perfect communication, which finds its fullest 
articulation in the phallic image of the unrelenting cyborg; itself “a devotee of 
truth”.
171  One need only think of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s turn as the now 
ubiquitous Terminator; itself a Cold War figure whose every word regarding 
the terrible realities of a machine-infested future seems to carry the weight of a 
hundred-thousand bibles.  His terse expressions effecting only shock and 
silence, as the seriousness of his tone (“the tone of truth!”) prompts no real 
consideration on the part of the characters, but instead, only futile attempts at 
preventing that which has already happened.
172  In other words: action devoid 
of thought. 
Any accurate assessment of the cyborg body and its politics must 
include an examination of this overwhelming majority represented by figures 
like the Terminator, because the only proper measure for the accurate study of 
a particular image within a particular culture is by watching that image play 
out in the collective unconscious of the larger population.  Or, to be more 
specific, by examining its behaviour throughout the history of 20
th century 
popular media, so that one can see how the image actually manifests itself and 
creates meaning for that population; and not say, how we wish it would.   
Technology, after all, is consistently time specific, and as such it is always 
politically attuned.  It cannot stand a part from the time in which it was 
created, and as such, the cyborg’s heavy social, cultural, and political baggage 
tends to make any deviant reading of human-machine integration a cultural 
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anomaly at best; a bizarre variance that is not just the exception to the rule, but 
rather the one exception that proves the rule. 
Ironically, even some of Haraway’s textual examples fall short of 
anything that resembles a liberating narrative with progressive politics.  Anne 
McCaffrey’s  The Ship Who Sang is almost laughable in its attempt to 
reconstitute “[g]ender, sexuality, embodiment, [and] skill”, because even 
though a woman born with severe and crippling birth defects is essentially 
more able than even the healthiest male, she is still something of a simpering 
fool when it comes to interaction with her male “brawns.”
173  Indeed, at one 
point, McCaffrey even goes so far as to have one of the men defend the 
protagonists “virgin honor.”  Moreover, since she is driven by unimaginably 
powerful form of atomic power, and ultimately subservient to all of her 
respective partners, McCaffrey’s ship is often nothing more than a feisty 
sidekick or ‘uppity’ wife; her existence a mere echo of the subordinate parent 
in America’s idealized vision of the nuclear family. 
Marge Piercy, on the other hand, and her 1976 novel Woman on the 
Edge of Time is one of the primary texts from which Haraway’s original 
manifesto was ultimately derived.  As Haraway writes: 
 
Influenced by Piercy in my ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs,’ I used the cyborg as a 
blasphemous, anti-racist feminist figure reshaped for science-studies 
analysis and feminist theory alike…Piercy developed her theory about the 
cyborg as lover, friend, object, subject, weapon, and golem in He. She, It 
(1991).  Her cyborgs and mine became trans to their origins, defying their 
founding identities as weapons and self-acting control devices, thus trying 
to trouble U.S. cultural commitments to what counts as agency and self-
determination for people—for other organisms and machines.
174
 
Although Woman on the Edge of Time is a landmark in revolutionary feminist 
science fiction, and although He, She, and It is certainly excellent on all 
counts, Haraway’s explanation of each is somewhat overblown.  Yod, the 
golem-cyborg of Piercy’s latter work, whose UK title is Body of Glass, is not 
only a character trapped in a sexual, and therefore Oedipal relationship with 
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his symbolic mother, but is also a black box which, at the end of the novel, 
explodes upon penetration, and in so doing, annihilates his Father along with 
him.  Piercy writes: 
 
‘I have died and taken with me, Avram, my creator…I die knowing I 
destroy the capacity to replicate me’…Yod [the cyborg] was the product of 
tensions between Avram and Malkah and their disparate aims as well as the 
product of their software and hardware…
175
 
Interestingly, there is even a strong link between the research of 
Clynes and Kline and the novels of Marge Piercy.  For example, working from 
Rockland State Hospital from the mid 1950s, Drs. Manfred Clynes, and 
Nathan S. Kline in particular, used “human mental patients as part of [their] 
psychiatric research on neural-chemical implants and telemetric 
monitoring.”
176  In fact, Kline himself was openly “associated with the 
Psychiatric Research Foundation in New York, an organization established to 
promote controversial investigations into psycho-pharmacology”; a field that 
would swiftly find itself inextricably intertwined with scores of government 
mind-control programs from exactly the same period.
177  Today, the institution 
bears a new name.  Re-branded in 1982 as the Nathan S. Kline Institute for 
Psychiatric Research, the hospital pays homage not only to its namesake, but 
also to his somewhat dubious research on the link between stimulants, 
depressants, psychedelics, and the control of human psychosis. 
Piercy used Rockland State Hospital as “background for the brain-
implant experiments practiced on psychiatric patients in”, what Donna 
Haraway calls, “her transformative feminist science-fiction story, Woman on 
the Edge of Time.”
178  Published in 1976, Piercy’s book describes the general 
treatment of psychiatric patients in the United States during the mid to late 20
th 
Century.  Re-labeling Rockland State with the near-transparent name of 
“Rockover State,” Piercy paints a damning portrait of psychoanalysis, 
psychopharmacology, and the general system of American biopolitics as it 
relates to gender, race, and the American underclass.  Piercy writes: 
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The nurse began removing the head bandages.  Cautiously Connie 
and Sybil edged nearer and nearer till Connie called out, “Is it true you got 
needles stuck in your…head?” 
“No Lie.  Electrodes, they call them.” 
Connie stared expectantly as the bald scalp emerged from the 
swathing…But I don’t see anything!” 
They inside, girl.  What you expect, I look like a god-damn 
pincushion?  They stupid, but they not that stupid!” 
Alice they are electrodes, where are the wires?” Sybil asked 
cautiously. 
“You old fashioned.  No Wires.  They use a little radio and they 
stick that inside too!” 
“Now, you cut this out,” the nurse said suddenly…“Quiet down or 
I’ll give you a shot that will lay you out flat. 
Back at their own beds, Sybil whispered, “The nurse didn’t 
contradict us about the electrodes.  Could it be true?” 
“But what for?” 
“Control.  To turn us into machines so we obey them,” Sybil 
whispered.
179
 
In many ways, Joanna Russ is the most subversive author discussed 
by Haraway, as The Female Man is not only a remarkable novel, but one that 
also defies explanation.  Unlike Anne McCaffrey’s ship, or even Marge 
Piercy’s Body of Glass, Russ has indeed given us a new “story to tell,” a new 
“account of the unconscious…one that does a better job of accounting for 
subjects of history.”  As such, there is a great deal of hope within Russ’ 
writing, but again, it is only that; hope.
180  After all, her work is not the norm.  
Instead, cyborgs like Zero in Angela Carter’s The Passion of New Eve 
represent the majority of human-machine manifestations.
181  They are rapists 
and war-machines; emblems and agents of patriarchal power.  They have no 
interest in subversion.
182  They do not seek autonomy, and are not politically 
subversive.  The cyborg does not understand the concept of subjugation or the 
imposition of ‘Otherness’.  Instead, the body powers forward without thought 
to cost or consequence; selfishly seeking the fulfillment of its own pleasure, as 
well as the fruition of its own political agenda. 
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The roots of such destructive behaviour are of course patently 
obvious in the films which came before Haraway.  James Cameron’s The 
Terminator (1984), Sidney Lumet’s Fail-Safe (1964), and Stanley Kubrick’s 
Dr. Strangelove (1964); each reflect worlds that are not only threatened by 
fear, paranoia, and political brinksmanship, but also by the distinctly 
patriarchal dangers of cybernetics, and the true nature of human-machine 
integration.  Within each film there are numerous visual and auditory 
references to the various types of mental, ocular, and linguistic abstractions 
permeating mid 20
th century America.  From the endless analyses that pour 
from machines and analysts alike; to the vast banks of computer monitors that 
fuse with, and replace the human eye; to the bizarre techno-babble that 
simultaneously describes, alienates, and fetishizes real events.  Within each 
film, the subsequent amalgamation of flesh and non-flesh, both physical and 
metaphorical, plays a central role in fulfilling the ultimate goal of both the 
cyborg and the Cold War, as its body not only signifies the inevitable outcome 
of atomic confrontation, but also a massive death drive forced onto the public 
by the politics of a pre-existing hegemony.  Even within the context of the 
more contemporary Terminator sequels, the mere existence of the cyborg’s 
hard body continues to represent the inevitable end of all things. 
 
2.4 Black Hands 
 
Despite the importance of Pynchon’s V2 and the ubiquity of James Cameron’s 
Terminator, the dual images of these Aryan man-machines are not the 
prototypes for every subsequent representation of the cyborg body and its 
politics.  That particular honour belongs to one of the most iconic characters in 
the history of cinema; if not the most recognizable scientist in the history of 
Hollywood.
183
Dr. Strangelove, who—among other things—remains even now a 
brilliant parody of both Wernher Von Braun and his near-anonymous 
colleagues in Operation Paperclip, is the centrepiece of Kubrick’s 1964 film, 
functioning not only as the “apocalyptic ‘nuclear wise man’”, but also as a 
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kind of grim reaper.  An “angel of death” waiting for the right moment in 
which to initiate a nuclear response that is nothing less than total (Figure 
10).
184  His very existence foretelling at worst, the end of human life and 
civilization; and at best, the design and subsequent erection of the ultimate 
patriarchal fantasy in its stead.  Like Strangelove’s echo in the body of a 
German Terminator, Fuhrer knows best as even the Nazification of America’s 
nuclear family becomes a desirable possibility in the shadow of imminent 
Holocaust.
185  As Strangelove declares, 
 
Mr. President, I would not rule out the chance to preserve a nucleus of 
human specimens. It would be quite easy for some of our deeper 
mineshafts. The radioactivity would never penetrate into a mine some 
thousands of feet deep…[Human selection] could easily be accomplished 
with a computer…set and programmed to accept factors ranging from 
youth, health, sexual fertility, intelligence, and a cross section of necessary 
skills.
186
 
Adding: “man is an amazingly adaptable creature…the conditions would be far 
superior to those of the so-called concentration camps, where there is ample 
evidence [that even the] most wretched creatures clung desperately to life.”
187
There is no ambiguity in the politics of Dr. Strangelove.  It is very 
clear where he stands in regards to atomic death, patriarchal oppression, 
National Socialism, racial exploitation, sexual violation, and any number of 
other dubious practices and ideas.  Nor is there any doubt regarding his status 
as a cyborg, since from the very beginning, Strangelove is immediately placed 
within the sphere of the man-machine by his apparent disabilities and 
numerous prostheses.  His wheelchair, for example, physically integrates his 
body into a steel mechanism facilitating his locomotion.  His spectacles, 
although dark, allow him to see.  While the doctor’s machinic status is 
compounded yet again by the presence of a mysterious black glove fitted over 
the form of his famous right hand.
188  An appendage that not only recalls the 
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last 30 years of German history, but one which appears to act autonomously, 
and without regard for the owner’s physical health or mental commands. 
According to author Peter George in his novelization of Kubrick’s 
film—which bizarrely, is also an adaptation of George’s original book—
Strangelove lost his hand in “the British bombing of Peenemünde,” where like 
his immediate historical forebear, Dr. Wernher Von Braun, “he [too] was 
working on the German V-2 rocket.”
189  However, the story does not end here, 
since this missing hand, this thing “that hate[s] the rest of [his] body for 
having” compromised his Nazi past, also reaches further back to the beginning 
of the 1930s, and the end of the 1920s, in the years immediately before and 
after the rise of National Socialism.
190  After all, Strangelove’s autonomous 
prosthesis not only recalls the black gloves of Hitler’s SS, but also the right 
hand of throwback Rotwang in Fritz Lang’s 1926 film Metropolis (Figure 
11).
191  As Christopher Frayling writes: 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Playboy magazine in mid-flight.  After which, the audience’s viewpoint switches to different 
areas of the plane where they can see other crew members sleeping, playing cards, or doing 
nothing at all.  More than just a set-up for all subsequent scenes involving the B-52 bomber 
crew, Kubrick is emphasizing the plane’s ability to fly without the input of the pilot or his 
group; thereby transforming the human body into few pounds of dead weight lodged inside the 
belly of an automated machine.  However, once a military action is commenced the human 
component becomes an integral part of the overall whole, because the machine now starts to 
rely on the reflexes of its crew in order to survive.  In a sense, the bomber and its crew become 
extensions one another, since the plane increases a person’s overall speed and strength 
dramatically, while in turn, the crew allows the plane to survive in combat situations, and 
accomplish its mission.  The bomber crew may not undergo any physical alterations, but the 
implications of a cybernetic relationship are certainly evident. 
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Strangelove is the reincarnation of Rotwang…just as the cavernous War 
Room in which he operates was partly based on Berlin-born designer Ken 
Adams’ memories of having seen Metropolis in the mid-1930s; Metropolis 
he said, was part of ‘my visual education’…Strangelove, with his 
black…hand, crimped white hair…is the Rotwang of the nuclear age.
192
 
Weirdly, Metropolis was also part of Adolph Hitler’s education, since “[he] 
and [his soon to be right hand] Joseph Goebbels loved the movie when they 
saw it”—quote—“‘in a small town.’”
193  Certainly, there are “sequences of 
choreographed mob activity” permeating both Thea von Harbou’s novel, and 
her husband, Fritz Lang’s film, that easily parallel the mass hysteria of a Nazi 
rally.  To quote Harbou: “Dark, angry waves were the heads before Freder.  
These waves [of the mob] frothed, raged and roared.  Here and there a hand 
shot up in the air.”
194  The parallels between Harbou’s throng of disgruntled 
workers and Riefenstahl’s representation of an enraptured German people are 
of course frightening, but more than this, the story’s  varied cultural 
connections seem to run far deeper and darker than even Lang and Harbou 
intended (Figure 12).  In fact, Christopher Frayling even goes so far as to 
suggest that 
 
in the debate about the impact of [the film] on design in the real world, it 
could…be argued that the ‘Moloch’ sequences set in the huge underground 
furnaces helped to prepare the visual ground for the [ovens] of the 
concentration camps.  Certainly, von Harbou likes to describe the machine-
city as ‘wanting living men for food’, its furnaces requiring ‘the endless 
stream of human beings processed through the machine room.’
195
 
Clearly, a concrete correlation between the two cannot be confirmed, since 
“the sinister implications of…these references are created by hindsight.”
196  
Yet, in many ways indisputable evidence is also irrelevant.  What matters here 
are the innumerable points of connection that allow such speculation to occur, 
because Metropolis is not simply a significant film, but also a priceless cultural 
artifact that reflects the time and place in which it was made.  In truth, it seems 
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only natural that uncanny elements of an imminent German future should 
manifest in a film that looks forward as well as back (Figure 13). 
 
2.5 Strange Love 
 
Like Lang’s futuristic vision of an ultra-modern Germany run by the 
“alchemy” of a “medieval” madman, Kubrick’s post WWII villain is also far 
more than just a simple parody of American Cold War policy, but a wonderful 
interpretation of the many elements which make up the mid-20th century’s 
social, cultural, and political climate.
197  Indeed, like the stunning visuals of 
the city of Metropolis, and the menacing machines which ensure its survival, 
Kubrick’s depictions both subtle and gross, combine beautifully to reflect an 
atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia which not only allows Strangelove—son 
of Rotwang—to grow and thrive, but to a certain extent, also exist in his own 
peculiar apocalyptic way.  Bear in mind, as both a character and a movie, Dr. 
Strangelove is far more than just a biting satire of Mutually Assured 
Destruction, but also a rich study of human sexuality, and a powerful statement 
on the bizarre neuroses that consistently spring forth and shatter the earth when 
desire supersedes reason. 
From the very beginning, sex is one of Kubrick’s primary issues as 
the opening sequence presents the audience with two “fornicating flying 
machines”.
198  Their massive hulls depicting sexual intercourse from the male 
perspective as the image of a huge B-52 ‘Stratofortress’ meets its equally 
masculine mate in mid-air—the KC-135 fuel tanker.  Notably, Kubrick’s 
camera is lodged in the belly of the ‘male’ tanker with the shot looking down 
along the shaft of the phallus, as the fuel line penetrates and spills itself into 
the approaching plane.  In sexualizing such an event Kubrick has not only re-
contextualized these machines through the lens of the homo-eroticized male 
body, but also reframed the scene with techniques stolen from the hardcore 
pornographer.   Oscillating between tight close-ups of the actual coupling, and 
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wide shots of each plane in mid-coitus, Kubrick’s camera somehow prefigures 
the decidedly sleazy POV perspective of contemporary porn, as the ‘top’ 
tanker begins to penetrate and undulate against its more submissive ‘bottom.’  
As Randy Rasmussen writes: 
 
The tanker’s nozzle becomes a ludicrously detailed penis while the 
undulating movement of the…camera imposes a sexual choreography on 
the two mechanical giants.  Sex and the capacity for mass destruction 
become intertwined and confused.
199
 
While poetic and largely true, one should note, however, that Rasmussen is 
also much too restrained when making this especially important point.  In my 
opinion, “sex and the capacity for mass destruction” are more than just 
“intertwined and confused.”  Rather, sex and the desire for total annihilation 
are one and the same when fused in the body of the B-52, since moments of 
orgasm, and the actual tools of nuclear Armageddon, overlap and collude to 
the point of seamlessness. 
For instance, the B-52, which was known affectionately to Strategic 
Air Command crews as the BUFF, “an acronym” that according to David 
Pascoe, “allegedly spell[s] out ‘Big Ugly Fat Fuck’”, is represented here as 
nothing more than a “fuck.”
200  A huge hit and run weapon whose only job is 
to find the target, deliver its payload, and then move on to blast open and fill 
up the next hole with yet another enormous tool.  Although somewhat vulgar, 
the plane’s oversexed representation appropriately foreshadows the huge 
explosions which occur at the end of the film, as “Major Kong [rides] his great 
phallic” weapon into “apocalyptic orgasm.”  His ensuing obsolescence not 
only signifying the beginning of a massive never-ending ‘little death,’ but also 
the delivery of an efficient and effective ‘Dear John’; a bomb “apologetically 
[but properly labelled] for the end of someone’s world.”
201  Indeed, Kong’s 
enormous cyborg phallus is doubly appropriate in relation to the masculine and 
now decidedly heterosexual perspective of the B-52.  Because really, once 
your payload is blown there is no longer a reason left to stay.  Especially after 
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having found, touched, and set-off the “cobalt-thorium-G [spot]” of a once 
frigid Mother Russia. 
Writer Robert Kolker maintains that in general terms, “Dr. 
Strangelove is a discourse of death.”  That its “language and images…bespeak 
the confusion of life and death and the desire to see one in terms of the other.”  
He also contends that Kubrick’s movie is really about a 
 
language that creates its own destruction, its own death, and the death of 
the world.  [Because in a film] that delineates a love of destruction and 
death, a Merwűrdigliebe…everything done and everything said manifests 
this love and hastens its consummation.
202
 
There is no doubt that the various forms of love expressed by Kubrick are 
nothing short of strange, but given the text’s consistent preoccupation with 
‘essence,’ penetration, erection, and orgasm, it is perhaps more precise and 
more appropriate to label Dr. Strangelove as a discourse of ‘little deaths.’  As a 
movie which perpetuates a language that cycles back continually to a single 
but all-consuming vanishing point; namely, sexual satisfaction in the name and 
image of the masculine cyborg body. 
Kong falling toward the earth on the back of American mega death, 
only to disappear in a white flash of a million little deaths is only the most 
obvious example to correlate a connection between sex, death, and cyborgs 
through the warped lens of Mutually Assured Destruction.  Moreover, despite 
Kolker’s assertions of “confusion,” the collusion of death and desire in the 
context of Kubrick’s film constitutes the purest and most successful attempt at 
communication in a Cold War system.  After all, nothing is more perfect than 
communication without language, the clear delivery of feeling from one person 
to another in an exchange devoid of abstraction, even if that interaction 
requires one’s total consumption by the desires of another.  In a way, 
physicality is almost irrelevant.  All that matters is the mechanistic extension 
of one’s sexual desire, and its subsequent consummation in the body of 
another, even if that exchange both consumes and destroys.
203
                                                 
202 Robert Phillip Kolker, “Dr. Strangelove and 2001: A Space Odyssey,” Perspectives on 
Stanley Kubrick, ed. Mario Falsetto (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1996), p. 141. 
203 For clear visual evidence see Chapter 3, figures 22 and 23.   73
For Kubrick to extend the purpose of such language to coincide with 
the purpose of an explosive cyborg phallus seems only logical in the context of 
the Cold War.  Especially since both elements collude so well in the highly 
sexualized image of the atom bomb.  Indeed, what screenwriters Terry 
Southern and Stanley Kubrick do so well is juxtapose “a series of linguistic 
and visual reductions…[that] give the characters utterances which defeat 
meaning” against those which project it flawlessly.
204  Thus, like “the auto-
destruct mechanism on the SAC bomber’s radio, the characters words undo 
and destroy themselves”, but only when that technology fails.
205  When 
working efficiently, such linguistic reductions successfully eradicate the 
possibility of connotation; transmitting only the proper code, a cipher that must 
always be translated and implemented, while at the same time, never truly 
understood.
206  To recall the story’s one failed attempt at thoughtful analysis: 
 
Bombardier: Major Kong, is it possible that this is some kind of loyalty 
test. You know, give the go code and then recall to see who would actually 
go? 
Major Kong: Ain't nobody ever got the go code yet. And old Ripper 
wouldn't be giving us plan R unless them Russkies had already clobbered 
Washington and a lot of other towns with a sneak attack. 
Bombardier: Yes sir.
207
 
To truly comprehend the level of conflict that occurs when a Cold War turns 
‘hot,’ is counterproductive to the very goals of that system.  No intelligent 
person would ever commit to the possibility of total annihilation, and neither 
would anyone else with even a glimmer of comprehension for the kind of 
destructive power contained within all nuclear weapons.  Yet, Kubrick presents 
us with a world in which sanity is practically non-existent, and not only 
because a reductive and seemingly ‘doctored’ discourse has made even the 
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most insane acts sound rational, but because those in power have ordered their 
followers to commit those acts without even a moment’s pause.  Only a 
mindless “Yes sir” will do. 
Unsurprisingly, Kubrick’s comic take on the Cold War and its effects 
not only on language, but also on the much larger field of human 
comprehension, could not be considered peculiar.  His vision is not so far from 
the truth, because the material world of the early 1960s was also a crazy one.  
Supporting a political environment which operated not only outside the realm 
of reality—or even the bonds of sanity!—but which also firmly itself rooted 
within the blind and far more forgiving boundaries of technological hubris and 
sexual metaphor.  Interrelated elements which combined their efforts to 
contain Soviet influence through the erection of a tightly controlled “North 
American continental fortress,” while simultaneously maintaining that need for 
protection and total isolation through another more suggestive discourse.
208  
Specifically: one which also managed to extend selfishly inward, but this time 
toward the sexual centre of the male genitalia, as opposed to the armoured 
plating which can surround and defend it. 
Sadly, any gaze that fixes itself upon the image of the phallus also 
signifies an internalized desire to prove that “banana’s” effectiveness and 
rigidity; thereby, facilitating a desire which often borders on obsession when 
applied to both the military and the government.
209  In fact, this feeling is often 
so powerful that it can prevent each branch from accomplishing their 
respective duties, including their primary goal of protecting the nation’s 
citizenry, because in transposing the sexualized metaphor of the male phallus 
onto the central motivations behind military policy, a nation will ultimately 
strive to reject diplomacy and prove its potency through offensive strategies 
based on “pre-emptive strikes” and “total commitment.”
210  In the eyes of 
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many U.S. Generals, nuclear war was not something to be avoided, but was 
instead seen as one great move towards sexual potency on a national scale.  
Initially, such a statement might seem ridiculous, since the idea of one man 
trying to prove his machismo through the subsequent destruction of all things 
living seems absolutely insane.  But the truth is, such a dangerous form of 
psychological motivation once appeared absolutely real; its veracity locked up 
in the language of strength, proof, and inflexibility.  To put it simply, a real 
leader must prove he is willing to ‘push the button.’  That he has, for lack of a 
better phrase, “the balls” to go through with such an act.  Otherwise, he 
becomes womanish, revealing a fatal weakness in the eyes of his enemy, and 
leaving his land open to the possibility of rape by more effective atomic tools. 
Sterling Hayden’s portrayal of General Jack D. Ripper is the best 
possible example of just such a conceit, because like the officer’s highly 
problematic namesake, the character is not only a dangerous sexual predator, 
but also a man rendered impotent by a myriad of ineffectual politicians that 
collectively strive to bind his power and stunt his desires.  Yet, unlike Ripper’s 
infamous woman-killing predecessor, the General’s needs, both sexual and 
professional, are suffocated rather than fulfilled by one especially important 
‘muff.’  U.S. President Mirkin Muffley represents the most immediate danger 
to the integrity, power, and potency of the American nation.  Even his name, 
which signifies both a pubic wig and a vagina, implies the subsequent 
emasculation of the world’s most masculine superpower at the hands of weak-
willed diplomats, and other political eunuchs.  As Ripper explains: 
 
Ripper: Mandrake, do you recall what Clemenzo once said about war? 
Mandrake: No. I don't think I do sir, no.  
Ripper: He said war was too important to be left to the Generals. When he 
said that fifty years ago, he might have been right. But today, war is too 
important to be left to politicians. They have neither the time, the training, 
nor the inclination for strategic thought. I can no longer sit back and allow 
Communist infiltration, Communist indoctrination, communist subversion, 
and the international Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our 
precious bodily fluids.
211
                                                                                                                                           
planes from reaching their target” (86).  The Air force fought against possible defense plans in 
favour of the attack-oriented policy of Strategic Air Command (SAC).  General Curtis LeMay, 
the commanding officer of SAC was once quoted as saying that he “could not imagine a 
circumstance under which the United States would go second in a nuclear war” (85). 
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It is no coincidence that within this specific scene, Kubrick chooses to shoot 
the General from below (Figure 14).  Depicting him not only in a monstrous 
light, as something threatening, inhuman, and decidedly deadly, but also and 
perhaps more importantly, as a creature shot from a highly sexualized camera 
angle. 
The lens itself is resting at waist level, looking up from the 
perspective of Ripper’s own erect penis.  Seemingly, the camera had been 
positioned rather carefully, as if to peer through the end of his genitalia.
212  Its 
lens projected upward toward another phallic symbol protruding from the 
General’s mouth.  Such a connection is not entirely out of place, since Ripper’s 
potency and “essence” have now been regained due to his defiance, and 
subsequent destruction of the feminized administration that once tried to 
control him.  In a sense, Ripper has not only been able to ‘grab his ‘balls’’ 
back, but is also ready and willing to impose that sexuality on a world which is 
essentially ‘asking for it.’ 
Naturally, Ripper is not alone in experiencing feelings of personal 
and professional impotency, but reflects a general feeling of castration felt 
throughout the voluminous war room.  Some characters, such as Muffley and 
his staff, seem to embrace this feeling of impotence on a personal and 
professional level, since the thought of proving themselves militarily is not 
only an affront to their collective morality, but also to their sensitive, and 
rather sexless constitutions.  Other characters like the highly virile, if not 
sociopathic, General Buck Turgidson, strive to offset the strict limits imposed 
on their desires through overcompensation in their private lives (Figure 15).  
Indeed, at one point near the beginning of the film, Turgidson is “perched 
over” the bed of his mistress as 
 
he makes a sexual boast couched in the metaphor of a rocket launch—one 
of the film’s many verbal and visual links between sexuality and military 
hardware.  The camera cuts immediately to the image of a machine gun 
barrel tilted upward on its jeep mount.  In the context of the General’s 
remark, the weapon becomes phallic, just as the mid-air refueling scene 
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was imbued with sexual meaning by romantic background music.   
Turgidson, of course, is unaware of the link he forges between sex and 
weapons.  And that is one of the core problems in Dr. Strangelove, where 
most characters, lacking insight into their motivations, confuse their 
personal concerns with professional duties.
213
 
Yet, while most of the film’s administration strives to compensate, hide, and/or 
co-exist with their individual forms of lack, one man looks the opposite way.  
Biding his time until the moment arrives in which he can cast off all feelings of 
flaccidity, and stand erect for the first time; or at least, for the first time in a 
long while. 
 
2.6 Master-race 
 
Dr. Strangelove is more than just the scientific counterpart to General Ripper’s 
psychosis, but also represents the shadow of American President, Mirkin 
Muffley.  As the dark half of a whole body long since split, he is the wild and 
passionate Mr. Hyde to Muffley’s calm and rational Dr. Jekyll.  Id versus 
superego, desire versus reason; the two are not only played by the same man, 
but their constant and close proximity also connotes the image of two figures 
on either side of the looking glass (Figure 16).  As Rasmussen writes, they are 
 
variations on a single character.  Muffley’s balding head, transparent 
eyeglasses, and tranquil voice are superficially suited to a person of 
emotional detachment, propriety, and reason.  Strangelove’s flaring, 
bleached blond hair, dark glasses concealing hysterical eyes, tense voice, 
and mouth clenched in a mirthless smile betray lurking, violent passions.
214
 
Dark versus light, black versus white; Dr. Strangelove could be construed as a 
parable about the penalties incurred when the violent passions of the Id go 
unchecked by the calming influence of the more rational mind.  Or, it could be 
a story about dangers encountered when the desires of the Id merge with the 
hubris of the Ego to overtake the limits imposed by the Superego.  Either way, 
Strangelove chooses to escape the impotence of Muffley’s political waffling by 
surreptitiously pushing civilization to the brink of world-ending ‘wargasm.’ 
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Like General Ripper, it is not until the shackles of diplomacy have 
been cast aside, that Strangelove finally regains his masculinity, because only 
when the bombs are dropping does the doctor’s once folded body stand erect 
with a priapic stutter.  His stiff cyborg form now rising for the first time just as 
the world—and the film!—are blown apart in an act of orgasmic obsolescence.  
Mouth open, lungs screaming, Strangelove not only signals the birth of the 
cyborg master-race, but also one final act of celebration as the ‘Muff’ is 
displaced, and the veracity, vitality, and potent political power of the male 
phallus is once again reinstated, forced upon, and pushed into the earth.  With 
Gaia raped, the cyborg takes its rightful place as humanity’s only heir.  “Mein 
Führer, I can walk!” 
The technological transformations and social changes occurring in 
mid-twentieth America were extremely influential in regards to how we think 
about and represent the cyborg body.  One could argue that these mechanical 
changes to the human form are the culmination of numerous historical forces 
that combined to create and activate a man-machine image which has haunted 
Western culture since the early nineteenth century.
215  It is no coincidence then 
that a character so deeply marked by this history should dominate a film about 
the very processes that birthed the image on which that character is based. 
After all, if Dr. Strangelove is any indication of the politics associated 
with the cyborg body, there is obviously a very clear link between cyborgs, 
cybernetics, and the dangerous social, cultural, and political climate that 
sprung from Second World War, because even though NASA and MKULTRA 
are not responsible for birthing the original notion of human-machine 
integration, they were instrumental in the creation, promotion, and subsequent 
development of the creature as a physical possibility.  Each organization 
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provided both the theory and the motivation to generate such a body, while the 
parallel development of digital computing and artificial intelligence supplied 
the technological base from which to build that self.
216  It was in the 1960s that 
the cyborg was named, defined, understood, and invested with purpose.  It was 
here that the image was given a life outside fiction and art, where it acquired 
the power to exist and participate in the wider world, and essentially became 
real.  It is no wonder then that cyborgs during and after the late 1950s, often 
carry the same values and ideas regarding gender, violence, sexuality, and 
embodiment as their Cold War creators, since the image was born from and 
incubated within this particular context.
217  Even the cybernetic creatures that 
exist today tend to bear the same kind of Cold War mentality, since quite a 
number of our modern man-machines, both fictional and real, still symbolize 
and refer to the same ideas and events that not only define Dr. Strangelove, but 
also Dr. Strangelove. 
In spite of the numerous socio-political shifts which occurred after 
the Second World War, and despite our subsequent reworking of the human 
body to encompass a new and contradictory lived experience, Western culture 
did not suffer a true change in our collective subjectivity or ontology, but only 
a modification of what we as Westerners already were, or thought we were.  
Strangelove’s journey towards his filmic body is clearly not the sign of a 
changing consciousness, nor is it representative of a larger social 
transformation.  It does not qualify as a political and subjective reformation, 
nor does it even carry the potential for such a change, because rather than 
rejecting hegemonic ideas which support patriarchy, militarism, racism, and 
exploitation, Dr. Strangelove happily reinforces those concepts by improving 
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the majoritarian system that sustains both him, and his ideas.  His cyborgic 
transformation is not about autonomy or individuality, but a modification 
based on the confirmation, concentration, continuation, and propagation of the 
status quo.  It is a self rooted in orthodoxy, and the search for supremacy, not 
in self-knowledge, and the desire for personal sovereignty. 
Strangelove’s cyborg-self is deeply imbedded within the politics and 
discourse of the Cold War, making his place within that world as inescapable.  
He does not rise above America’s paranoid political climate, because he is 
somehow more than human, but instead falls downward towards the centre of 
that world, as he becomes increasingly involved in its continued operation and 
existence.  Subsequently, the final words of both Dr. Strangelove and Dr. 
Strangelove seem all the more appropriate, as his body was not only conceived 
by MAD science and incubated by its political system, but also instilled with 
problematic values and nihilistic goals.  In short, Dr. Strangelove signifies the 
ascendancy of American power, and the rise of the Western phallus, even as it 
illustrates the inevitability of their mutually assured destruction. 
As a rule, all cyborgs follow this same path, since all are derived from a 
single template; a being originally designed as an “exogenously extended 
organizational complex” specifically adapted to conquer space without the 
benefit of elaborate tools, suits, or bio domes.
218  As such, cybernetic bodies 
are rooted in Cold War paranoia and colonial practice, since the original 
creature was initially created not only to acquire and exploit for the benefit of 
empire, but also to eradicate potential competitors.  Issues of expansion and 
exploitation are thus unavoidable elements of the cyborg-self, because even if 
its creators intended to produce a being outside those concerns, their final 
product inevitably became a slave to the dominant ideas and anxieties of the 
culture it sprung from.  As Wiener once wrote: 
 
Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics thus 
stand in a moral position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable.  
We have contributed to the initiation of a new science, which, as I have 
said, embraces technical developments with great possibilities both for 
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good and for evil.  We can only hand it over into a world that exists about 
us, and this is the world of Belson and Hiroshima.
219
 
Revolution, whether political or subjective, is clearly not part of the cyborg’s 
agenda, because any inherent political leanings must be reflected in its overall 
representation, and frankly the kind of optimism demonstrated by Haraway 
does not coincide with a majority of the cyborg bodies found in Western 
popular culture.
220  In fact, each only serves to further obscure an image which 
is already difficult to explicate, while simultaneously undermining the 
progressive feminisms and subjectivities that each theorist is trying to support.  
Accordingly, the following chapter will attempt to articulate a clear alternative 
to contemporary visions of cyborg politics, so that the image itself can not only 
be placed within the correct context, but also the appropriate political 
framework: a goal which, if successful, will illuminate not only its structure, 
but also its role within that culture. 
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Part 2: Deciphering Cyborg Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   83
3: A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Haraway, Alien, and the Politics of 
Popular Representation 
 
3.1 Pumping Irony 
 
During an interview for the upcoming film Pumping Iron in 1976, champion 
bodybuilder and burgeoning mega star, Arnold Schwarzenegger, said the 
following: 
 
The greatest feeling you can get in a gym, or the most satisfying feeling 
you can get in a gym, is the pump. Let’s say you train your biceps. Blood is 
rushing into your muscles, and that's what we call ‘the pump.’ Your 
muscles get a really tight feeling like your skin is going to explode any 
minute. It’s really tight, it’s like somebody blowing air into your muscles, 
it just blows up and it feels different. It feels fantastic. It’s as satisfying to 
me as coming is; as having sex with a woman and coming. So can you 
believe how much I am in heaven? I’m like getting the feeling of coming in 
the gym. I'm getting the feeling of coming at home. I’m getting the feeling 
of coming backstage when I pump up, and when I pose out in front of 5000 
people, I get the same feeling. So I'm coming day and night. I mean it’s 
terrific, right?
221
 
3.2 Reading a Manifesto for Cyborgs 
 
Nine years later, and mere months after Schwarzenegger’s subsequent rebirth 
in the figure of the first Terminator, Donna Haraway published an article that 
would not only mark a turning point in contemporary feminist theory, but also 
the birthing point for the newly emerging field of cyborgology.
222  Written in 
response to second-wave feminists like Catherine McKinnon, Haraway’s “A 
Cyborg Manifesto” provided a dramatic alternative to the ideas put forward by 
similar writers from the same period, and by what can only be called other 
exclusionary feminisms born from the heady days of 1970s.
  223  Building on 
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the work of Chela Sandoval, as well as Haraway’s previous research regarding 
the gendered roots of science in culture, as well as the constructed nature of 
‘Nature’ itself, Haraway argued for the adoption of a subjective position that 
promoted affinity as opposed to unity, collaboration as opposed to 
incorporation, and coalition as opposed to what she saw as an emerging 
socialist-feminist hegemony.  One which “achieves its end—the unity of 
women—by enforcing the experience of, and testimony to, radical non-
being.”
224  In other words, a theory that inadvertently accomplishes “what 
Western patriarchy…never succeeded in doing”: forcing feminists to accept 
“the non-existence of women, except as products of men’s desire.”
225
Haraway sought to achieve these goals by exploring the incongruous 
and highly masculine fusion of animal and machine, and by professing a kind 
of “blasphemy” that would not only re-orient feminist theory away from the 
‘Goddess,’ but also find a means of solidifying the various factions within the 
feminist movement without enforcing one set of values or experiences on the 
larger whole.
226  Ironically, it was the fragmented structure of the cyborg body 
                                                                                                                                           
men’s constitution and appropriation of men sexually.  Ironically, McKinnon’s ‘ontology’ 
constructs a non subject, a non-being.  Another’s desire, not the self’s labour, is the origin of 
‘woman.’  She therefore develops a theory of consciousness that enforces what can count as 
‘women’s’ experience—anything that names sexual violation, indeed, sex itself as far as 
women be concerned.  Feminist practice is the construction of this form of consciousness; that 
is, the self-knowledge of a self-who-is-not” (158-159).  McKinnon writes: “Implicit in feminist 
theory is a parallel argument: the molding, direction, and expression of sexuality organizes 
society into two sexes—women and men—which division underlies the totality of social 
relations.  Sexuality is that social process which creates, organizes, expresses, and directs 
desire, creating the social beings we know as women and men, as their relations create society.  
As work is to Marxism, sexuality to feminism is socially constructed yet constructing, 
universal as activity yet historically specific, jointly comprised of matter and mind. As the 
organized expropriation of the work of some for the benefit of others defines a class-workers-
the organized expropriation of the sexuality of some for the use of others defines the sex, 
woman. Heterosexuality is its structure, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its 
qualities generalized to social persona, reproduction a consequence, and control its issue.”  
Catherine McKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory,” 
Signs 7.3 (Spring, 1982), p. 516.  For more on McKinnon see, Catherine McKinnon, Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
224 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 159.  For more on the work of Chela 
Sandoval see: “New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed,” The 
Cyborg Handbook, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 407-422; Methodology of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
225 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 159. 
226 Ibid, p. 149.  “This chapter is an attempt to build an ironic political myth faithful to 
feminism, socialism, and materialism.  Perhaps more faithful as blasphemy is faithful, than as 
reverent worship and identification…I know of no better stance to adopt from within the 
secular-religious, evangelical traditions of United States politics…Blasphemy protects one 
from the moral majority within…Irony is about humour and serious play.  It is also a rhetorical   85
that provided Haraway with the metaphorical framework by which to congeal 
and strengthen the position of all women.  A template—now propagated by a 
German Terminator—that would supposedly grant equal space to all 
perspectives and ideas no matter how diverse or antithetical, and which would 
therefore fail to facilitate the exclusion of one value system in favour of 
another: a strategy often employed by white feminists in the name of 
confederacy.
227  This new framework would strive to create partnerships 
between divergent factions, producing a relaxed network of affiliated groups 
that could work toward positive social change while remaining adaptable to 
fluctuating social, cultural, and political climates.  Like the diverse and 
dualistic structure of the cyborg itself, Haraway’s ideas would be inclusive, not 
exclusive, and as such willing to embrace new methods and new modes of 
thinking without resorting to the old cry of unity.  As Haraway writes: 
 
Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for 
appropriation or incorporation by the other.  The relationships for forming 
wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, 
are at issue in the cyborg world.  Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s 
monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a 
restoration of the garden; that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual 
mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos
228
 
                                                                                                                                           
strategy and political method, one I would like to see more honoured within socialist-
feminism.  At the centre of my ironic faith, my blasphemy, is the image of the cyborg…” 
227 Arnold Schwarzenegger’s father, Gustav Schwarzenegger, was a known Nazi.  As a 
member of the Nazi party from March 1, 1938, and a member of the S.A. from May 1, 1939, 
the elder Schwarzenegger was a “convinced Nazi” well before his home country of Austria 
was annexed by Germany on March 12, 1938 (USA Today).  As of now, the details of his war 
record are unknown, but “Ursula Schwarz, a historian at Vienna's Documentation Center for 
Austrian Resistance, said she believed Gustav Schwarzenegger's war record was run of the 
mill for an Austrian of his generation” (CommonDreams.org).  Nevertheless, the connection 
exists.  For more on Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Nazi connections see: “Records: Arnold’s 
Father was Member of Nazi Storm Troops,” USA Today (August 24, 2003), Accessed 16 
November 2007: http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2003-08-24-arnold-
father_x.htm; “Spotlight Thrown on Nazi Past of Schwarzenegger’s Father,” 
CommonDreams.org (August 25, 2003), Accessed 16 November 2007: 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0825-06.htm
228 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 151.  For Haraway solidarity does not require 
unity because unity is a fiction.  Unity of thought and opinion lead only to stagnation and the 
patriarchal traps of heritage and tradition.  Elements the cyborg manages to escape, 
supposedly, because it resists wholeness in favour of fragmentation; thereby avoiding the 
centre in favour of the margins.  Accordingly, liminality becomes position of strength, since it 
allows a person to critique, appropriate, and disrupt the social order while remaining 
simultaneously separate and malleable.  To quote Haraway: “Stripped of identity the bastard 
race teaches us about the power of the margins…Women of color have transformed…the evil 
mother of masculinist fear into the originally literate mother who teaches survival.  This is not 
just literary deconstruction, but liminal transformation” (176-177).   86
The Terminator, which Haraway later described as “the sign of the 
beast on the face of postmodern culture, the sign of the Sacred Image of the 
Same”, is certainly not the body Haraway had in mind.
229  However, even now 
almost twenty-five years after it first appeared, Schwarzenegger’s “mensch-
machine” still haunts the feasibility and purpose of her manifesto; hanging 
there, just beyond the fringe of her ideas, even as she seeks to subvert its 
power by pulling the cyborg away from the context of the Cold War.
230  
Encouraging her fellow scholars to not only re-evaluate the supposedly 
genderless nature of contemporary technologies, but to also resignify the 
cyborg body by constructing a fresh set of cybernetic values in order to 
illuminate the gendered realities of all technology.  An act that would ideally 
“strike fear into the…supersavers of the new right…[by] both building and 
destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories.”
231  
Terminators beware. 
Clearly, these are values which seek to place the cyborg beyond the 
work of Manfred Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, as well as beyond the reach of 
both Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, by bestowing a subjective position 
contrary to the patriarchal overtones of psychoanalysis.  As Haraway once 
remarked during an interview with both Constance Penley and Andrew Ross in 
1991: 
 
As a strategic and emotional matter, I really am hostile to the Oedipal 
accounts and their mutants, not because I don’t recognize their power, but 
because I am too convinced of their power.  Again, it’s the problem of 
being in the belly of the monster and looking for another story to tell.
232
 
It was this search for new stories that made Haraway’s manifesto so 
significant.  Moreover, it was her articulation and subsequent skewing of the 
cyborg body into the realm of feminist theory that really laid the foundation for 
                                                 
229 Donna J. Haraway, “Cyborgs and Symbionts,” p. xv. 
230 The German mensch-machine is manifest not only in Arnold Schwarzenegger, but also in 
the music of Kraftwerk, and even in the British band Ultravox!  For example, Kraftwerk’s 
1978 album is actually called Die Mensch-Machine, while Ultravox’s 1977 LP Ultravox! 
contains the song, “I Want to Be a Machine”; a title which alludes to a very famous 1963 
statement, in which Andy Warhol declared the same desire. 
231 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 181.  Strangely, Haraway’s reference to 
space stories is not directly connected to the Clynes and Kline paper, “Cyborgs and Space.”  
Haraway had never seen the article until it was shown to her by Chris Hables Gray in the early 
1990s, see: Donna J. Haraway, “Cyborgs and Symbionts,” p. xix, note 2. 
232 Constance Penley, Andrew Ross, and Donna Haraway, “Cyborgs at Large,” p. 14.   87
the further development and study of the cyborg in general.  Today it remains a 
near-universally accepted fact by feminists the world over that technology can 
no longer be left to the pleasure of the Superpower and Übermensch.  Thanks 
to Haraway’s manifesto, “Nature” is no longer recognized as “resistant to 
patriarchal capitalism,” because as Constance Penley put it, “women…had 
better start using technologies before technologies start using them.”
233
Donna Haraway defines the cyborg as a “hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”
234  
Reiterating an obvious truth since the man-machine is not simply a cybernetic 
monster comprised of organic and inorganic components, but also the image of 
“our time”.  As Haraway writes, today “we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short we are cyborgs.”
235  
After all, images of human-machine integration saturate almost every aspect of 
our culture; infecting not just narrative, but also the workplace and the home.  
Even in 1995, about 25 million people in the United States alone were 
 
estimated to be cyborgs in one form or another, including those with 
electronic pacemakers, artificial limbs, drug implant systems, implanted 
corneal lenses, and artificial skin.  A much higher percentage [were] 
involved in jobs which [made] them metaphoric cyborgs, [such as 
computer programming, robotic surgery, and basically any other profession 
involving prolonged exposure to, and/or mediation through, high 
technology].
236
 
This statistic ignores an even larger percentage exposed to cybernetic imagery 
on a day to day basis; people who see and hear cyborgs in innumerable media 
such as film, television, music, advertising, literature, art, and architecture.   
Moreover, given the rise in computer sales and use, as well as jobs involving 
machinery and technology, not to mention the tremendous scientific and 
technological advancements which have occurred since the mid 1990s, these 
are percentages which could only have increased since the survey was first 
performed.
237
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234 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 149. 
235 Ibid, p. 150. 
236 N. Katherine Hayles, “The Life Cycle of Cyborgs,” p. 322. 
237 Since the competition of that particular survey in the mid-1990s, there have been a number 
of advances which have only further linked the human body to concepts of information, data 
streams, and the increasing collusion of the bio and mechanical.  For example, the human   88
Cyborgs populate our everyday lives, and most of the time, they are 
so ubiquitous that we do not notice them.  A simple search through one’s 
memory will reveal filmic versions of human-machine amalgamation 
stretching from Metropolis (1926) to Star Wars (1977) to the The Terminator 
(1984).  In television, there was the cybernetic bargain known as Six Million 
Dollar Man (1973-1978) as well as his less successful, and somewhat 
hysterical, female counterpart, The Bionic Woman (1976-1978).  There is also 
the murderous Borg race of Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987-1994), and 
the stringently logical Cybermen who first appeared on the UK’s long-running 
Doctor Who series in 1966.  In the field of popular music, Kraftwerk are 
perhaps the best known representations of human-machine integration; often 
presenting themselves as artificial people and/or products.  Such self-
representation complements Kraftwerk’s somewhat unusual view of 
themselves, since they refuse to be seen as musicians, but rather as scientists. 
More interestingly, contemporary architecture is also populated with 
cyborgic forms; designs which combine curved organic shapes with both high-
tech construction techniques and materials such as glass.  Notably, the link 
between cybernetics and architecture is not a new idea.  Cybernetician Gordon 
Pask postulated just such a connection nearly thirty-six years ago in his paper, 
“The Architectural Relevance of Cybernetics.”  Of course, like any true 
cybernetician Pask viewed the connection between the two disciplines in a 
systematic sense, using terms like “releasers” and “feedback” to describe 
buildings and constructed space.  As Pask writes in relation to Spanish 
architect Antoni Gaudí: 
                                                                                                                                           
genome was completed in April 2003, and reduced DNA to a computer code.  The completion 
of such a project has strong similarities to that of The Visible Human Project.  Another 
undertaking by the medical sciences which sought to better understand the human body and its 
anatomy by slicing up the cadaver of a condemned prisoner into thousands of transparent 
slivers, and then scanning those slices into a computerized database.  Not only translating the 
human form into a kind of text, but also transforming it irrevocably into something illusive, 
incorporeal, and totally non-existent outside the confines of a computer—and even then, only 
partially.  As Catherine Waldby writes of the Visible Human: “Just as Da Vinci’s ratiocinative 
anatomies have served as icons for humanist knowledge and technical modernity, so the 
Visible Human Project has been taken up as a new iconography of ‘Man’ for the virtual future, 
a future in which all content, even the mysterious materiality of the human body, can be hyper-
mediated, transported and traversed by computer.  It circulates in the media as evidence of the 
near future, token of empowering biotechnical innovations yet to come”  Catherine Waldby, 
The Visible Human Project: Informatic Bodies and Posthuman Medicine (London: Routledge, 
2000). p. 4.  For more on the Visible Human Project see the website for the U.S. National 
Library of Medicine: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/visible/visible _human.html  89
 
[Cybernetic architecture] reaches maturity in Gaudí’s work, especially the 
Parque Guell which, at a symbolic level, is one of the most cybernetic 
structures in existence.  As you explore the piece, statements are made in 
terms of releasers, your exploration is guided by specially contrived 
feedback, and variety (surprise value) is introduced at appropriate points to 
make you explore.
238
 
Later, architect John Frazer would align himself and his work with an aesthetic 
philosophy deeply indebted to cybernetics, and thus to those texts produced 
previously by Gordon Pask.  Indeed, as Frazer wrote in his book, An 
Evolutionary Architecture: 
 
An evolutionary architecture will exhibit metabolism.  It will enjoy a 
thermodynamically open relationship with the environment in both a 
metabolic and a socio-economic sense.  It will maintain stability with the 
environment by negative feedback interactions and promote evolution in its 
employment of positive feedback (Frazer, 253).
239
 
As such, the cyborg has not only become one of the most pervasive and 
powerful images of the 20
th and 21
st Centuries, but as Haraway declares, it has 
become “our ontology; it gives us our politics.”
240
Yet, what are those politics and upon what are they based?  Personally, 
I am not convinced the cyborg, its subjectivity, and the politics therein, are as 
revolutionary, or as beneficial as Haraway would have us believe.  Judging 
from cyborg representation over the last 60 years, the image often aligns itself 
with the absolute inverse of Haraway’s innovative and potentially valuable 
brand of feminism.  Indeed, even though her readings of certain feminist 
science-fiction texts are for the most part, correct; her assumption that all 
cyborgs can and must naturally follow suit is absolutely untrue.  Bear in mind, 
despite Haraway’s acknowledgement that cyborgs are in essence, “the 
illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism,” she dismisses 
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240 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 150.   90
the implications of this potential bombshell far too quickly.
241  And despite her 
assertions that cyborgs often challenge dualisms “systematic to the logics and 
practices of the domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, [and] 
animals”, she has ignored the fact that the cyborg itself is a walking-talking 
dualism.
242  One, which in spite of an inherent ability to blur and corrode the 
boundaries of its own internal dichotomies, nevertheless enforces the values 
and ideals of a culture based on the principles of self over other, mind over 
body, culture over nature, male over female, whole over part, civilized over 
primitive.  Behold Exhibit A(lien). 
 
3.3 Reading a Manifesto for Misogyny 
 
Ash rips a clump of hair from Ripley’s head.  On the floor, she “hurriedly 
moves on all fours trying to get out of [her attacker’s] reach”.  Yet, before she 
can run away, Ash “grabs her by the back of her flight suit, and with 
superhuman strength, throws her against a wall.”
243  Ash is standing over 
Ripley who now lies on a bed surrounded by pornographic photos and female 
pinups.  With his eyes blinking rapidly, he rolls a XXX magazine into a tight 
hard tube, and begins to stuff it down Ripley’s throat (Figure 17).  She awakes 
under the sudden pressure and tries to fight off the attack, but once again Ash 
is much too strong.  As the magazine starts to penetrate further, the sound of 
Ripley’s muffled cries brings her colleagues, Parker (a black man) and 
Lambert (a white woman), into the room.  Parker picks up a fire extinguisher 
and strikes the abuser.  Ash releases the magazine and Ripley is freed, but the 
force of the blow causes Ash to whirl and thrash about the ship.  Spewing 
whiteness from his mouth in an uncontrollable fit, as his damaged and flailing 
body emits “a high-pitched squealing sound, proclaiming his alienness,” while 
his neck continues to spew liquid goo into every corner of the bedroom.
244  
This is a male orgasm gone horribly wrong; or perhaps more disturbingly, 
horribly right. 
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244 Ibid, p. 49.   91
Again Parker hits Ash with the extinguisher, and this time manages to 
rip off his head.  As Ash’s body falls to the floor it squirms and convulses 
while endlessly spraying white glop from its throat.  To stop it, Parker beats 
Ash more and more while the white man’s inhuman physique thrashes about in 
what is; a) either a vain attempt to resist the black man’s blows; or b) the 
orgasmic throes of homo-erotic masochism.  Either way, the struggle continues 
until Ash is subdued.  With the officer’s apparently lifeless body still spurting, 
and with Parker now covered in Ash’s whiteness, the black man remarks: 
“Jesus…It’s a robot.  Ash is a goddamn robot.”
245
In truth, Ash is a godless cyborg; a man “[c]ast violently out of the 
robotic closet” to reveal a creature whose behaviour and appearance are not 
simply “contextualized as inhuman transgression,” but also irrevocably coded 
as that of rapist.
246  Judging from his violent treatment of Ripley, and his 
subsequent expulsion of white ejaculate all over Parker’s black body, Ash 
clearly imbues a number of disturbing sexual fetishes, as well as some very 
telling racist tendencies.  Propensities which seek to erase, assimilate, 
incorporate, and/or destroy all those deemed to be threatening or inferior.   
However, before we investigate Ash’s representation as rapist, as well as his 
inherent racism, we should first examine his basic role as cyborg within Alien 
through his familial relationship with two very important characters also 
trapped aboard the Nostromo.
247  In doing so, this discussion can not only 
provide a better understanding of the man-machine’s role within the film, but 
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also better explicate any underlying political affinities attached to this 
particular character. 
For instance, today there remains a widely accepted belief within Sci-Fi 
cinema studies that Alien is more about gender, reproduction, genetics, and 
family  than it is about gore and guts, and considering Ridley Scott’s 
representation of the cyborg, the ship, its crew, and the monster within, this 
idea is absolutely correct since the movie itself reads like a rather chilling 
parody of the old maxim: “It takes a village to raise a child.”  After all, not 
only is Ash a sexually abusive misogynist, but also a ‘man’ who throughout 
the film, is consistently fashioned into the role of Father: the vital counterpart 
to the ship’s negligent and all-knowing computer system, otherwise known as 
MU/TH/UR.
248
More than any other motif, parental and Mother imagery in particular 
pervade Ridley Scott’s Alien.
249  They infect the gales of unfamiliar planets, 
and permeate even the nothingness of space, defining the relationships 
generated between each and every character; whether male, female, alien or 
otherwise.  In fact, the film’s maternal themes are so pervasive that even the 
men in this movie are not only contained within, and controlled by the limits of 
a giant metallic womb, but are also menaced by their own reformation into 
potential Mothers, as each of them is transformed into a disembodied uterus 
for the film’s namesake.  Producing a mere inkling of what feminist scholar, 
Barbara Creed, once coined as a manifestation of the “monstrous-feminine.”
250
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250 Shown throughout the film as “a complex representation of women as archaic mother,” the 
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articulation of the colossal womb.  A reproductive site that is simultaneously generative and 
acidic; a kind of uterine womb/tomb that not only gives birth, but also threatens to consume, 
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dark female orifice that threatens to remove one’s manhood, even as it confirms one’s 
masculinity.  After all, aside from the mouth of the Alien itself, the MU/TH/UR embodied 
within the Nostromo occupies this Freudian nightmare more than any other presence within   93
Creed’s term specifically refers to a grotesque female archetype in 
which the power of the Mother is continually reaffirmed, while her all-
encompassing Motherhood, or womb/tomb, is vilified and perverted to the 
point of nightmarish snuff film.  As film critic David Thomson writes: 
 
What made audiences scream in 1979, what had some people vomiting as 
they ran away, was the eruption from within.  For I think very few people 
then foresaw that the monster was going to demand birth from the body.  
We had never seen one breaking out of another…We had not really 
understood the title Alien until this scene, and the absolute parasitic 
subduing of one organism by another…the body seemed very secure then.  
And the nausea, the gulping, the retching, came in the sudden upheaval of 
understanding, of what had been done down Kane’s throat.  For the man 
had been made pregnant.
251
 
Ash ‘the cyborg’ and his partner ‘the ship,’ are a strange familial pair to be 
sure.  Especially since the womb that produced their alien ‘Son’ is external to 
both their respective bodies.  Yet make no mistake, both are members of the 
same parental coupling, and each combine to gestate, nurture, and protect their 
progeny.  Kane, that “poor bastard” who died on the dinner table, is merely a 
surrogate. 
 
3.4 Reading a Manifesto for Rapists 
 
The Alien is not only the violent centre of Ridley Scott’s future family unit, 
but a being whose sleek and phallic body also acts as the perfect complement, 
double, and/or reflection to Ash’s hyper-masculine cyborg self.
252  F o r  
                                                                                                                                           
the film, because the ship contains, embodies, and reflects a copious amount of “womb-like 
imagery”, such as “long winding tunnels leading to inner chambers…rows of hatching eggs, 
the body of the mother-ship, the voice of the life-support system, and the birth of the Alien” 
itself.  Moreover, the MU/TH/UR-ship is also filled with warm, soothing, and ethereal spaces, 
as well as dark passages bordered by sharp metallic sphincters which not only squeal as they 
contract, but presumably, also sever as they tighten and close.  Inevitably, Creed’s theory of 
the monstrous-feminine is even present in the poster for Alien; in the abject, oozing, and acidic 
egg with the vaginal cleft at its base: a dark vagina that not only threatens to produce, but 
perhaps, to also continually reproduce a race of horrible, misshapen, unnatural, inhuman 
monsters.  Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith, Alien Woman: The Making of Lt. Ellen 
Ripley,  p. 7.  For more on the monstrous-feminine see: Barbara Creed, “Alien and the 
Monstrous Feminine,” Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction 
Cinema, ed. Annette Kuhn (New York: Verso, 1990), pp. 128-141; Barbara Creed, The 
Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
251 David Thomson, The Alien Quartet (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), p. 49. 
252 MU/TH/UR and the ship’s science officer, Ash, combine their forces to acquire, gestate, 
and protect the Alien killer.  The two stop at nothing to ensure the Alien’s survival, even 
rescinding all other priorities, including the health of the crew, to achieve this end.  In this 
sense, these two characters are the Alien’s adoptive parents.  The fact that Ash is the only   94
example, one is a penis made manifest, and as such, the epitome of naked 
masculine sexual aggression; an extraterrestrial monster that is constantly 
fulfilling its wish for domination, penetration, and bodily violation; the other is 
a carcass literally brimming with ejaculate, its overt sexuality suggesting the 
Son follows the Father, as there are several physical and behaviour links 
joining the two characters.
253
The relationship between the cyborg and the Alien is nothing if not 
disturbing, because both the Father and the Son constitute differing halves of a 
larger whole.  As if each piece of this bizarre pair plays an essential role in the 
production of what can only be seen as the ultimate rape fantasy.  That is, the 
fabrication of a huge phallic erection, the endless ejaculation thereof, as well as 
the domination and sexual violation of the movie’s only two women, thereby.  
After all, the Son is a monster coded as male, a body constructed from a stiff 
and impenetrable exterior that can puncture and dissolve through anything in 
the known universe.  Moreover, it is also a creature whose jaws literally drip 
with sexual lubricant, and whose tendons are composed of shredded 
condoms.
254  The Son has a body made for sex, with a form impossibly hard 
and at the ready, but unfortunately, one which also lacks the necessary ‘seed’ 
to complete its primary function.  Conversely, Ash carries nothing but his seed, 
                                                                                                                                           
consistent character on the ship with access to MU/TH/UR, and the only one to whom 
MU/TH/UR discloses everything to, only compounds their close familial relationship. 
253 There is also the possibility that Ash could be construed as the ‘Son’ rather than the 
‘Father,’ since as Gallardo and Smith point out, he often relays information and follows orders 
“like a dutiful son.”  However, this model does not work nearly as well, because from a 
psychoanalytic perspective Ash never follows an oedipal trajectory when forced into the role 
of Son.  Whereas, a decidedly oedipal relationship is present with Ash as Father, Alien as Son, 
and MU/TH/UR as—of course—the Mother.  After all, the Alien crawls around inside 
MU/TH/UR like a child forcing itself back into the safety of the womb.  Moreover, we can 
only presume that the Alien would also kill Ash if the two ever met, since the creature shows 
no mercy to all humanoid life-forms.  Furthermore, if we were to assume Ash is the Son, then 
the question remains, where does the Alien fall into the film’s familial dynamic?  The Alien 
could be construed as Kane’s son, but this is not only a faulty supposition, but also a rather 
clumsy one, since it creates a very unwieldy family tree filled with half-brothers, and distant 
relations.  Instead, it would be more appropriate to stick with my original formulation and 
label Kane is as a kind of surrogate pod—an egg, which both Ash and MU/TH/UR helped lay, 
nurture, and then discard.  Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith, Alien Woman: The 
Making of Lt. Ellen Ripley, p. 29. 
254 Ibid, p. 26.  As Gallardo and Smith note: “Special effects wizard Carlo Rimbaldi was called 
in to make the [Alien’s] head.  Appropriately, for such an obviously phallic creature, ‘six 
stretched and shredded condoms doubled as tendons’ to allow the Alien’s lips to curl…and its 
jaws [were] smeared in KY jelly [a sexual lubricant] before shooting.’”  For more information 
see the made-for-TV documentary: The Alien Saga, dir. Brett Zachy (20
th Century Fox, 2002).   95
futilely striving to penetrate others with his hopelessly soft body, so that he can 
not only ejaculate, but presumably, also violate and impregnate. 
Inevitably, the film’s alienation of Erection and Ejaculation, of noun 
and verb, ensures that such an aggressive merger and monolithic manifestation 
of masculine power will never occur between Father and Son.  At least not in 
the world of Alien, since the physical estrangement between the cyborg and the 
monster-phallus signifies an enormous sense of lack within each individual 
self.  Indeed, even though both creatures are powerful males, each is ultimately 
fragmented and impotent, because neither retains enough of their manhood to 
retain the title of Man.  Strangely, some theorists have taken this point and 
misconstrued it as proof of a “third sex” within the film franchise.
255  Framing 
both Ash and Alien as androgynous bodies typifying both male and female 
characteristics, insisting, as Gallardo and Smith do, that even if 
 
Ash is gendered [as] male… he cannot properly be described as having a 
‘sex’ at all.  Even if he does have a penis and testes, they are not real 
biological organs and serve no real biological function.  His ‘sex’ would 
serve a performative purpose only, allowing him to pass as a normal male 
in tight quarters.
256
 
Such a formulation would naturally align Ash with Haraway’s manifesto, since 
she also maintains that cyborgs are “creatures in a post-gendered world” and 
that they have “no truck with bi-sexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated 
labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation 
of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity.”
257  Yet, the notion of a third 
or “post-gendered” sex within Alien is ultimately faulty, because the idea treats 
the film far too literally.  In truth, Ash is a male.  He acts like a male, looks 
like a male, and performs sexually as a male—albeit an impotent male.  The 
fact that his penis is not a natural organ is irrelevant.  It is there.  And if it does 
not exist physically, then he is certainly laying claim to the patriarchal rights 
inherent to that appendage through acts of violence, feminization, and rape.  
The very absence or unnaturalness of the penis merely makes his inherent lack 
all the more sinister.  Rape after all, is an act of the profoundly inadequate, 
                                                 
255 Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith, Alien Woman: The Making of Lt. Ellen Ripley, p. 
50. 
256 Ibid, p. 51. 
257 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 150.   96
since as a feat of violence it is rooted in a “[man’s] sense of psychological 
weakness toward women.”
258  As Celia Farber remarked during an interview 
with Camille Paglia: 
 
In the case of rape, a man has to use brute force to obtain something that a 
woman has—her very sex.  So naturally she’s weaker physically, and will 
always be oppressed by him physically.  But in that moment when he 
decides that the only way he can get what he wants from her emotionally, 
or sexually, or whatever, is to rape her, he is confessing to a weakness that 
is all encompassing.  She is abused, but he is utterly tragic and pathetic.  
One is temporary and the other is permanent.
259
 
Positing the cyborg as a rapist, which on the surface is an extremely powerful 
role, only serves to compound the figure’s innate sense of lack, and its desire 
to fill that lack by means of gross overcompensation.  Because even as a sex 
offender exerts power to confirm or assert his own masculinity he is also 
simultaneously verifying that he has none.
260  Accordingly, Ash’s body is not 
simply incomplete, but also driven by a desire to mend that fragmentation 
through massive overcompensation, and to essentially repair itself by enforcing 
the illusion of wholeness on its varied and broken parts.
261  Like a child 
                                                 
258 Camille Paglia, “Rape and Modern Sex War,” Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays 
(New York: Vintage, 1992), p. 52. 
259 Camille Paglia, “The Rape Debate, Continued,” Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays 
(New York: Vintage, 1992), p. 52.  As an aside, I should note that using Camille Paglia’s 
views on rape is not without some danger.  For instance, are the psychological effects of rape 
really temporary as Paglia and Farber assert?  I doubt it.  Yet, even if Paglia’s views on rape 
are somewhat suspect, her thoughts on the rapist are in many ways absolutely correct, and 
therefore worth consideration.  For a few responses to Camille Paglia’s highly controversial 
comments on the subject of rape and male sexuality see: Leslie Rebecca Bloom, “A Feminist 
Reading of Men's Health: Or, When Paglia Speaks, the Media Listens,” Journal of Medical 
Humanities 18.1 (December 1997). pp 59-73; Helen Benedict, Virgin or Vamp: How the Press 
Covers Sex Crimes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Beth Loffreda, “Of Stallions 
and Sycophants: Camille Paglia's Sexual Personae,” Social Text 30 (1992), pp. 121-124; Sue 
O'Sullivan, “Camille Paglia's Sex, Art, and American Culture,” Feminist Review 49 (Spring, 
1995), pp. 108-114.  For a history on the damaging treatment of women by the judicial system 
after rape see: Peggy Reeves Sanday, A Woman Scorned: Acquaintance Rape on Trial (New 
York: Doubleday, 1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation 
and the Failure of Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, Rape 
and the Culture of the Courtroom (New York: New York University Press, 1999). 
260 Jonathan Goldberg writes: “For excessive coming…disconnects phallus and penis.  In such 
dispersal, the body itself is shattered even as it is built.”  Jonathan Goldberg, “Recalling 
Totalities,” p. 236. 
261 In their 1972 book, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari make the following remark: “…the machine remains desire, an investment of desire 
whose history unfolds, by way of the primary repression and the return of the repressed” (41).  
Although Deleuze and Guattari are referring directly to the idea of “desiring-machines,” or a 
mechanisms which are “proof of the loss or repression of desire”, their statement can still be 
applied to the body of Ash (40).  After all, as a synthetic person Ash is not only a product of   97
undergoing the mirror phase, both the rapist and the cyborg cling to their own 
form of the Symbolic drama, rushing from “insufficiency to anticipation”.  In 
the words of Jacques Lacan, such an effort 
 
manufactures for the subject, captive to the lure of spatial identification, 
the succession of phantasies from a fragmented body-image to a form of its 
totality which we shall call orthopaedic, and to the assumption, finally, of 
the armour of an alienating identity, which will stamp the rigidity of its 
structure on the whole of the subject's mental development.
262
 
To put it simply, Ash not only seeks to create an overall identity, but to also 
impose a feeling of unity upon his person through the subjugation of other 
people and his environment.  Unfortunately, this unity is always temporary 
since a rapist must always take (his) sex from another, and thus continually 
recreate and/or reassert his own sense of self by reliving the same scenario 
over and over again.  Thus, contrary to the views proposed by Haraway’s 
manifesto, women will always  be “the resource for appropriation or 
incorporation” by the rapist-man-machine, because “the relationships for 
forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical 
domination, are [never] at issue in the cyborg world.”
263
There are five scenes within Alien involving overt acts of sexual 
abuse against both men and women.  Three of which are successful, two of 
which are attempted.  Two of those violations are committed by the Father, 
while the remainder belongs to the Son.  In each instance, MU/TH/UR remains 
distant and uninvolved, as her apparent inaction serves only to condone the 
actions of both her partner and their progeny.  Hence, the film’s familial 
                                                                                                                                           
The Company, but in relation to the theories of Deleuze and Guattari, he is also “product” 
which has had the process of production “grafted” on to it by the process of production itself 
(39-40).  Ash is both a desiring-machine, and a machine that desires.  For more see: Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: 
Continuum, 2004). 
262 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the ‘I’ Function,” Écrits: A Selection, 
trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 4.  To clarify, Lacan 
refers to this stage of development as ‘orthopaedic,’ because a child in this phase of life is 
underdeveloped, and therefore incapable of living without help from another.  It also refers to 
the initial stages of the child’s burgeoning identity, because during this time the child’s sense 
of self-awareness is still being formed.  For a comprehensive reading of the mirror phase and 
its implications see: Elizabeth Grosz, “Psychoanalysis and the Body,” Feminist Theory and the 
Body: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1999).  For more on the life and work of Jacques 
Lacan see: Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elisabeth 
Roundinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997). 
263 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 151.   98
subtext can be formulated as such: Abusive Father (Cyborg) + Negligent 
Mother (C3I) = Rapist Son (Phallus).  Predictably, Lt. Ellen Ripley, the film’s 
female protagonist and feminist heroine, is subjected to at least two counts of 
attempted rape by both the Father and the Son.  In the first instance, Ripley 
manages to escape, but only after succumbing to a forced act of fellatio from a 
eunuch cyborg.  Luckily, she is able to break Ash’s grip before his orgasmic 
climax, thereby avoiding the taboo, abject, and possibly incestuous violation of 
being forcibly contaminated by another’s bodily fluids.  Kane, on the other 
hand, and Parker in particular, as the film’s only non-white, are not nearly so 
fortunate. 
Ripley’s second sexual assault occurs at the end of the film at the 
hands of the Alien-Son.  It is here, on the deck of an escape pod named the 
Narcissus that elements from two previous rape scenes are played out 
simultaneously.
264  First, the Son’s effort to ‘complete’ Ripley’s previous 
abuse at the hands of his Father; and second, the Son’s desire to relive his 
previous violation of Lambert; the ship’s only other female crewmember.  In 
this final scene between Ripley and the Alien, the violent desires of both the 
Father and the Son are aligned along a single trajectory.  Binding the 
characters inextricably, as they share a wish to not only penetrate Ripley’s 
“hard-body,” but to also satiate a mutual need to meld death and desire in the 
act of physical pleasuring.
265  To quote Harvey Greenberg’s description of the 
movie’s final scene: 
                                                 
264 The work of Joseph Conrad appears once more in Alien.  This time the film is referring to 
Conrad’s 1897 novella The Nigger of ‘The Narcissus’, which is about the crew of a merchant 
ship sailing from Bombay to London.  Again, the parallels between Scott’s movie and 
Conrad’s fiction are hard to miss, especially since themes of isolation pervade Conrad’s 
novella.  After all, Scott’s escape vessel is a designed for a single occupant.  There might also 
be a connection in terms of crew numbers between each vessel, because aboard Conrad’s 
Narcissus there are eight sailors, while aboard Scott’s Nostromo there are an equal number of 
occupants, if one includes the Alien.  For more see: Joseph Conrad, The Nigger of ‘The 
Narcissus’ (New York: Penguin Classics, 2007); Norris W. Yates, “Social Comment in the 
Nigger of Narcissus,” PMLA 79.1 (March, 1964), pp. 183-185. 
265 The “hard-body” is not a natural body, but is instead akin to a kind of “techno-body” drawn 
from the “technique or technology” of bodybuilding.  The conceit of the human hard body, 
whether male or female, was a major theme in Hollywood during the 1980s, often reflecting a 
significant cultural and political shift felt under the Reagan administration.  Although, Alien 
was released one year before Ronald Reagan took office, Ripley’s lean and muscular frame, as 
well as the courage and level-headedness which allowed her to dispose of the Alien, certainly 
codes her as a hard bodied hero.  Or at the very least, as a sort of proto-type for the ultimate 
hard-body: namely, Velasquez, the female ‘grunt’ in the sequel Aliens.  For more on the hard-
body see: Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith, Alien Woman: The Making of Lt. Ellen   99
 
Unlike the blinding speed of its earlier assaults, [the Alien] moves slowly, 
languorously.  It stretches its phallic head out, as if preening.  Ripley, her 
horrified gaze fixed hypnotically upon it, retreats stealthily into the 
equipment locker.  It extends a ramrod tongue [the phallus within the 
phallus], tipped with hinged teeth from which drips luminescent slime (KY 
jelly!), and hisses voluptuously.  The very air is charged with the palpable 
threat of rape—and worse.
266
 
Concordantly, there are several filmic elements within this scene, which betray 
the use of XXX photographic techniques.  As Gallardo and Smith point out, 
many of the shots, especially those of Ripley semi-naked and in the closet, are 
filmed from below “with a hand held camera in extreme close-up focusing on 
the face, vagina, and phallus [Alien], all to which [the director] will add a 
soundtrack featuring panting and climactic screams a bit later.”
267  Moreover, 
without any ‘protection’ by which to counter the Alien, whether it be weapons 
to ward off physical harm, or clothes to guard against the male gaze, Ripley is 
left with nothing but her sex (Figure 18).  The film’s once formidable heroine 
is now rendered totally vulnerable to an assault in nothing but her spotless 
white panties and extra small undershirt.  Any shred of subjectivity, power, or 
personhood that she once had has now been literally ‘stripped’ away, leaving 
only weakness, subjection, and objectification.
268
As the creature slowly approaches Ripley, an identical soundtrack to 
the one played during Lambert’s violation sounds in the background.  Thereby, 
helping to “re-create the scene as a sexual encounter,” and as such further 
embed our heroine in the midst of an archetypal rape-slasher scenario, in 
                                                                                                                                           
Ripley, p. 85; Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994). 
266 Harvey R. Greenberg, “Reimagining the Gargoyle: Psychoanalytic Notes on Alien,” Close 
Encounters: Film Feminism and Science Fiction, ed. Constance Penley et al (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 83-84.  Note: it is interesting that the idea of the 
phallus within the phallus echoes the interior of Rocket 00000 at the end of Gravity’s 
Rainbow; the hyper-masculine recalled. 
267 Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith. Alien Woman: The Making of Lt. Ellen Ripley, p. 
56. 
268 Sigourney Weaver describes the scene as such: “You’re almost seeing me through the 
alien’s eyes.  Suddenly I go from a dark green animal to a pink and white animal.  Ridley and I 
had so much fun working out the ending.  There were so many different endings.  One of them 
was that the alien would surprise me and I would run into the closet where I’d take off my suit 
and put on another.  So there would have been a moment when the alien would see me 
between suits and be fascinated.  Because the alien isn’t evil.  It’s just following its natural 
instincts to reproduce through whatever living organisms are around it.”  David Thomson, The 
Alien Quartet, pp. 70-71.  100
which the Man with the Knife approaches the “Final Girl” who seemingly, has 
no place left to run.
269  With the slow movements of the Son now echoing his 
previous performance with Lambert, we as audience members cannot help but 
recall the image of her small form frozen in terror as the creature stood above 
her fully erect for the first time.  In both scenes, the Son’s teeth are bared and 
hissing; the KY jelly once smeared across its jaw now dripping from both his 
phallic tongue, and penis-like head.  Of course, while the former is a bona-fide 
rape-murder, the latter can only be classified as attempted.  After all, in the 
scene depicting the Alien’s successful violation of Lambert, Parker-the-male-
protector is quickly dispatched leaving the girl to cower in a corner, terrified 
and screaming, as her hysteria merely helps to further embed the monster in a 
position of violent physical dominance. 
The creature plays with her, moving languidly toward Lambert, until 
the monster finally ensnares her leg with a long hard tail, thereby solidifying 
its stance as a rapist through the manner in which it kills her.  Namely, by 
snaking its limb between her legs, and then sweeping the appendage upward to 
apply an overtly sexual, if not obscure deathblow.  Fortunately, “the audience 
does not get a chance to see what [happens] to [Lambert], but the sounds of 
[her] hyperventilating broadcast over the intercom are strongly reminiscent of 
the grunts and heavy breathing [that occur] during sex.”
270  Yet unlike 
Lambert, Ripley’s experience in successfully extricating herself from the 
violent advances of the film’s familial unit has taught our heroine how to 
defend herself against similar attacks.  The trick, as she learned from the 
destruction of Ash, is to acquire and assume the Phallus; to become a symbolic 
male by wielding a sword or a gun, and then by repaying the hostility inflicted 
upon one’s person by essentially raping the offender.
271  Because just as 
Lambert punctured the cyborg-Father with a metallic rod to save her friends, 
Ripley escalates to a slightly more effective weapon, when she arms herself 
                                                 
269 Ximena Gallardo C., and C. Jason Smith, Alien Woman: The Making of Lt. Ellen Ripley, pp. 
56-57.  The mixture of sex and death in this final scene becomes even more palpable as 
“Ripley pants heavily in her spacesuit, her eyes half closed in what could be interpreted as 
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270 Ibid, p. 52. 
271 The assumption of the phallus by a violated female becomes even clearer in the James 
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and then takes revenge for the rape of her life against an entire race of Alien sex offenders.  
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with a mini-harpoon gun against the Alien-Son.  Apparently, in the early stages 
of phallus-envy, a girl has to start small in order to ‘hang’ with the ‘big boys’ 
later on, since Ripley’s final triumph over the Alien finishes with her minor 
penetration of the Son, just as Lambert’s victory over Ash ends with her 
parallel penetration of the Father; a blow which she incidentally administers 
from behind (read: anal). 
Subsequently, instances of female violation are mirrored only by an 
equal number of forced feminizations to the male body, because just as Ripley 
and Lambert triumphed over their respective aggressors with the acquisition of 
a symbolic phallus, so do Father and Son rape their way through the ship by 
remaking men into valueless non-men.  Kane, the Alien’s first victim and the 
ship’s Executive Officer, is the epitome of male emasculation through forced 
feminization (Figure 19).  He is, if you recall, (s)mothered by the Alien 
“Facehugger” at the beginning of the picture; a creature which in turn, acts as a 
living delivery system for the abject egg that will quickly produce the penile 
“Chestburster,” or infant Alien.  As Gallardo and Smith write: 
 
Covering Kane’s face completely, the Facehugger suppresses (or erases) 
his voice and face and renders him immobile.  The overall image is 
dramatic and repulsive: blanketed in the monstrous flesh, Kane no longer 
looks human at all.  A scan reveals that the Facehugger has inserted a 
member down Kane’s throat, completing a representation of fellatio [which 
will be repeated later when Ash attacks Ripley], since its ‘hands’ are 
holding Kane’s head to force its appendage deep inside his body.  Co-
writer Dan O’Bannon, who (years later) termed the image ‘homosexual 
oral rape,’ contends that he created it to make the men in the audience 
cross their legs.’  The action of ‘crossing one’s legs,’ of course, is a gesture 
of protecting the penis and the testicles that, in turn, point to the Alien 
assault as castration: Kane is being made ‘not a man.’
272
 
Of course, Gallardo and Smith also contend that the “Facehugger’s aggressive 
sexual subjugation and transformation of the male body…could [also] be 
interpreted as a type of sexual disciplining, an S&M Othering, that forcibly 
disciplines the male body into a new type of sexual being.”
273  However, this 
line of logic is ultimately faulty, as I am more inclined to agree with their 
latter, and seemingly self-contradictory comment, “all humanity is female (a 
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womb) in the face of the Alien.”
274  For instance, Kane’s mouth is distorted 
into a vaginal opening, while his chest and body are figuratively transformed 
into a massive uterus.  Given this conversion, or mode of castration, the 
grotesque birth of the phallic “chestburster” seems highly appropriate, since as 
the figurative embodiment of Kane’s lost manhood, the “little-dick-with-teeth” 
literally slithers away from his open corpse after breaking loose from his now 
useless body (Figure 20).
275
The separation of Kane’s manhood from his masculinity, or more 
specifically, their mutual alienation, foreshadows the upcoming divide 
between the Alien phallus and the cyborg orgasm, because like Ash’s 
ejaculate, the phallic Chestburster also emphasizes the creature’s ontology as a 
member of the male gender, or perhaps more appropriately, as a ‘male 
member’ in the constant and futile search for never ending sexual gratification.  
In effect, the cyborgic Ash and the machinic Alien not only embody aspects of 
both the rapist and the penis, but also reduce what Haraway calls, “the 
perspective of the cyborg,” from a rather wide panorama, with the ability to 
include all viewpoints and opinions, to a tiny myopic pinhole at the end of the 
white man’s urethra.
276  After all, if the film’s feminization of men is 
epitomized by the Alien’s violation and symbolic castration of Kane, then such 
an act is indisputably explicated by Parker’s abuse at the hands of the cyborg: a 
scene, which unfortunately, extends the man-machine’s influence and dubious 
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political leanings beyond both the feminine and the masculine, and into the 
racial.  Recall Exhibit A. 
 
3.5 Reading a Manifesto for Racists 
 
After the cyborg ceases to convulse, Parker creeps over to inspect the corpse, 
but as he does so, Ash’s headless body grabs him suddenly and the two begin 
to struggle on the floor once more.  In the end, Ash emerges on top, spewing 
white ejaculate from his neck until it covers Parker’s face and form.  The 
body’s grotesque shape endlessly churning out its white insides until a woman 
stabs him from behind with a long pointed staff.  Immediately, Lambert’s blow 
diffuses Ash; literally turning the man off in a loaded act of penetration.  After 
which, the cyborg falls limp against Parker.  Satiated, we cut to the next scene. 
Ash’s head now sits atop a table, completely severed from his body 
save a few wires connecting the bottom of his neck to the hole where his head 
should be.  With his head carefully placed upright by Ripley, Ash’s eyes are 
half-closed while his mouth is wide open, suggesting a kind of post orgasmic 
bliss (Figure 21).  The white glop that spurted from his head and neck only 
minutes before is now smeared all over his face; some of which still dribbles 
from his lips.  Ripley then activates the cyborg’s head, and after a large 
expulsion of white fluid from Ash’s mouth, the cyborg declares with hollow 
digital inflection: 
 
Ash: “You still don’t understand what you’re dealing with do you…Perfect 
Organism.  Its structural perfection is matched only by its hostility.” 
Lambert: “You admire it…” 
Ash: “I admire its purity.  A survivor.  Unclouded by conscience, remorse, 
or delusions of morality.” 
 
If the previous scene is any indication of the “cyborg perspective,” then those 
who adopt that perspective are anything but “freed of the need to ground 
politics” in what Haraway calls, the “privileged position of the oppression that 
incorporates all other dominations.”
277  Like Ash, we are not only neck deep in 
those dominations, but are also spewing out ever more sinister forms of 
whiteness in order to incorporate, and obliterate all those who are not Us.   
Parker is the most obvious example, since as the only non-white person in the 
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film, Ash effectively transforms him into a man saturated with whiteness.   
Expunging the black man’s racial identity, and replacing it with a far less 
threatening colour—or should I say, absence of colour—as Parker’s dark skin 
is totally submerged beneath Ash’s overwhelming pallor.
278
Parker is literally whitewashed by the cyborg, and is therefore 
colonized to the point of erasure, as the character’s perpetual spurting is not 
only the manifestation of an endless male orgasm, but also the continual 
expansion, proliferation, and distribution of the man-machine’s racialized 
self.
279  In effect, it is an attempt by the cyborg to not only make the whole 
world white, through the mass assimilation of culture and skin colour, but to 
also degrade, humiliate, and obliterate non-whites by essentially raping them 
into submission.
280
It is worth noting that throughout their struggle, Ash forces Parker into 
a kind of homosexual intercourse; one which places the cyborg in the dominant 
role of ‘top,’ while the black man is placed in the more submissive role of 
‘bottom.’  On the other hand, we should also note that despite the scene’s overt 
homo-social tone, we as readers must always remember, that while construing 
Ash as “villainous homosexual” is not terribly incorrect.  It is more precise and 
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more appropriate to frame Parker’s rape as yet another example of the cyborg’s 
gross overcompensation for its own sense of lack.
281  Such a reading is 
extremely fruitful because the cyborg’s act of violence can now be read, not 
only as a need to prove its own virility as a heterosexual male, but also as a 
drive to verify the creature’s own worth as a white man; a person whose virility 
and ‘girth’ easily matches that of his enemy, and chief sexual rival, the African 
male. 
After all, Parker is awash in Ash’s white ejaculate.  Moreover, he is 
raped and feminized even as he is colonized by Ash, since the cyborg’s 
violation and forced feminization of Parker is the means by which he is 
colonized.
282  By pressing the man into a feminine likeness, Ash is not only 
stripping away Parker’s masculinity, but also his blackness by overwhelming 
Parker with his own over-compensation, his own hyper-sexuality, and 
subsequently, his own cyborgic lack.  Concordantly, it is very difficult to view 
Parker’s subjugation, and accompanying racial annihilation, as anything less 
than a microcosm of white colonialism, because the psychology driving Ash’s 
abuse perfectly mirrors the psychological insecurities, as well as the often 
brutal processes, lurking behind the white face of colonial rule.  As Frantz 
Fanon writes: 
 
If at a certain stage, [the colonized man] has been led to ask himself 
whether he is a man, it is because his reality as a man has been challenged.  
In other words, I begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree 
that the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized 
native, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite 
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on the world, that I must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with 
the white world…
283
 
Parker is a black man painted white.  His blackness is erased by the cyborg’s 
desire.  His racial identity is obliterated and then incorporated by Ash into that 
of the white culture.  Moreover, he is in a homo-social sense, initiated into that 
culture through terrible humiliations designed to not only deaden his own 
potency as a black male, but to also negate his status as a “terrifying penis” in 
the mind of the white man.
284  Inflicting degradations calculated to make those 
considered threatening more palatable, submissive, and attractive to the white 
patriarchal culture that dominates them, while simultaneously resignifying 
everything considered hostile, divergent, foreign or inferior through the lens of 
the female, or more specifically, the feminine.
285
There are numerous contemporary parallels for this kind of tactic, 
especially in regards to the sorts of ‘interrogation methods’ utilized by 
Americans in present-day Iraq.  Admittedly, the connection between Alien and 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” might seem like a bit of a leap, but when one 
considers the methods used by the U.S. to subdue its opponents, one can do 
nothing but wonder at the similarities between American methodologies, and 
the methodologies that Ash represents.  After all, if as a cyborg, Ash really 
does sign “our ontology”, and if he does indeed “give us our politics”, then 
logically he and his ilk are also supplied and influenced by the politics of the 
present-day.
286  In many ways, the photographs leaked from Abu Ghraib 
reflect the experiences of a people forced to endure the same systems of 
oppression employed by the cyborg upon the Nostromo, because like Parker, 
son of HAM, these suspected terrorists are not only being tortured, but are also 
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trapped in the throes of what could easily be called, a classic American hazing 
ritual; one fashioned to emasculate, dominate, assimilate, and incorporate all 
those deemed to be outside the accepted community.
287  Qualities which are 
emphasized very early in Alien, when Parker begins to voice his concerns over 
his paltry salary only to be told by a white captain, to “just shut up and listen to 
the man.”
288  A statement which not only refers to Ash-the-cyborg, but also to 
the white patriarchal capitalist system the man-machine works for, embodies, 
and represents by proxy. 
It is no coincidence then that Ash, a white cyborg who does nothing 
but erupt his own whiteness onto all things non-white, should speak of things 
like purity, reproduction, and organic perfection.
289  It is also unsurprising that 
he should eschew desirable human qualities like “conscience, remorse, or 
delusions of morality” in relentless pursuit of that reproductive purity, because 
judging from his actions in Alien, as well as the many similarities that connect 
his behaviour to the violence of current events, he is not simply a cyborg and a 
rapist, but also an agent of colonialism whose job is to subjugate and absorb all 
those considered threatening or inferior without thought to cost or 
consequence.  It is this steadfast loyalty to one particular ideology that makes 
the cyborg so dangerous, since such unwavering dependability also implies an 
inherent inability on the part of the creature to transfer from one political 
framework to another—i.e. from patriarchy to feminism.  In the words of Ash 
himself: “I thought I was clear.  All other priorities rescinded.”
290
 
3.6 What’s the Story Mother? 
 
The politics of the man-machine are equivalent to the politics of endless 
ejaculation; that is, the politics of the hyper-masculine, of disembodiment, of 
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overcompensation to disavow emasculation, and of lack born from the desire 
for wholeness, for self.  It is a phallogocentric ideology.  One which, according 
Jonathan Goldberg, “locates an inadequacy within the Symbolic, a lack at the 
very site of the realization of the equation of penis and phallus.”
291  Thereby, 
placing a psychological disconnect at the very heart of the cyborg body, which 
refuses to join the penile appendage with the paternal signifier, the concept that 
“designates the privileges of the symbolic”.
292  This disconnect is profoundly 
damaging since it separates the male subject from a feeling of patriarchal 
privilege that would normally be intrinsic.  Thus, the cyborg feels that he must 
gain his patriarchal rights by taking what belongs to him, or in turn, by proving 
his worthiness through a kind of “hypermasculinity that fails, insofar as it 
exceeds, to guarantee the gender category it means to secure.”
293
Ash is not the cyborg of “A Cyborg Manifesto”.  His ideological 
affinities and personal subjectivity are so radically divergent from everything 
Haraway postulated that he totally subverts her entire understanding of cyborg 
ontology; making the man-machine’s endless orgasm not only gruesome in the 
most extreme sense, but also directly contrary to Haraway’s vision of the 
cyborg body and the politics therein. 
For instance, Haraway states that every story beginning with 
“original innocence” and which “privileges the return to wholeness”—
something the cyborg supposedly avoids—imagines 
 
the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the birth of the self, the 
tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation; that is, war, tempered 
by imaginary respite in the bosom of the Other.  These plots are ruled by 
reproductive politics—rebirth without flaw, perfection, abstraction.  In this 
plot women are imagined either better or worse off, but all agree they have 
less selfhood, weaker individuation, more fusion to the oral, to Mother, less 
at stake in masculine autonomy.
294
 
Naturally, these tales of original innocence are very familiar, as they are the 
humanist narratives one finds throughout Western culture.  The stories whose 
plots and themes have not only shaped and informed all of our lives, but also 
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provided the standard by which to judge and subjugate women and non-whites 
even as they claim to empower them. 
However, according to Haraway, there are better narratives for the 
subsequent empowerment of these margins, and therefore other “route[s] to 
having less at stake in masculine autonomy.”  Routes “that [do] not pass 
through Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror Stage and its imaginary.”
295  
Specifically, a course of action which is governed by Haraway’s cyborg 
politics and ensuing subjectivity, a route that passes “through 
women…illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideological 
resources of victimization so as to have a real life.”
296  In other words, a theory 
which upholds a set of values considered contrary to conventional Western 
narratives involving the subjugation of the Other to the values of the Self, and 
which not only refuses to marginalize or exoticize, but one that firmly rejects 
psychoanalytic, and/or other intellectual truths designed to degrade the value 
and position of both non-whites and women. 
After all, Haraway’s vision of cyborg politics manifests itself as “the 
struggle for language, the struggle against perfect communication, [the 
struggle against ‘truth’], against the one [dominant] code that translates all 
meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism.”
297  Her “politics 
insist on noise and advocate pollution,” culminating in a chorus of polyphonic 
voices that “[rejoice] in the illegitimate fusions of animal and machine.”
298  
Naturally, these ideas are absolutely ideal when it comes to granting greater 
freedom and autonomy to those who are otherwise oppressed.  Yet, given 
Ash’s dramatic ejaculation, and in my opinion typical cyborgic reaction, as 
well as the man-machine’s unflinching pursuit of flawless communication, 
Haraway’s articulation of cyborg politics is clearly misinformed.  Human-
machine integration is not a coupling that subverts “the structure of desire, the 
force imagined to generate language and gender”.
299  Furthermore, it does not 
subvert “the structure and modes of reproduction of ‘Western’ identity, of 
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nature, of culture, of mirror and eye, slave and master, body and mind.”
 300  If 
anything, animal-machine fusions simply reinforce every oppressive element 
mentioned in the previous sections of my argument, because if one continues 
to examine Ash, and by extension all other manifestations of the cyborg image, 
one can see a very clear division between the politics and subjectivity 
represented through those bodies, and the politics and subjectivity expressed in 
Haraway’s manifesto. 
Ash’s world, the world of Alien, does not shy away from tales of 
“innocence” and “wholeness.”  Like all other supposedly uncyborgic 
narratives, it too imagines “the drama of life to be individuation, separation, 
the birth of the self, the tragedy of autonomy,” and lest we forget, 
“alienation.”
301  The film not only embraces reproductive politics, but is ruled 
by them, since the entire story is constantly orbiting concerns which are not 
only linked to Ash’s sense of “purity”, but also inextricably connected to what 
Haraway calls, “rebirth without flaw, perfection, abstraction.”  As a result, the 
cyborg’s world does not rejoice in “the illegitimate fusions of animal and 
machine”.  Rather it rejoices in the legitimacy of those couplings.  Ash, after 
all, is a company man.  Moreover, he is a man made by “The Company”; the 
all-knowing, all-seeing force driving the economic engine of the galaxy, as 
well as the action of Ridley Scott’s film.  Animal-machine integration is 
therefore a sanctioned merger within this reality. One enforcing the values of 
the establishment, while perpetuating the very narratives Haraway claims to 
subvert, because like the principles of both “The Company,” and the white 
cyborgs who speak for it, all politically correct ideas regarding equality are 
destroyed, and/or superseded, by the perpetual and obsessive search for 
supremacy; whether it be political, biological, racial, religious, or economic.
302
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It is essential to note, however, that the political values described 
above do not spring from cyborg politics.  Rather, cyborg politics spring from 
these political values, because to paraphrase writer Elaine L. Graham: 
technology may expose the “instability…of the Humanist subject”, but it does 
not render that subject inert.
303  Nor does it repair the attitudes formed by 
hundreds of years of colonial rule.  As Richard Dyer writes: “the endless 
choices that constitute the practices of the world are at every point informed by 
judgments about people’s capacities and worth…Race is not the only factor 
governing these things...but it is never not a factor, never not in play.”
304  
Subsequently, any present racial, social, or political problems will be 
transferred onto the technologies we create, either through use or through 
representation.  This of course, has devastating implications not only for 
feminist re-workings of the cyborg body, but also for female representation 
within cyborg narratives, because regardless of what one does, or how one 
resignifies, there remains a legacy of violence attached to this image that is 
impossible to erase. 
“There are several consequences to taking seriously the imagery of 
cyborgs as other than our enemies.  Our bodies, ourselves; bodies are maps of 
power and identity.  Cyborgs are no exception.”
305  Certainly, the logic of 
Haraway’s argument is highly compelling, urging us as readers to “see from 
both perspectives at once, because each reveals dominations and possibilities 
unimaginable from the other vantage point.  Single vision [as Haraway states,] 
produces worse illusion than double vision or many-headed monsters.”
306  Yet, 
in adopting such a perspective one must be forever vigilant, because there is 
always the temptation to deny what is, in favour of what could be.  Haraway is 
surely guilty of such an act, as she not only expounds all potential cyborg 
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virtues as existent facts, but perhaps more perilously, also locates possible 
merits where none exist. 
For example, Haraway maintains that a “cyborg body is not innocent; it 
was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so generate 
antagonistic dualisms without end (or until the world ends)”.
307  Moreover, she 
maintains that as a “monstrous and illegitimate” being the cyborg is “outside 
salvation history”, and the myth of “original unity” which drives all Western 
narratives.  Existing as a creature beyond the power base of Western culture, 
and therefore outside the one dualism upon which all others are founded: 
male/female.
308  As Haraway writes: 
 
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gendered world…the cyborg has no 
origin story in the Western sense…An origin story in the ‘Western’, 
humanist sense depends on the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss, and 
terror, represented by the phallic mother  from whom all humans must 
separate, the task of individual development and of history, the twin potent 
myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and 
Marxism…The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification 
with nature in the Western sense.  This is its illegitimate promise that 
might lead to subversion of its teleology as star wars.
309
 
This however is clearly faulty, because even though cyborgs are “not innocent” 
neither are we.  Like the generations before us the cyborg is a creature steeped 
in sin.  It may not have been “born in a garden”, but the deserts, cities, and 
techno-jungles of contemporary Western culture are no less fertile than those 
of Eden.  Each is a point of origin, and each is a paradise to their respective 
tenants.  Eternal bliss versus endless orgasm: the widest gap between these two 
sites is scarcely more than a crack. 
Donna Haraway is only half-right when she states: “the cyborg does 
not expect its father to save it through a restoration of the garden; that is, 
through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its completion in a 
finished whole.”
310  Because what she fails to fully comprehend, is that the 
image does not expect salvation through its father only because it already is the 
Father, and will thus seek out, obtain, and appropriate, whichever mate it 
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desires in order to verify or complete itself.  Even a powerful presence like the 
monstrous MU/TH/UR is defined in terms of the Father within the Alien 
narrative.  Existing without subjectivity or autonomy, serving only to enable 
the abuser, and ignore the victims.  MU/TH/UR is only a ship, and as such, 
merely a vessel for the Name and Law of the Father.  She is a carrier for the 
values and ideals of the patriarchal line that spawned her, and more 
specifically, for “The Company” that built her—body and mind. 
Indeed, even the inclusion of such an omnipotent feminine presence 
remains completely analogous to “the [conventional] function of woman in 
forming the patriarchal unconscious”, because as Laura Mulvey writes; first 
MU/TH/UR “symbolizes the castration threat by her real absence of a penis”, 
which is of course, then amplified by her own ownership of numerous vaginal 
openings and womb-like corridors.
311  Second, she then solidifies that 
patriarchal unconscious by 
 
raising her child [the Alien] into the Symbolic.  Once this has been 
achieved her meaning in this process is at an end, it does not last into the 
world of Law and Language except as memory which oscillates between 
memory of maternal plenitude and memory of lack…[MU/TH/UR’s] 
desire is subject to her image as bearer of the bleeding wound, she can 
exist only in relation to castration and cannot transcend it.  She turns the 
child into a signifier of her own desire to possess a penis.
312
 
Under this system, Mulvey’s “child” becomes the overtly phallic Alien; the 
embodiment of uncontrolled masculine lust, a dick on the loose, and even a 
literal representation of the MU/TH/UR’s desire to carry her own male 
member.  This desire is echoed throughout the film by the omnipresent and 
ever-illusive Company, whose interests are represented by both Ash and 
MU/TH/UR; cohorts in crime, agents of capitalism.  Ash is the Company’s 
active agent—probing bodies, breaking protocol, and killing dissenters—while 
MU/TH/UR plays a far more passive role, allowing the Father to perform 
Company business by neglecting the health and well-being of her expendable 
crew.  Consequently, when the film’s abusive Father-Son dynamic is mixed 
with that of the negligent but archetypal Mother, the combination firmly 
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implants the man-machine within a very different theoretical framework than 
the one specified by Haraway.  In Ridley Scott’s Alien, women are not only 
excluded, but also coded as inferior, while the men are strongly aligned with 
power and authority.  MU/TH/UR stands with the men of Alien, just as 
Mulvey’s women are implanted firmly within the male hegemony of post-
World War II American culture.  Each are 
 
signifier[s] for the male Other, bound by a Symbolic order in which Man 
can live out his fantasies and obsessions through linguistic command by 
imposing them on the silent image of Woman still tied to her place as 
bearer of meaning, not maker of meaning.
313
 
Some might argue that Ripley is the exception to this rule, since she defies and 
ultimately overcomes Ash and his doppelganger, the Alien.  However, aboard 
the Nostromo Ripley is officially third in command, and is therefore the direct 
subordinate of two males, as well as the physical and sexual inferior of two 
more inhuman males.
314  As such, Ripley is constantly subject to the whims of 
her superiors, and more crucially, to the wants of her abusers.  Her behaviour 
is therefore continually circumscribed by the desires of another, defining her as 
a purely reactive force which cannot drive the narrative, since her actions are 
mere counterpoints to that of the Father and Son.  Despite the obvious qualities 
of courage, power, and guile which have since become synonymous with her 
over the last 20 years, Ripley exists as a kind of non-entity.  She is a hard body 
defined solely by masculine pleasure and male erections, while her mind is 
filled only by the fear induced by the threat of male violence.  With her 
subjectivity and her rank consistently undermined or stripped away, Ripley is 
figured as nothing but frightened prey; running like a battered woman 
desperate for escape.
315
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and manage a ship. 
315 Of course, not everyone has the same view when it comes to domestic abuse.  For instance, 
as Camille Paglia once said in a notorious interview with Spin magazine: “You know what 
gets me sick and tired?  The battered-woman motif.  It’s so misinterpreted, the way we have to 
constantly look at it in terms of male oppression and tyranny, and female victimization.  When, 
in fact, everyone knows throughout the world that many of these working-class relationships 
where women get beaten up have hot sex.  They ask why she won’t leave him?  Maybe she 
won’t leave because the sex is very hot.  I say we should start looking at the battered-woman   115
 
3.7 Reading a Manifesto for Mega-death 
 
The fusion of rapist-Alien-son with abusive-cyborg-father to produce an 
enormous, disembodied, penetrating, forever coming erection, only serves to 
further entrench the man-machine within the very worst parts of an already 
existent ideological framework; specifically, the politics of patriarchy, 
supremacy, exploitation, domination and abuse.  There is no liminality in Ash.  
He does not live on the margins, nor is he beyond the oppressive ideologies of 
the centre.  Like Dr. Strangelove, Ash lives and thrives within that centre as 
the very embodiment of male oppression both, social and sexual, political and 
subjective.  He is, along with his Alien counterpart, the enemy of all women 
everywhere, and despite Donna Haraway’s assertions to the contrary, it is 
precisely his ‘cyborg-ness’ which makes him so dangerous. 
For example, Ridley Scott’s direct correlation between the cyborg and 
the misogynist, technology and the phallus, extends even beyond Alien into 
numerous and varied texts found throughout Western culture, since 
connections between male ejaculation, female penetration, rape, power, 
privilege, the cyborg body, and the politics therein, are in fact endemic to most 
cyborg representations.  Indeed, all of these elements are inextricably bound, 
locked together in a tightly coiled mass that is impossible to untangle.  To pull 
at or adopt only one of these strands is to drag the entire load along with you.  
Consequently, the politics of the cyborg are not only allied with the same sorts 
of values, and damaging ideologies infecting the Nostromo and its crew, but 
are also linked with the values and ideologies that drove the political system 
which produced the cyborg in the first place.  As a result, the politics of 
human-machine integration are identical to both the systems of patriarchal 
oppression and racial domination, as well as the decidedly masculine drive 
                                                                                                                                           
motif in terms of sex.  If gay men go down to bars and like to get tied up, beaten up and have 
their asses whipped, how come we can’t allow that a lot of wives like the kind of sex they are 
getting in these battered-wife relationships.”  Of course, whether Ripley and Lambert derive 
any power or pleasure from their encounters with Ash, the Alien, or the other members of the 
Nostromo  crew is highly suspect.  But it is, let’s say, an ‘interesting’ (if not dubious) 
perspective on the film.  Especially when applied to the case of Lambert, who does express 
pleasure in the sexual innuendo exchanged between her and her male colleagues.  Camille 
Paglia, “The Rape Debate, Continued,” p. 65.   116
toward the Cold War’s ultimate orgasmic orgy, otherwise known as atomic 
Armageddon. 
The cyborg represents far more than just a history of violence, but more 
crucially, it represents a history of supreme violence.  It is an amalgamation 
rooted not only in its “teleology as star wars”, but in a drive toward total death 
blown out through the obsolescent act of orgasmic release.
316  Thus far, we 
have seen how the cyborg body and its subsequent politics manifest 
themselves in both Ash and the Alien, as well as through their individual 
relationships with other members of the Nostromo crew; including the massive 
techno-womb each of them call MU/TH/UR.  However, there are many more 
representations of similar cyborg bodies instilled with an identical set of 
political values; figures which are far more explicit in their explication, and 
subsequent exposition of masculine themes, ideas, and imagery.  Yet, rather 
than inspect each case individually, I will only list five of the most eloquent 
examples. 
In Raw Deal (1986), international action hero, and permanently-coded 
cyborg, Arnold Schwarzenegger, plays a disgraced FBI agent out for revenge 
against an Italian-American crime family.
317  In a memorable scene near the 
end of the film, Schwarzenegger enters a Mafia compound in a large red 
Cadillac convertible, and begins to kill every single gangster stationed therein.  
With his right hand on a long double barreled shotgun, he pumps his weapon 
relentlessly, systematically filling every bad guy in the area with countless 
bullets.  Penetrating their bodies until each of them fall dead: all while playing 
the Rolling Stones’ “I Can’t Get No (Satisfaction),” from a tape deck in his 
car, at full volume.
318
                                                 
316 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 151. 
317 Jonathan Goldberg writes: “one cannot speak of the Terminator’s place without recalling 
that one is also speaking about Arnold Schwarzenegger” (Goldberg, 242).  Moreover, to quote 
Michael Blitz and Louise Krasniewicz: “For the past two decades the label ‘Terminator’ has 
become synonymous with Arnold Schwarzenegger himself, not just with a film character, and 
no matter what he is doing, or how removed it is from a cyborg in a science fiction film” (Blitz 
and Krasniewicz, 93).  Jonathan Goldberg, “Recalling Totalities: The Mirrored Stages of 
Arnold Schwarzenegger”; Michael Blitz and Louise Krasniewicz, Why Arnold Matters: The 
Rise of a Cultural Icon (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 
318 Raw Deal, dir. John Irvin (Live/Artisan, 1986).  Naturally, such a scene could be construed 
as a direct result of Schwarzenegger’s earlier career as a bodybuilder, since Raw Deal’s 
representation of an  endless male orgasm perfectly mirrors Arnold’s earlier comments about 
the nature of “the pump.”   117
In Michael Crichton’s pop novel, The Terminal Man, Harry Benson is 
an artificial intelligence researcher gone mad, because ever since a recent car 
crash he has suffered from a ridiculous brain ailment known only as “thought 
seizures.”
319  These “seizures” induce a kind of psychic fit, which in turn 
causes Benson to attack any person who either works with, and/or acts like a 
machine; including mechanics, gas station attendants, prostitutes, and strippers.  
However, thanks to a new surgical procedure developed in the realm of 
psychiatric mind-control, Harry can now reverse these violent fits.  To do so, 
doctors must insert 40 electrodes into the pleasure centres of Benson’s brain, 
which will “short circuit” his seizures with waves of orgasmic pleasure.  The 
surgery is successful, but only for a time.  After a short while, Harry learns to 
control the technology attached to his new and improved mind.  Subsequently, 
the man begins to pleasure himself continuously until the procedure no longer 
affects his condition.
320  With his brain and body now overloading in 
masturbatory ecstasy, Benson escapes his psychiatric handlers and runs off to 
engage in a murderous rampage; strangling, stabbing, and beating the innocent, 
as his brain orgasms over and over and over again.
321
Sixty years earlier, British sculptor Jacob Epstein produced an equally 
hard, equally phallic, and equally insatiable cyborg in the form of the Rock 
Drill (1913).  In fact, prior to its eventual destruction in 1915, Epstein’s 
sculpture was lean and metallic with girder-like legs perched atop a very large, 
very real, and very suggestive drilling machine.  All of which combined to 
                                                 
319 Michael Crichton, The Terminal Man (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), p. 17. Crichton 
writes: “He was told he had injured his brain in [an] automobile accident and, as a result, had 
an illness that produced ‘thought seizures’—seizures of the mind, not the body, leading to a 
loss of inhibitions and violent acts.” 
320 Crichton characterizes Harry Benson as a cyborg in a number of obvious and somewhat 
clumsy paragraphs, writing: “Now, however, in this operation we have created a man with not 
one brain but two. He has his biological brain, which is damaged, and he has a new computer 
brain, which is designed to correct the damage. This new brain is intended to control the 
biological brain. Therefore a new situation arises. The patient's biological brain is the 
peripheral terminal—the only peripheral terminal—for the new computer. In one area, the new 
computer brain has total control. And therefore the patient's biological brain, and indeed his 
whole body, has become a terminal for the new computer. We have created a man who is one 
single, large, complex computer terminal. The patient is a read-out device for the new 
computer, and his is as helpless to control the read-out as a TV screen is helpless to control the 
information presented on it.” Michael Crichton, The Terminal Man, p. 83. 
321 Crichton writes: “Following delivery of the blow to the head, she’s lifted up and placed on 
the bed.  At this time, she’s not bleeding much…But now her killer picks up some instrument 
and stabs her in the stomach several times.  You’ll notice that the deepest wounds are all in the 
lower abdomen, which may have some sexual connotations for the killer.  But that’s just 
guessing on our part.”  Michael Crichton, The Terminal Man, p. 173.   118
represent a sort of hypersexual, hyper-masculine, bio-mechanical body 
attached to a tremendously large phallic erection that pointed directly down 
towards the ground.  As if the being’s sole purpose was to penetrate the earth 
and excavate the remains until the area was either ready for resettlement, or 
stripped of its value.  Forcibly converting the surrounding environment into a 
form of valuable capital, or until its surface was raped and disfigured into a 
palatable likeness of the creature itself.  To paraphrase one early 20
th century 
art critic: “it all seems like the naked expression of a definite force.”
322
Even Gravity’s Rainbow expresses human-machine integration in terms 
of orgasmic satisfaction, because almost every V-2 rocket within Pynchon’s 
narrative lands in a site predetermined by character Tyrone Slothrop’s sexual 
activities.  In fact, the missiles are actually drawn to his erections.  They 
explode in those places where Slothrop has, in a sense, already exploded, 
causing even the character’s “love-making or fantasy” to become 
superimposed with “the structure of bombs.”
  323  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  S l o t h r o p ’ s  
sexuality is not only transformed into a harbinger of doom, but also resignified 
as a bringer of cyborgic death for all those unlucky enough to reside near the 
sites of his many conquests.
324  Each erection foretells a time when the 
                                                 
322 Sculpted in 1913, and then exhibited two years later, the Rock Drill was described by critics 
as a “futurist abortion”; “unutterably loathsome”; “a hideous thing.”  Only one reviewer found 
value in the work, writing: “Mr. Epstein has accepted the rock drill…One can see how it 
fascinated him; the three long, strong legs, the compact assembly of cylinders, screws, and 
valve, with its control handles decoratively at one side, and especially the long straight cutting 
drill like a proboscis—it all seems the naked expression of a definite force.  Mounted upon it 
Mr. Epstein has set a figure of the spirit of the drill—an idea of what a man might be who 
existed only for drilling.”  Richard Cork, Vorticism and Abstract Art in the First Machine Age 
(London: Fraser, 1976), p. 476. 
323 Friedrich Kittler writes: “Slothrop’s erections act as an index…already designating the next 
strike position.  The V-2s follow the erections in the same way that the sound of flight follows 
the impact. In other words, even Slothrop’s love-making or ‘fantasy is superimposed with the 
structure of bombs.’”  Friedrich Kittler, “Media and Drugs in Pynchon’s Second World War,” 
pp.104-105. 
324 At one point in the narrative, Tyrone’s sexuality actually colludes with the arc of the V-2 in 
a strange moment of prophesy: “The minute he puts it in, though, she goes wicked and a little 
crazy, slashing at his legs, shoulders, and ass with chewed-down fingernails sharp as a saw.  
Considerate Slothrop is trying to hold off coming till she’s ready when all of a sudden 
something heavy, feathered, and many pointed comes crashing down onto the small of his 
back, bounces off triggering him and as it turns out Geli too ZONGGG! eeeeee…oh, gee whiz.  
Wings flap and Wernher—for it is he—ascends into the darkness” (Pynchon, 294).  This 
“Fucking bird,” as Slothrop puts it, whose name is synonymous with German rocket scientist, 
Dr. Werner Von Braun, heralds the V-2’s forthcoming fall toward the site of Tyrone’s present 
orgasm.  Moreover, Slothrop and his temporary lover, Geli Tripping, make love in a roofless 
home, open to the sky, the rain, and to any other forms of falling debris that might pass within 
range.  This sense of openness could not only emphasize the couple’s vulnerability to the 
falling V-2s, but also highlight the connection between Slothrop’s erections and the locations   119
Rocket’s phallic form will drop steadily in; penetrating the earth where our 
hero has just ‘pulled out.’  Its terrible mass falling inexorably downward 
toward a spot where Slothrop once lay; thereby “triggering” itself upon impact 
just as he was ‘triggered’ upon insertion.
325  In effect, Pynchon’s missile re-
enacts that which Slothrop has already completed, because by expelling its 
sperm-like Schwarzgerät all over the surrounding area, the V-2 not only 
emphasizes its status as phallus, but also becomes interchangeable with both 
the form and function of the penis itself.
326
On the other hand, despite the correlation between Rocket and penis, 
one must never forget that Pynchon figures the weapon as something far more 
complex than a mere representation of the male member.  Instead, he describes 
the V-2 as having both male and female genitalia, each of which remain true to 
the cyborg within, since both are forever perched on the edge of perpetual 
climax.  For instance, near the end of the novel, during the final stages of 
Rocket production, Pynchon describes the joining of V-2 and Schwarzgerät as 
such: 
 
Stuff him in.  Not a Procrustean bed, but modified to take him.  The two, 
boy and Rocket, concurrently designed.  Its steel hindquarters bent so 
beautifully…he fits well.  They are mated to each other, Schwarzgerät and 
next higher assembly.  His bare limbs in their metal bondage writhe among 
the fuel, oxidizer, live-steam lines, thrust frame, compressed air battery, 
exhaust elbow, decomposer, tanks, vents, valves…and one of these valves, 
one test-point, one pressure-switch is the right one, the true clitoris routed 
directly to the nervous system of the 00000.  She should not be a mystery 
to you, Gottfried.  Find the zone, love lick and kiss…Get ready, 
Liebchen.
327
 
The interior of the Schwarzgerät is synonymous with the Rocket’s G-spot, 
which of course, suggests an even greater degree of connection between the 
                                                                                                                                           
of Rocket-strike.  Accordingly, Wernher flaps about the roofless house like a spectre of the 
coming/ejaculating V-2: “Something comes flapping in out of the sky: talons scrabble along 
the top of the canopy.  “What’s that?” half awake and she’s got the covers again, c’mon 
Geli…”(291). 
325 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 294. 
326 Ibid, p. 750.  Weirdly, the connection between Tyrone Slothrop’s erections, ejaculations, 
and the many V-2 explosions are also echoed in Slothrop’s expulsion of vomit in the novel: 
“Slothrop joins at the rail a miserable lot of musicians and girls.  They instruct him in fine 
points such as not vomiting into the wind, or timing it for when the ship rolls toward the 
sea…‘Öööööö,’ goes Slothrop over the side” (500).  The link between Slothrop’s bodily 
expulsion and Rocket 00000 is difficult to ignore. 
327 Ibid, pp. 750-751.   120
cyborg and sex; in particular, the female sex.  However, despite the obvious 
sexual interplay between the V-2’s feminine interior and the Schwarzgerät’s 
rigidity and performative masculinity, we must always remember that the 
Rocket as a whole cannot be classified as a feminine.  The missile’s overall 
structure as a stiff, penetrating, forever-coming phallus supersedes all other 
contradictory physical characteristics inherent to the womb-like weapon.  Bear 
in mind, the V-2 is a penis filled with semen.  One driven not only by a desire 
to explode or ejaculate, but also by the need to re-enact all previous sexual 
encounters performed by its double.
328  Furthermore, if the Rocket’s 
femininity is not negated by its overt masculinity, then they are certainly 
resignified in the same manner as Ridley Scott’s MU/TH/UR.  After all, the 
body of the V-2 is not only coded by Pynchon as a vessel for paternity, and for 
the politics of patriarchy, but also more literally, it is represented as a carrier of 
“sperm.”
329  Consequently, the Rocket stands as a symbol for both the Name 
and Law of the Father, and for the decidedly phallogocentric and racialized 
ideologies which it maintains and supports. 
Of course, in a text so overwhelmingly dominated by the intersection 
of orgasm and missile, the patriarchal properties inherent to Pynchon’s V-2 are 
not simply affiliated with the morbid and decidedly dangerous sexual politics 
of Dr. Strangelove, but also with the good doctor’s one true love, and apparent 
sexual aid; the nuclear bomb.  Since the first atomic test at Los Alamos, the 
atom bomb has become more than just the image of ultimate power, but one 
whose mere detonation has been commonly used as a symbol for the ultimate 
in orgasmic release.  Schwarzenegger, Strangelove, and their repeated echoes 
in the products of American culture; all cling to the dangerous amalgamation 
                                                 
328 On the doubled nature of Slothrop, Kittler writes: “…as always, it comes to light that the 
detective coincides with his double in the cockpit of the V-2.”  Friedrich Kittler, “Media and 
Drugs in Pynchon’s Second World War,” p. 105.  As Pynchon writes on the naming of 
Slothrop: “Once Slothrop—or Rocketman as he is soon to be known—thought he might warn 
them about things like tulip bulbs ” (359); “It occurs to Slothrop that without these horns on it, 
why this helmet would look just like the nose assembly of the Rocket.  And if he could find a 
few triangular scrapes of leather, figure a way to sew them on to Tchiterine’s boots…yeah, a-
and on the back of the cape put a big, scarlet, capital R— It is as pregnant a moment as when 
Tonto, after the legendary ambush, attempts to—‘Raketemensch!’ screams Säure…Slothrop 
has been imagining full Rocketman Hype, in which the people bring him food, wine and 
maidens…” (366); “But somebody’s got to hold on, it can’t happen to all of us—no that’d be 
too much…Rocketman, Rocketman.  You poor fucker” (741).  Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s 
Rainbow. 
329 Ibid, p. 750.   121
of orgasm and annihilation.  Even at the end of Gravity’s Rainbow, the V-2’s 
need to explode or ejaculate is pushed beyond the scope of a normal World 
War II narrative, as the novel is thrust outward into the age of potential mega-
death.  Arching from 1945 to 1973, as the Rocket’s “terrible mass” lands on an 
LA movie theatre in an epoch defined by the imminent production of countless 
‘little deaths.’
330  Consequently, the atmosphere of fright and paranoia once 
confined to World War II London now turns planet-wide, moving beyond 
story, beyond fiction, as the parallel works of Werner Von Braun and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer fuse inexorably in the parabolic arc of the ICBM.
331  As 
Friedrich Kittler writes: 
 
At the end of the text, while high over California a new world war is 
beginning, a song of consolation is sung for a “crippl’d Zone,” whose 
referent is not only post-war Germany [but the whole planet].  Thus 
concluding song and novel: ‘Now Everybody—’”
332
 
Like Dr. Strangelove nearly a decade earlier, Pynchon plays on the image of 
the atomic wargasm, on the irreversible fall toward the blissful feeling of a 
million ‘little deaths,’ and on the subsequent cyborg fantasy of endless 
ejaculation embodied within that atrocity.  However, unlike Kubrick, who 
filmed Major Kong on the back of a bomb, cowboy hat flailing as he whoops 
his way downward to the point of impact, Pynchon places the rider within the 
bomb (Figure 22).  Man moves from a position of power as possessor of the 
Phallus to a mere component of that image, since Gottfried is physically 
                                                 
330 Kittler writes: “Pynchon’s Second World War is able to end with the intercontinental 
weapons of the next war, insofar as Blicero’s manned V-2…lands on the last page of the novel 
in Hollywood, 1973, the year the novel is published.  Its base delay-action fuse targets 
precisely the movie theatre in which Pynchon and his readers are sitting.”  Obviously, the V-2 
was never literally blasted into the future, but its technology was transferred from Nazi 
Germany to the Allies, where it was used to facilitate both American Space Exploration, and 
the creation of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.  Friedrich Kittler, “Media and Drugs in 
Pynchon’s Second World War,” p. 114.  For more on Pynchon’s passage see: Thomas 
Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 760. 
331 Kittler writes: “The rocket, therefore, occupies the focal point of a novel that reads our 
signs.  At the far end of the horizon of the novel or the theatre of war, the parallel development 
of American weapons technology turns up in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  One need only replace 
the conventional explosives of the V-2…with Uranium or Plutonium as the rocket payload in 
order to be concurrent with the state of affairs in 1985…Accordingly, Pynchon’s subject 
matter is German-American friendship as technology transfer.  The technology that began on 
the beach of Peenemünde and proceeded to production-stage in the bunkers of Nordhausen 
(built by IG Farben and taken over by the Reich)…finds its continuation in Huntsville and 
Baikonur.”  Friedrich Kittler, “Media and Drugs in Pynchon’s Second World War,” p. 102. 
332 Ibid, p.117.   122
inserted into the shell of a long, hard, cylindrical spear.  An act which alters his 
subjective position from that of virile Male, to that of a lowly and humiliating 
glob of semen sealed inside the image of a free floating, and uncontrolled 
erection.
333  Gottfried and Rocket, missile and payload, each is as an indication 
of the potential inherent in the unfulfilled combination of Alien and Cyborg, 
Phallus and Orgasm, because like the mixture of bullet and gun, each half not 
only provides the necessary elements for a satisfactory sexual release, but also 
for a kind of unending orgasm that leads only to obsolescence; the end of 
everything.  As Robert S. McNamara writes: 
 
In the 1950s, contrary to the advice of some senior military leaders…the 
Eisenhower administration had relied increasingly on nuclear weapons for 
the national defense.  Secretary of State Jon Foster Dulles had summarized 
this doctrine of massive retaliation when he declared that the United States 
aimed to deter aggression by relying ‘primarily upon a great capacity to 
retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing.’   The 
Kennedy administration worried that this reliance on nuclear weapons gave 
us no way to respond to a large non-nuclear attack without committing 
suicide.  President Kennedy said we had put ourselves in a position of 
having to choose in a crisis between ‘inglorious retreat and unlimited 
retaliation.’
334
 
Despite decades of time, and numerous alterations to the National Defense 
policy of the United States, Eisenhower’s doctrine of total retaliation is not 
dead or defunct, but is instead reflected absolutely in the life and (little) death 
of the cyborg body.  The policies of totality have not only found a kind of 
everlasting life in the image of their star pupil, but have also been transposed 
onto the body of the cyborg itself, as man and machine blow out together; 
covering the Earth in a very old, very strange, and very deadly act of ‘love’ 
(Figure 23).  Consequently, we cannot escape the legacy of the Cold War even 
as we try to lose ourselves in the fiction of another.  Moreover, we cannot 
escape the politics of the cyborg even as we lie to ourselves about its potential 
and its properties.  In truth, the vast majority of human-machine manifestations 
fall into the categories described above; namely, those of the hyper-masculine, 
the hyper-sexual, the destructive, the totalizing, and most of all, the 
fragmented.  All of which perpetuate a sense of brokenness, which the cyborg 
                                                 
333 One could construe Pynchon’s V2 as a penis-on-the loose, and thus as a literary parallel to 
the phallic Chestburster in Ridley Scott’s Alien. 
334 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, pp. 24-25.   123
strives to mend through gross overcompensation; by means that guarantee its 
continued fragmentation as opposed to its eventual fulfillment. 
Mutually Assured Destruction; the very acronym evokes a world 
which is literally out of its mind.  As if the saturation of America by 
psychedelics and psychosis had produced a near-global state of unbridled 
lunacy, of which the only appropriate symbol is Pynchon’s “banana.”  Long, 
slim, brown, and yellow, it reflects not just the infiltration of madness into 
every corner of the civilized environment, but also signifies, at least in part, the 
source of such a potentially terminal form of global psychosis, since the erect 
penis, visual parallel to Pynchon’s fruit, stands out as both the real world 
signifier of phallogocentrism, and the cultural twin to a particularly phallic 
form of equatorial produce.  As Pynchon writes, the “banana label” is in a 
sense, forever “glued on the erect cock for ready reference.”
335  Its marker 
fixed firmly to the shaft not only as an open reminder of Western patriarchy, 
but perhaps too of HAM the Chimponaut, sitting atop his own “steel 
banana.”
336
Even the Terminator, whom Haraway once described as a “sign of 
the beast on the face of postmodern culture,” represents a world that will not 
only go “bananas”, but indeed, one which has already embraced the politics of 
absurdity rather than reason.
337  The mere existence of Arnold’s hard body, as 
well as its consistent return, continues to signify the inexorable end of all 
things, as ICBMs—not MR-2s—rise and fall again and again in a hail of fruit 
shaped mega-death.  From Schwarzgerät to Schwarzenegger, the parallel 
images of the hardened penis, and a stiff cylindrical piece of fruit, reflect 
worlds that are not only threatened by the effects of fear, paranoia, and 
political brinksmanship, but also by the distinctly patriarchal dangers of 
cybernetics, and the true nature of human-machine integration.  To recall the 
words of Tyrone Slothrop: “The Schwarzgerät is no grail, Ace, that’s not what 
the G in Imipolex G stands for.”
338  Instead, with no trace of the Grail, this 
uppercase G could easily stand for the “spot” which triggers the male orgasm, 
and thus for the long, hard, and volatile phallus, as the V2 can only reinforce 
                                                 
335 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 678. 
336 Ibid, p. 8. 
337 Donna J. Haraway, “Cyborgs and Symbionts,” p. xv. 
338 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 364.   124
the symbolic presence of the Grail’s enemy, counterpart, and partner.  As Jesse 
Weston writes: 
 
Lance and Cup (or Vase) were…connected together in a symbolic relation 
long ages before the institution of Christianity, or the birth of the Celtic 
tradition.  They are sex symbols of immemorial antiquity and world-wide 
diffusion, the Lance or Spear, representing the Male, the Cup or Vase, the 
Female, reproductive energy.
339
 
After all, the Schwarzgerät is trapped inside the V-2.  Its soft body is snapped 
securely into the heart of a Nazi Rocket, which in itself, is a long spear-like 
weapon designed to penetrate and kill.
340  Subsequently, the German black box 
cannot be called a Grail, since it is not a symbol of feminine “energy” or 
power, but rather the inverse, as its affinities lie with the Phallus and not the 
Vagina. 
Haraway has argued the cyborg has the potential to shed these 
properties, and that within its phallic form sits the promise of subversion, since 
according to her manifesto, cyborgs “are suspicious of the reproductive matrix 
of most birthing”, and thus of sexuality itself, whether male or female.
341  
Within such a scenario cyborgs would perpetuate the possibility for our 
“reconstruction” within “a monstrous world without gender”; one which would 
erase antagonistic dualisms and unreasonable hierarchies, and therefore 
subvert all pre-existing gender roles.
342  Certainly, “there are several 
consequences to taking seriously the imagery of cyborgs as other than ‘our’ 
enemies”—the enemies of women—because in becoming genderless or 
                                                 
339 Jesse L. Weston, From Ritual to Romance (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 
p. 75. 
340 The Rocket’s link with the phallus is highlighted indirectly much later in the novel, when 
Slothrop watches a rainbow arc through the sky:  “…and now, in the Zone, later in the day he 
became a crossroad, after a heavy rain he doesn’t recall, Slothrop sees a very thick rainbow 
here, a stout rainbow cock driven down out of pubic clouds into Earth, green wet valleyed 
Earth, and his chest fills and he stands crying, not a thing in his head, just feeling natural…”  
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 626. 
341 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 181. 
342 Ibid, p. 181.  Haraway likens the cyborg to salamander in order to veer the image away 
from “the resources of reproductive sex.”  She writes, “I would suggest that cyborgs have 
more to do with regeneration and are suspicious of the reproductive matrix of most birthing.  
For salamanders, regeneration after injury, such as the loss of a limb, involves regrowth of 
structure and restoration of function with the constant possibility of twinning or other odd 
topographical productions at the site of former injury.  The regrown limb can be monstrous, 
duplicated, potent.  We have all been injured, profoundly.  We require regeneration, not 
rebirth, and the possibilities for our reconstruction include the utopian dream of the hope for a 
monstrous world without gender.”   125
asexual, cyborgs would forsake their power as Rapists.
343  Yet, such an idea, 
however progressive, is not without a great deal of danger, because in looking 
towards what is possible, one must never forget what is.
344  We must always 
remember where the cyborg was produced, and how that image behaves, 
because the creature is and always has been gendered male, even if its 
amalgamated body does not fit every piece of anatomical criteria required for 
the constitution of that specific gender.  Even if a cyborg body is represented 
as female, its status as an empowered being is not assured.  Like most gender 
representations found within most patriarchal cultures, female cyborgs are 
defined in terms of the Phallus; or more precisely, by their own lack thereof.  
Accordingly, Haraway’s alternate route toward “having less at stake in 
masculine autonomy, a route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, 
Zero, the Mirror Stage and its Imaginary”, ultimately comes to the same dead 
end as the destination it supposedly avoids, because if human-machine 
integration really does represent “our ontology” then logically the cyborg also 
supplies the politics of the present-day, whether we know it or not.
345  As 
Jonathan Crary writes, “[a] society is defined by its amalgamations, not by its 
tools…tools exist only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or 
that make them possible.”
346
For instance, as an amalgamation, the cyborg body is not only defined 
by the socio-political circumstances in which it was produced, but is also one 
of the defining factors of reality itself.  The world is reflected in the surface of 
the cyborg, just as the cyborg is reflected in our image of the world, causing 
the body to not only double any existing social, cultural, and/or political 
problems, but to also reinforce those problems through its own behaviour, 
rather than aid in their deconstruction or subsequent diffusion.
347
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346 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p. 8. 
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Presidential Candidate, John F. Kennedy, in November 1960: “America’s politics would now 
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3.8 Reflections 
 
Nevertheless, despite the many issues complicating Haraway’s optimism, her 
“Cyborg Manifesto” is not devoid of worth.  On the contrary, Haraway’s 
theories hold a great deal of value for both men and women alike, since they 
offer Western society the opportunity to not only grow, but to also understand 
itself without resorting to the old hierarchies of class, race, and gender as well 
as other similar notions based on the totalizing fallacies of incorporation and 
supremacy.  Unfortunately, such revolutionary realizations are not 
forthcoming.  Moreover, they will not be immediate once the time for change 
finally does arrive, as such a significant transformation to our overall 
subjectivity “means both building and destroying machines, identities, 
categories, relationships, space stories.”
348  In other words, such a massive 
resignification requires not only massive alterations, but perhaps even a 
massive revolution before the idea of cyborg-as-ally can ever become viable 
on a massive scale. 
So far this chapter has not only strived to illustrate how cyborgs are 
represented throughout Western popular culture, but also to examine the ways 
in which the image manifests itself within the larger cultural unconscious.   
Through these examples, we have seen the ways in which current models of 
the cyborg model stand in direct opposition to Haraway’s manifesto, and how 
each representation is intimately connected to the very properties and politics 
which Haraway strives to subvert.  In fact, despite her assertions to the 
contrary, this chapter has provided sufficient evidence to show that there is a 
“drive in cyborgs to produce total theory.”
349  Or to more precise, a drive to 
produce a totalizing  theory very similar in consequence to the ideas put 
forward by writers like Catherine McKinnon, since both theoretical 
frameworks maintain the so-called “informatics of domination” by reproducing 
                                                                                                                                           
a coalescing of politics and popular culture, but I would also further that argument by 
suggesting a very strong correlation, not just between politics and culture, but between 
technology, society, and the values which govern them.  All of which were permanently 
instilled in the image of the cyborg in 1960.  Norman Mailer, “Superman Comes to the 
Supermarket,”  Esquire (November, 1960), Accessed 30 September 2005: 
http://www.esquire.com/features/articles/2003/031001_mfe_ mailer_1.html. 
348 Donna J. Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” p. 181. 
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bodies that not only serve to reinforce ‘our’ allegiance to images of 
phallogocentricity, but which by extension, also serve to emphasize “the non-
existence of women, except as products of men’s desire.”
350  Yet how could 
this be?  Given the obvious correlation between the cyborg and the Phallus, 
why is there such a large gulf between Haraway’s manifesto and the reality of 
human-machine representation?  Is it merely a case of misinterpretation on her 
part, or is Haraway’s misunderstanding linked to something within the cyborg 
body that perpetuates its continual misrecognition? 
Ironically, the reasons for such a significant theoretical disconnect are 
alluded to inadvertently by Haraway in another essay, entitled “The Past is the 
Contested Zone: Human Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction 
in Primate Behaviour Studies.”  Because while Haraway may have written this 
paper in relation to the study of animals—and primates, in particular—we can 
safely extend her ideas into the realm of the cyborg without risk of unwanted 
distortion.  In her paper Haraway describes human fascination with animals as 
such: 
 
People like to look at animals, even to learn from them about human beings 
and human society.  People in the twentieth century have been no 
exception.  We find the themes of modern America reflected in detail in the 
bodies and lives of animals.  We polish an animal mirror to look for 
ourselves.  The biological sciences’ focus on monkeys and apes has sought 
to make visible both the form and the history of our personal and social 
bodies.  Biology has been pre-eminently a science of visible form, of 
dissection of visible shape, and the acceptance and construction of visible 
order.  The science of non-human primates, primatology, may be a source 
of insight or a source of illusion.  The issues rest on our skill in the 
construction of mirrors.
351
 
If our “focus on monkeys and apes has sought to make visible both the form 
and the history of our personal and social bodies”, then our obsession with the 
cyborg has certainly prompted the same goals.  Moreover, if “[b]iology has 
been pre-eminently a science of visible form, of dissection of visible shape, 
and the acceptance and construction of visible order”, then so has cyborgology.  
After all, if “we polish animal mirrors to look for ourselves” then we as 
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Westerners certainly polish animal-human, as well as human-machine mirrors, 
to accomplish the very same task.
352  Indeed, like the scientific study of 
primates, issues of cyborgology also “rest on our skill in the [literal] 
construction of mirrors.” Producing a visual motif that not only reconciles the 
seeming disparity between the reality of totalizing patriarchal cyborg politics, 
and Haraway’s fragmented yet inclusive cyborg-bodies, but one which in turn, 
also offers an explanation regarding the figure’s continual misrecognition, as 
well as the many associations and dangers embedded in our unfailing 
representation of that image. 
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4: Refracting Culture, Reflecting Selfhood: W. Ross Ashby and the 
Emergent Property 
 
“We have come to the age of double-men.  We no longer need mirrors to look 
at ourselves.”
353
 
4.1 Emergence 
 
Throughout the course of this dissertation, we have investigated the 
foundations of cyborg studies and exposed the subject’s general treatment of 
the man-machine as a Schwarzgerät.  Furthermore, we have attempted to see 
beyond previous examinations of the image by discarding the assumptions that 
spring from the cyborg’s status as a black device, and by uncovering the 
creature’s political affinities in an effort to discern a corresponding ontology.  
Concordantly, the following chapter will now attempt to discover a physical 
structure that moves beyond the simple and deceivingly inclusive image of 
human plus machine, in order to construct a corporeal model which remains 
consistent with the cyborg’s previously explicated political leanings, as well as 
its long and checkered history. 
The first step in exploring the nature of the man-machine lies in reading 
both the history of the image, and the etymology of the term.  Unfortunately, it 
is very difficult to define the cyborg in terms of its past, because depending on 
the elasticity of one’s definition, cybernetic imagery can stretch back for 
decades, centuries, even millennia.
354  However, for the purposes of this 
dissertation we have already begun our discussion at the point where the 
cyborg was metaphorically born.  Or to be more precise, where it was 
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ultimately named by American scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, 
and instilled with the politics of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove.  As such, 
it is here in the midst of the Cold War that we have opened our black box in 
order to properly view the elements concealed therein. 
The second step in exploring the nature of the man-machine lies at the 
root of all cyborg theory, in the equation: Organic + Inorganic = Cyborg.  Yet, 
instead of simply accepting the prior relationship as truth, and then basing any 
subsequent theories upon that truth, we shall investigate further by examining 
the components of this equation, and then by exploring the ways in which 
those individual parts might join together and interact.  First, from the structure 
of the image, we can surmise that a cyborg is actually more than just the 
product of two merging entities.  Moreover, we can see from the equation itself 
that the image is actually more complex than a single black box, but is in fact, 
the product of two linked black boxes.  Both the human body and the scaffold 
of the machine are highly complex systems, organic and inorganic 
arrangements that must be reduced to simplified constructions because each is 
so complex.  The human form is a myriad of cells, organs, and chemicals both 
moving and static.  To account for every constituent within is practically 
impossible.  As such, it is far more convenient to create a black box by 
labeling that system as ‘human,’ and then applying that construction to 
whichever problem one wishes to solve.  The same method also applies to 
‘machine’, since it too exists as highly complex combination of kinetic and 
static parts.  As W. Ross Ashby writes: 
 
Were the engineer to treat bridge-building by a consideration of every atom 
he would find the task impossible by its very size. He therefore ignores the 
fact that his girders and blocks are really composite, made of atoms, and 
treats them as his units. As it happens, the nature of girders permits this 
simplification, and the engineer’s work becomes a practical possibility. It 
will be seen therefore that the method of studying very large systems by 
studying only carefully selected aspects of them is simply what is always 
done in practice. Here we intend to follow the process more rigorously and 
consciously.
355
 
Of course, conceptualizing the cyborg as the product of two 
dissimilar black boxes forces a subtle, yet significant change to our overall 
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perspective, since we are no longer treating the body as the sum of two 
differing parts, but rather, as the product of two distinct and disparate entities 
working together in tandem to create something which is ultimately 
unexpected.  Because while it remains true, that if more than one black box is 
given, “and each is studied in isolation until its canonical representation is 
established, and if they are coupled in a known pattern by known linkages, 
then it follows…that the behavior of the whole is determinate, and can be 
predicted,” we must also remember that a successful prediction can only occur 
if the Boxes themselves are either identical, or if our knowledge of each is 
absolute.
356  If neither of these factors apply, and each box is both dissimilar 
and mysterious—as the human body and the structure of the machine 
ultimately are—then the behavior of the whole could prove unforeseen, if not 
totally surprising.  Indeed, if the examiner’s knowledge is less than full: 
 
a prediction has to be undertaken on incomplete knowledge and may prove 
mistaken.  Sometimes all that is known of the parts is that every one has a 
certain characteristic. There may be no better way of predicting than to use 
simple extrapolation—to predict that the whole will have it. Sometimes 
this proves justified; thus, if a whole is of three parts, each of pure copper, 
then we shall be correct if we predict that the whole is of pure copper. But 
often the method fails, and a new property can, if we please, be said to 
‘emerge’.
357
 
Sadly, Ashby’s concept of the emergent property has eluded or been ignored 
by cyborg theory since its inception, and has led to what I can only call the 
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misrecognition of the cyborg body, and its associated politics.  Because if one 
looks closely at various manifestations of the cyborg body over the last 
century, one can see very clear indications that human-machine integration 
does indeed produce a property both totally new and unpredictable; a property 
which can only be called “emergent.” 
For instance, we all know the term itself denotes the intermingling of 
flesh and non-flesh to create a living hybrid of human and machine.  Yet, over 
time we have ignored how that intermingling is represented, eschewing the 
essence of the cyborg and the reality of its so-called subversive politics in 
favour of the obvious, and somewhat superficial mixture of bone and metal.  In 
truth, all cyborgs share a common root, an image that links them to their 
forerunners as well as their successors.  As such, the cyborg’s blend of skin 
and alloy should not be viewed as the linkage of two separate nouns, but rather 
as the amalgamation of two disparate parts into one cohesive unit, because just 
as two chemicals can combine to produce a single substance, so can the 
cyborg’s blend of bone and steel generate a singular image.  Strip away the 
skin to reveal a hard metallic frame, but wipe away the blood and that frame 
becomes a mirror: 
 
Organic + Inorganic = Cyborg = Glass 
 
Robbed of its flesh, the cyborg reflects the environment that surrounds it, but 
when covered with skin, with a veneer of normalcy, it plays the role of the 
errant copy; that of the double or the doppelganger—the living reflection.  As a 
result, popular representations of the cybernetic body are continually 
characterized as either possessing a reflective surface, or conversely, as having 
reflective qualities: thereby transforming their characters from mere mixtures 
of machine and organism, into a series of reflective surfaces holding all the 
properties of both the mirror and the window.
358
Prior to 1945, cybernetic doppelgangers seem to be the dominant trend.  
However, like all lasting cultural myths, the echoes of a twinned cyborg 
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continue right to the present day.  In Fritz Lang’s Metropolis the tormented Dr. 
Rotwang creates of a demented double of the saintly Maria.  The resulting 
creature is an exact duplicate or reflection of the human Maria: one that not 
only sets out to undermine the original’s efforts to alleviate the pain of the 
industrial proletariat, but seemingly, also her reputation as a chaste young girl.  
Furthermore, a reflective and translucent material known as Imipolex G in 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, serves as the cybernetic link joining German 
soldier to German rocket.  While the aptly named, but all too human 
Schwarzgerät’s which pack the insides of each experimental V2, have the 
dubious honour of reflecting Pynchon’s hapless hero, Tyrone Slothrop; who 
coincidentally, is otherwise known as the “Rocketman.”
359
The most obvious examples explicating the link between the mirror and 
the cyborg are those provided by the post-war Hollywood dream factory.  One 
of the clearest and most blatant manifestations is the 1995 action thriller 
Virtuosity, in which a computer program containing the composite 
personalities of over one hundred serial killers is downloaded into a cybernetic 
body actually made of glass (Figure 24).  To quote one suitably awkward 
techno-geek on the microscopic nature of his own device: “What you’re seeing 
are millions of nano-machines suspended in colloidal solution absorbing the 
glass molecules and using them to generate the [body of the creature]…The 
nano-cells are silicon based so they need, you know, glass to regenerate.”
360  
Despite the odd image of Russell Crowe eating a collection of laboratory 
beakers, car windshields, and tram windows, the most exciting combination of 
the cybernetic and the reflective is the trilogy fronted by the Terminator.  In 
fact, as one of the most successful cinematic trios in the history of film, each 
movie not only recalls the connection between cybernetics, cyborgs, and the 
military applications of the Cold War, but also the legacy of Trinity, and the 
glass produced at the instant of its detonation.  After all, the conjoined icons of 
light, glass, and Armageddon fuse quite clearly in the image of the T-101’s 
reflective steel frame. 
In 1991 when James Cameron launched his first sequel in a moment of 
mega-death—or perhaps more appropriately, in the instant of a million ‘little 
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deaths’—he revealed a skull that not only reflected the surrounding devastation 
with the strange clarity of a convex mirror, but one which also harbours the 
broken pieces of a recently destroyed American nation within the boundaries 
of its mirrored form.  Flash forward to the year 2003, almost two decades after 
Schwarzenegger first landed, and that hail of fire and light begins again.  This 
time the sand is not only seared to resonate with that federally owned material 
otherwise known as Trinitite, but is in turn, framed by the director as just one 
more detail in an opening scene packed with glass.  Bear in mind, 
Schwarzenegger’s cyborg not only enters the story in the centre of a mirrored 
ball, but also exists as a kind of mirror himself, because beneath all those 
layers of blood, and skin, and muscle, and hair lay the reflective plates of his 
gleaming metal frame.  Indeed, it is remarkable that in a scene spanning no 
more than thirty seconds there are at least three links to the misshapen mirror; 
two of which are explicit, one of which is implicit.  Intentional or not, such 
imagistic density speaks to something far more significant than the presence of 
a mere anomaly, especially when similar images seem to recur steadily within 
unrelated projects, as well as within different media. 
Film critic David Skal once wrote that the “the real creation myth of 
[the 20
th century] is not Darwin, not Genesis.  It is Frankenstein.”
361  Yet, 
according to Donna Haraway cyborg subjectivity rejects all affiliations with 
origin.  In her words, 
 
Nature and culture are reworked…The relationships for forming wholes 
from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at 
issue in the cyborg world.  Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the 
cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a restoration of the 
garden…
362
 
On the other hand, even if the “cyborg [does] not recognize the Garden of 
Eden”, and even if it is “not made of mud and cannot dream of returning to 
dust” the image is not without myth, because whether it arrives on a bolt of 
lightning on the outskirts of the promise land, or develops as the product of 
mad science in a time of Mutually Assured Destruction, this figure has a 
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story.
363  In fact, like an individual’s reflection in the looking-glass, this mirror 
also demands recognition. 
 
4.2 Glass 
 
Unfortunately, due to the cyborg’s ontological structure, and thus to its 
subsequent ability to assume the properties inherent in all glass products, any 
careful investigation of the man-machine becomes very difficult and very 
complex very quickly, because despite the cyborg’s strong connection to 
mirrors and glass, one must never forget that pursuant to its possible 
relationship with notions of subjectivity, reflectivity, and identity; the creature 
could easily contain qualities from other silicate structures, in addition to those 
already afforded to the image through its status as a reflector.  These 
subsequent considerations become extremely important to any explication of 
the man-machine, since all connections between it and glass become points of 
profound consequence. 
As a material glass is “as hard as a rock and as transparent as water”.
364  
It is “the only [substance] to provide light and protection from the elements, 
and [is] the basis for the most potent device in building: the window.”
365  
Moreover, glass also has the ability to elevate, or bestow importance upon any 
object it encloses, since it has the power to promote all items to the level of 
spectacle, whether that object is as mundane as a specimen trapped inside a 
beaker, or, in terms of architectural design, as extraordinary as a skyscraper or 
garden under glass.
366  As turn of the century author, Paul Scheerbart writes: 
 
The face of the earth would be much altered if brick architecture were 
ousted everywhere by glass architecture.  It would be as if earth were 
adorned with sparkling jewels and enamels.  Such glory is unimaginable.  
All over the world it would be as splendid as if the gardens of the Arabian 
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Nights.  We should then have a paradise on earth, and no need to watch in 
longing expectation for the paradise in heaven.
367
 
As a metaphor, glass also stands on the borderland between states, in the place 
where things begin and end.  It is that hard yet permeable line separating in 
from out, while simultaneously blurring the boundary between both.  Like its 
most ubiquitous manifestation, the window, glass is that clear translucent 
object, that invisible abstract thing, dividing, and yet closely linking, spaces, 
states, worlds, and even ideas.  Subsequently, when one considers the cyborg 
in relation to the mirror, that bond between reflective object and bio-
mechanical body begins to develop earlier cyborgic notions of physical linkage 
and integration, while dramatically expanding the role of this creature to 
include visions of self-reflection and identity formation.  If such a connection 
is coherent, consistent, and pervasive, not just in execution but also in 
presence, then as a ‘body of glass’ the cyborg not only operates symbolically 
as an enormous reflector—thereby allowing us to forge a new subjectivity 
through the image of the man-machine as opposed to in its image as some 
would suggest—but to also form a more accurate vision of our current state; a 
more precise reflection of who we are at this moment, as opposed to who we 
could be in the moments to come.  To paraphrase writers Chris Hables Gray 
and Steven Mentor, cyborg bodies are not “prescriptive” bodies.  They are not 
what we should be.  Rather, they are “descriptive.”
368  They tell us what we 
are, while providing the distance and the perspective to shape what we can 
become. 
In a way, the words of a lovesick Lou Reed sound strangely appropriate 
in relation to the cyborg, the mirror, and their clear connections with Western 
culture, since the lyric, “I’ll be your mirror/ Reflect what you are/ In case you 
don’t know,” seems to perfectly echo the symbolic function of human-machine 
amalgamation.
369  As the joining itself seems to consistently operate as a 
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symbol for the processes, consequences, and fallacies of self-reflection, self-
knowledge, and self-denial, than as an icon for the possible future of human 
evolution.  As Jean Baudrillard writes; “‘I’ll be your mirror” does not signify 
‘I’ll be your reflection’ but “I’ll be your deception.”
370
Fragility, transparency, opacity, reflection; all connotations associated 
with mirrors and various other forms of glass push the social, cultural, and 
political limits of the cyborg body ever-outward, beyond the borders of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, beyond mere self-reflection, and into realms which 
have been left relatively unexplored, at least in relation to human-machine 
integration.  In effect, these connections push the image inexorably toward far 
more unexpected issues concerning light, lenses, visibility, protection, and 
chill, as well as toward a few more surprising connections regarding glass, 
cybernetics, and their ever-growing influence on, as well as use within, 
architectural construction.  Glass is so diverse as a physical and metaphorical 
device, that it often has the properties of a fantastical doorway, serving as the 
entrance to magical realities, liminal spaces, and even death.  To quote the 
character, Heurtebise, from Jean Cocteau’s 1949 film Orphée: “I am letting 
you into the secret of all secrets, mirrors are gates through which death comes 
and goes…if you see your whole life in a mirror you will see death at work as 
you see bees behind the glass in a hive.”
371  Within the context of the cyborg, 
Cocteau’s re-imagining of the Orpheus myth could easily be construed as a 
wonderful parallel for the role of the man-machine in contemporary culture, 
because just as the glass in Orphée stands between life and the underworld, the 
cyborg might also stand in-between; dividing, and yet closely linking, two 
distinct subjectivities; one human, the other posthuman. 
Even writers in the realm of English Literature continue to compound 
the versatility of glass.  In the 1980 novel Waiting for the Barbarians, J.M. 
Coetzee describes “the paltry theatrical mystery of dark shields hiding healthy 
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eyes” of the dangerous Colonel Joll.  A man whose political stance, obsession 
with truth, and weird bespectacled appearance also bear a striking resemblance 
to the sociopathic Dr. Strangelove.
372  Indeed, within each of these cases, 
representations of glass tend to eschew all previously cited manifestations of 
the material in favour of its representation as a lens.  A form which in itself, 
tends to operate as a kind of physical and figurative shield; one which not only 
filters out the undesirable light of reality, but which at best, also protects its 
wearer from the gaze of another by showing nothing but the warped image of 
those who would stare.  At worst, however, such impenetrable glass eyes 
denote a terrible sort of emptiness; a soulless and evil quality, which more 
often than not, tends to represent more than just a complete lack of conscience 
on the part of the wearer, but perhaps also a total absence of identity, 
subjectivity, and self. 
There are innumerable points of contact between cyborgs and glass.  So 
far I have listed and briefly explored only a handful of variations.  Each of 
which contain, and relate in their own unique way to several different 
theoretical constructs; ranging from psychology and spectacle, to fragility and 
death, not to mention glass and the various metaphorical functions inherent to 
its use as a portal.  However, in the interests of concision, the sections 
contained within the following chapter will focus on only one of those 
variations.  Specifically, the cyborg’s connection to the mirror, its possible role 
in the processes of identity formation, and the many physical and 
psychological consequences contained therein.  After all, if one is to truly 
understand the glassy properties of the cyborg body, then certainly one must 
examine the physical structure of its primarily reflective surface, as well as any 
apparent consequences for its role as a psychological symbol resulting from 
our representation of that surface.
373  Thus, like each of the previous chapters, 
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the following sections will continue to follow the prudent advice of Freud, 
since it is hard “for a psychoanalyst [and an examiner] to discover anything 
new that has not been known of before by some creative writer.”
374  In this 
vein, I will focus my discussion of the mirrored man-machine through two 
tightly connected texts produced in the years 1524 and 1972.  More precisely, 
through the lens of one painting produced by the artist Francesco Mazzola, and 
one ekphrastic contemplation on that painting written by the poet John 
Ashbery.  Each of these textual doubles are both physically and metaphorically 
similar to the body of the cyborg itself, and therefore eminently capable of 
providing valuable insight into the many problems one encounters when faced 
with such a strange reflector.  Bear in mind, when conducting an investigation 
of the creature’s ontological structure, one must ask not only: is the cyborg a 
mirror, but also what sort of mirror does the cyborg resemble, and more 
importantly, what kind of resemblance is reflected within? 
 
4.3 Fragility 
 
Colossal, independent, and utterly alien, Francesco Mazzola’s right hand leans 
on the edge of his self-portrait like an “allegory of the creative act.”
375  His 
normally benign proportions stretched out and buckled over the curvature of a 
convex mirror, until his fingers hang insect-like from the end of a monstrous 
appendage.  At the centre of the painting, surrounded by a “few leaded panes, 
old beams, / Fur, pleated muslin, a coral ring run together/ In a movement 
supporting the face”, lies the visage of the artist, angelic and untouched by the 
distortions that twist his surroundings.
376  It is a face remarkably clear and 
unmarred, occupying the still centre of a work dominated by deformation and 
obscurity. 
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This is Parmigianino’s Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (1524), a 
painting that, in one way, could be construed as a “testimony to the virtuosity 
of the painter demanding his [professional] liberty” (Figure 25).
377  However, 
given the enormous warps in perception, and the extreme play on Realist 
painting, Parmigianino’s self-portrait holds something far more subversive 
than a simple declaration of genius.  It is also, as Sabine Melchior-Bonnet 
writes, a “corrosive acid” eating away at the very base of our understanding, a 
caustic chemical bleeding the line between sane and insane, real and unreal.
378
The body of the artist is not well proportioned or even whole, but exists 
within the work as an exaggerated collection of mammalian parts dominated 
by an enormous hand.  As such, the painter’s body is reduced to a single 
component, presenting a kind of visual synecdoche, in which the part 
represents the whole.  Subsequently, Mazzola’s fragmented form undercuts the 
notion of Man as a divine creature of God, because any “ontological 
resemblance, fundamental to the notion of man as [the] image of God, is 
broken by the painter’s” extreme freakishness in the surface of the mirror.
379  
Thus, any residual faith in the unifying power of consciousness, or in some 
essential human divinity, is shattered by the artist’s brutal depiction of a 
monstrous and unnatural self.  One, which is not only subject to the capricious 
nature of perception, but perhaps more immediately, to the terrible madness 
that can spring from within. 
Today, however, in a time when religious dogma plays a substantially 
smaller role in art, culture, and day-to-day life, the image of a warped 
reflection assumes a slightly different set of meanings than it did five hundred 
years ago, because instead of searching the mirror primarily for a sense of 
divine resemblance, something which would “unite man with his creator 
and…link him [with the rest of] his peers”.
380  Western culture has instead 
come to acknowledge the fragility and emptiness of its own image.  People 
look inward not to find that essential need or trait common to all of humanity, 
but to gather, collect, and understand the fragments that separate one person 
from another.  The goal of self-examination in a contemporary context is not 
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some bright religious epiphany, but the determination and explication of deep 
psychological processes; to make sense of our own fragility in the surface of 
the mirror, and to impose a sense of order and meaning on a subject which is 
not only irrevocably fractured, but also essentially meaningless.  To quote 
Melchior-Bonnet: 
 
Little by little the exploration of the subconscious, a structuralist game, led 
to its own dismemberment: both the inflation of images that referred only 
to themselves and the dislocation of a world deprived of meaning 
challenged the notion of the subject itself.  There are no more 
autobiographies or self-portraits, but instead randomness, scattered pieces, 
the anonymity of the impersonal “one,” a shattered or cobbled together 
self.
381
 
It is exactly these processes which sit at the very heart of the cyborg body.  
They inform not only the ontological structure of the cyborg, but also the 
mindset of those who would look toward the creature for a sense of identity. 
After all, as a mirror the cyborg body is intimately linked with theories 
of self-reflection and identity formation.  Specifically, those theories put forth 
by Jacques Lacan.  In fact, the glass-like façade of the typical man-machine is 
an enormously important cultural construction, and not just because of its 
extreme popularity and pervasiveness within Western culture, but mainly 
because it performs the same action as the ‘mirror’ in Lacan’s theory of the 
mirror phase.  Operating symbolically as a massive looking glass, in which the 
fears and desires of the whole Western world are reflected in the creature’s 
glassy surface.  It is therefore an object which can “shore up” a person’s sense 
of self, as well as a culture’s sense of itself, while exposing the many inherent 
instabilities and fragmentations that can plague their particular psyches. 
Typically, however, Lacan’s process of identity formation occurs 
within an ordinary mirror—one that is flat and free of distortion.  As such, the 
mirror’s reflection is steady and straightforward, and “seems to promise 
wholeness, an integrity of the self that is available in the future”.
382  Yet, the 
complete and/or perfect reflection is also “a trap, a decoy, a false promise.  
Thus, from the outset, falsehood and a dependence on things from without 
become necessary to constitute the truth of one’s own being”, because an 
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individual relies on that sense of totality presented by the reflection, and then 
uses that connection to trigger the development of a whole and socialized 
self.
383  Unfortunately, a person will never be as powerful, or as complete, as 
he or she may think, because any identity created through the mirror is not a 
true representation of the self, but is considered rather, as a projection or 
screen known as the ego.  When a child identifies with “its mirror image, [it] 
creates a monster [from] the scattered parts of its experiential self”.  This 
monster is the ego: “a fabrication, a construction, a defensive armour with 
which the self identifies.”
384  As Elizabeth Grosz writes, the ego 
 
it is not an outline or projection of the real body, the body of anatomy and 
physiology, but of an imaginary anatomy…an internalised image of the 
meaning the body has for the subject, for others in its social world, and for 
its culture as a whole.  [This imaginary anatomy] is a shared and/or 
individualized fantasy of the body’s form and modes of operation.
385
 
As a projection—a lie—the ego signifies a schism in the psyche of the 
individual, because at that moment “in which the self comes into view…it 
[also] becomes blind to its own emergence, alienates itself from itself.”
386  In 
other words, self-identification as described in the mirror phase “does not 
simply give rise to wholeness, rather it provides the illusion of wholeness at 
the very moment in which it produces the subject as divided and split.”
387  
Hence, “self-construction becomes self-defeat.”
388
This process is known as ‘misrecognition’; a stage in which “the 
mirage of the ‘I’ or ideal ego (Idealich)” supersedes the truth about one’s 
personality, as well as one’s body.
389  It also happens to be a vital component 
in the creation of the subject, and a necessary tool in the construction of a sane 
and socialized being.  The ego sutures fragments of the experiential self into a 
state of imagined totality, allowing one to function as a complete individual, as 
opposed to a series of discombobulated bits.  Sadly, this process of simulating 
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a complete personality simultaneously ensures that any self-knowledge a 
person might possess is derived per speculum in aenigmate, because the 
imagined ego denies all access to a clear view of one’s own self, and reveals 
only a “veiled image or representation of truth.”
390  Subsequently, perceptions 
of our own physical bodies are so frequently skewed that any representation of 
the self, either by photograph, sound, or video recording, is often seen as 
belonging to that of a startling, almost unrecognisable Other.  As John Ashbery 
writes in the poem, “Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror”: 
 
This otherness, this 
‘Not-being-us’ is all there is to look at 
In the mirror, though no one can say 
How it came to be this way.
391
 
On the other hand, not all mirrors are perfect mirrors.  There are a number of 
reflective surfaces returning likenesses that are neither pleasant nor whole, but 
which instead echo broken parodies of the original body due to some inherent 
abnormalities marring their glassy surface.  The cyborg is one such mirror, 
producing an atypical and imprecise replication that not only offers a vision of 
the self without wholeness, but which also denies the onlooker even the 
illusion of wholeness. 
For instance, the fragmentation of an individual as reflected in the 
mirrored surface of a cyborg body is measurable and immediate, because even 
though the cyborg is in essence, a body made of glass; it is not a ‘glassy’ 
creature in the smooth or flat sense of the word.  Rather, a cyborg is a three 
dimensional being replete with curves, protrusions, and indentations 
corresponding to the humanoid form.  As such, any image reflected within its 
surface is subject to the same distortions that characterize both the concave and 
convex mirrors.
392  It would be a gross miscalculation to see the cyborg as 
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anything less than a warped mirror, reflecting a likeness more easily found in a 
“funhouse,” than within a typical Western home.
393
Naturally, this specular trickery typified by the imperfect mirror 
produces an explosion “of incompatible gazes” in a single prismatic surface.
394  
It “divides representation into smaller pieces”, and shatters the image of the 
onlooker into a pile of scattered parts; thereby unfurling a collection of 
dissonant images as opposed to a single cohesive likeness.
395  The resulting 
distortion then breaks “the cohesion of the subject”, and sacrifices the 
complete reflection “to the aggregate of disparate” pieces populating the 
mirror’s rough surface.
396  Man “gets a piecemeal understanding of himself, he 
knows only bits of his singular experience and, as a fragment or shrunken 
image of a shattered mosaic, he [not only] loses his central and privileged 
position” within the Humanist hierarchy, but also any measure of stability 
found within his reflection.
397  The Lacanian “hommlette” is thus reflected as 
it truly is, broken and without form, deprived of a template on which to sew its 
scattered bits, because like the Mannerist painters of Renaissance Italy, the 
mirrored surface of the cyborg body also produces a likeness which is 
unstable, inconsistent, and divisive, and “neither personality nor mood can 
help give shape to this singular being made from ‘patches’ or ‘snippets’.”
398  
Instead, the grossly disproportionate caricatures returned by the man-machine 
offer the psyche no consolation and no respite, because the processes of 
imaginary identification necessary for the formation of the ego are rendered 
impotent by the very surface designed to facilitate them.  As Ashbery writes: 
 
The whole is stable within 
Instability, a globe like ours, resting 
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On a pedestal of Vacuum, a ping-pong ball 
Secure on its jet of water. 
And just as there are no words for the surface, that is, 
No words to say what it really is 
You will stay on…serene in 
Your gesture which is neither embrace nor warning 
But which holds something of both in pure 
Affirmation that doesn’t affirm anything.
399
 
Consider James Cameron’s 1991 blockbuster, T2: Judgement Day.  
Despite being the sequel to one of Hollywood’s most successful efforts, the 
film also explicitly details the cyborg’s distortive properties throughout, and 
which establishes the unsettling nature of the cyborg’s twisted surface, as well 
the uncanny image of our reflection within that surface, well before the story 
even starts.  It is a movie filled with cyborgic amalgamations that not only 
double, reflect, and distort the other characters as well as their environment, 
but bodies which also strive to beget a logical end to the political madness of 
Mutually Assured Destruction.  In the opening credits of T2, the audience is 
confronted with a vision of fire; presumably the city of Los Angeles directly 
after a thermonuclear attack.  As such, the opening credits not only present the 
viewer with the beginnings of a nightmare future, but also with the filmic 
fulfilment of Pynchon’s final V-2, with the End that lies beyond the end of 
Gravity’s Rainbow.
400  Where Pynchon leaves off, Cameron begins anew, 
launching his story in a moment of orgasmic Armageddon.  Beginning where 
“Orpheus puts down [his] harp”, where human flesh is blown off like so much 
chaff, and where humanity itself is reborn, remade, and/or refitted into a 
corporeal from that actually thrives in the aftermath of such a devastating form 
of sexual release.  After all, just as burning sand produces plates of shattered 
glass, the act of and/or potential for, a large atomic explosion also provides the 
necessary conditions for the production of the man-machine’s mirrored body 
(Figure 26).
401  Thus, from the very start, Schwarzenegger’s T-101 is 
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inextricably linked to a looking glass that reflects misshapen images of its 
immediate environment; a motif that flows throughout T1, T2, and T3 in a 
number of different guises.  Even the trilogy’s continual rehash of the double, 
or doppelganger, could be construed as one such example, since the doubled 
image of the cyborg body imbues the text with a series of living reflections, 
and thus with numerous physical reminders of the mirror itself. 
For example, within the flames that mark the opening, there are swing 
sets and hobbyhorses burned black by the heat, the children who once played 
there vaporized alongside them.  Yet, as the music swells to an uneasy climax 
the hard steel head of a skinless Terminator begins to emerge (Figure 27).  
Specifically: the kind played by Schwarzenegger in the 1984 film of the same 
name.  Stripped of its flesh, the T-101’s metallic skull reflects the fire with the 
clarity of a mirror, and as it draws closer to the camera, the warped image of 
the surrounding flame on its steel head becomes clearer to the viewer.   
Revealing not only the broken pieces of this now destroyed American city, but 
also how its newly burnt and shattered parts are contained firmly within the 
boundaries of the cyborg’s mirrored form.  Of course, the T-101 is not the only 
creature to assume the status of a reflective cyborg.  The visual connections 
between the looking-glass and the man-machine are echoed continually 
throughout the franchise in the far stronger, and far more suggestive forms of 
the T-101’s successors; in particular, within the formless and gleaming body of 
the shape-shifting rapist, and sworn enemy of Schwarzenegger, otherwise 
known as the T-1000.
402
Within the mythology of the Terminator franchise, the T-1000 is the 
next technological step in the eradication of humanity.  It is more powerful, 
more advanced, more destructive, and far more successful than its Aryan 
predecessor, because instead of sporting a “hyper-alloy combat chassis”, the T-
1000 exists as “a mimetic poly-alloy”; a kind of liquid state that allows it to 
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morph into almost anyone or anything.
403  This remarkable ability not only 
permits the newest Terminator to double others and conceal itself, but also 
compels the creature to reflect the entire world over the whole of its body. 
At one point in the film the T-1000 rides a motorcycle into the front of 
a hovering police helicopter.  After punching its way through the windshield, 
the Terminator then morphs into its default form and begins to pour itself 
through the glass and onto the passenger seat.  At this point, the reflected face 
of the copter pilot is clearly visible in the ‘head’ of the vague mirror-like mass 
stirring beside him (Figure 28).  Transforming the officer’s normally complete 
reflection into a bloated and distended mess; thereby producing a fractured 
likeness of the original body in the cyborg’s pooling mass. 
Predictably, the pilot is horrified to discover a Terminator rising 
alongside him, and presumably on a symbolic level, equally terrified by his 
own disjointed image echoed in the surface of that creature.  Certainly it must 
be quite a shock to see your own body reflected in the face of a living mirror, 
and to not only witness the fragility and transparency of your own ego as it 
swims inside a nightmare figure, but to also realize that your own cohesive 
sense of self, is nothing more than a lie.  Until this time, the pilot possessed “a 
unified, hierarchical relationship to his body…a subject over and above [his] 
various bodily experiences”.
404  His mere presence in the film as a functioning 
police officer is a testament to this fact.  Yet, upon seeing his twisted image in 
the surface of the cyborg that hierarchy momentarily collapses, destroying his 
ego, and fracturing his identity into an “untrammelled, objectless, formless” 
mess.
405  Homme becomes hommlette. 
With the pilot’s body now falling, both literally and symbolically into a 
lower state of consciousness, the cyborg functions as any warped mirror 
should.
406  Revealing not only the gaps and seams inherent to every identity 
made by Lacanian means, but also that strange sense of the uncanny 
experienced when one is confronted by an obscured or distorted vision of the 
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self.
407  After all, for a person who seeks “unity by the mediation of the mirror, 
the kaleidoscopic fragments of the broken mirror reveal a protean self, within 
infinite virtualities.”
408  The same can also be said of the imperfect mirror 
since each reveal an erratic, unstable, and ever-changing identity; one capable 
of collapse at anytime, because it exists solely in the “world behind the 
mirror…[in the] prism of the imagination and the dream.”
409  Thus, despite 
Western culture’s persistent representation of the cyborg as an indestructible 
monster, like the test pilots and astronauts populating Tom Wolfe’s The Right 
Stuff (1979), fragility is, and has always been, an issue, since the cyborg body 
not only shatters consistently, but in turn, always facilitates the fragmentation 
of those it doubles and reflects.  As Wolfe writes: 
 
In the front seat was all that was left of…Bud Jennings…a promising 
young fighter pilot was now a horrible roasted hulk—with no head.  His 
head was completely gone, apparently torn off the spinal column like a 
pineapple off a stalk, except that it was nowhere to be found…Each man 
could see it all…The curds were Bud Jennings’ brains.  The tree trunk had 
smashed through the cockpit canopy of the [plane] and knocked [his] head 
clean to pieces like a melon.
410
 
4.4 Illusion 
However, even though the cyborg body is inherently fragile, and even though 
the land beyond the glass is confused and illusory, this inherent instability can 
also illustrate how to create a sense of unity from that fragmentation.  Bear in 
mind, “man’s relationship with his reflection is [always] conflicted”, even in 
relation to the most ordinary situation.  For as Melchior-Bonnet writes: 
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Forced to let his image enter the [glass, man] is revealed—visible, naked, 
vulnerable, subject to the sight of himself as others see him.  He has to 
control his face, adjust his behaviour, hide his secrets.  Whether he 
embraces or rejects this image, he exposes himself to the danger of being 
misperceived.  Furthermore, his reflection is ephemeral, and inconsistent—
a mere weakening of consciousness or the cruelty of a sideways glance 
might cause it to lose its familiar conformity.  Worse yet, by revealing an 
image of the body to consciousness, the mirror becomes a screen for many 
imaginary projections and identifications.
411
 
These projections and identifications do not survive long, and must be 
continually reasserted so that the subject’s “familiar conformity” can survive.  
Nevertheless, unlike the identities produced and derived from a typical glass 
reflector, the warped mirror denies any such formations or assertions from 
taking place, because it only reveals the shattered image of an individual’s true 
psychological state. 
Yet, what happens when the viewer’s shattered parts are locked within 
the borders of a living body, when they are reflected in a corporeal creature 
both real and symbolic, as opposed to the relatively empty and formless plane 
of the rectangular mirror?  Can such a small shift in our perception affect the 
ways in which Western Culture not only perceives and represents the cyborg, 
but also in how we see and think about the subject being reflected within that 
body? 
Despite the overwhelming sense of fracture held within a reflective 
form like the Terminator, one must never forget that in spite of any previously 
mentioned schism between subject and reflection, object and representation, 
many of the consequences garnered from a) recognizing a fractured self in the 
surface of a warped mirror, and b) comprehending that same self in the warped 
surface of a cyborg body, differ immensely.  In the first scenario, the subject 
remains broken; untied to any form or context that could give rise to a sense of 
organization for subject’s shattered state.  While in the second, the glass body 
provides the organized sense missing from the first. 
In his ekphrastic poem, “Self-portrait in a Convex Mirror,” John 
Ashbery claims that in a typical warped mirror there is nothing outside the 
immediate surface, nothing beyond the “shield of a greeting”, because there 
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can be no interiority, no meaning, when faced with the distortions of a 
fractured face.
412  As Ashbery writes: 
 
Francesco, your hand is big enough 
To wreck the sphere, and too big, 
One would think, to weave delicate meshes 
That only argue its further detention. 
[…] But your eyes proclaim 
That everything is surface.  The surface is what’s there 
And nothing can exist except what’s there.
413
 
If Ashbery’s statement is true, then the misshapen images returned by the 
warped mirror are merely empty gestures devoid of any real significance, 
because whatever meaning is held by the reflection is tethered so closely to the 
glass, that “the soul is a captive/ …kept/ In suspension, unable to advance 
much farther/ Than your look as it intercepts the picture.”
414  Subsequently, 
“There is no way/ To [re]build” Man and his resemblance “flat like a section of 
wall”.
415  There is no way to make Francesco coherent and whole again, 
because his image cannot project meaning into the outside world, or serve as a 
surface on which meaning can be enforced or created.  Instead, that disparate 
sense of self dominating his reflection can only curve back on itself, turning 
away from the viewer to “join the segment of a circle,/ Roving back to the 
body of which it seems/ So unlikely a part”.
416  For the poet, it is impossible to 
see beyond the warped surface of the looking glass, and to penetrate in search 
of some meaningful internal core, because even if that core does exist, it 
refuses to interact, or to even show itself to the viewer.  Rather, there is only 
the curved surface of the mirror surrounding what is essentially, an 
unknowable centre; a hard shell protecting the contents of some inscrutable 
black box. 
Even the language of Ashbery’s poem, which itself functions as a kind 
of funhouse mirror, cycles in and out of focus, cleverly mimicking the same 
instability and ambiguity that pervades all warped reflections, because it 
refuses to concentrate on a single specific, or to even collect and make sense of 
                                                 
412 John Ashbery, “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” p. 82, Ln. 533. 
413 Ibid, p. 70, Ln. 72-81. 
414 Ibid, pp. 68-69, Ln. 29-31. 
415 Ibid, p. 69, Ln. 61-62. 
416 Ibid, p. 69, Ln. 63-65.   152
the many disparate parts that make up Mazzola’s image.  Such a task is futile, 
since any attempt at cohesion is a strike against whatever meaning is held by 
the painting. 
Yet, given their clear impenetrability, how does one go about 
interpreting such fragile and illusive works of art?  Furthermore, how does one 
‘read’ an image reflected in the mirrored body of a creature whose physical 
form is also modelled on the same twisted surface?  First of all, in order to 
compensate for the obvious incongruity between the cyborg’s warped 
reflection and our potentially destructive analysis of that reflection, while in 
turn, not only making sense of both Ashbery’s poem and Parmigianino’s work, 
but also all reflections held in the surface of any warped mirror, we as readers 
must follow the advice of critic Edward Hoeppner, and instead form an 
analysis which simultaneously comprehends points akin to the following: 
 
Parmigianino’s musings before the barber’s glass, his rendering of a 
particular image rendered by that mirror, Ashbery’s assessment of and 
response to Parmigianino’s work, and the poet’s production of a self-
portrait in the language of the poem[, which is itself a portrait in a convex 
mirror.]  All these are cast upon us.
417
 
And all these disparate elements must be considered if one wishes to 
understand the nature of the subject in the surface of any warped mirror, since 
the critical processes we use to understand “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” 
can also serve as a template for understanding self-reflection in the misshapen 
surface of the cyborg body. 
If a person is confronted with the broken pieces of their shattered image 
in a normal plate of curved glass, he or she will grasp the mirror’s many facets 
in the same way a reader would grasp Ashbery’s poetic deliberations on 
Parmigianino’s painting; where one must consider concurrently, the 
motivations, desires, realities, and responses that engulf the poet’s particular 
brand of ekphrasis.  After all, when confronted with such a twisted likeness, 
one would have to ponder his or her desires before the mirror, his or her 
reflections within that mirror, his or her assessment of and response to those 
reflections, as well as the individual’s internalisation of the images therein, and 
the resulting attempt at producing and/or reconciling a self in “the language” of 
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those images.  Unfortunately, the internalisation of a shattered image “sets into 
motion too many affects, and the [glass], instead of anticipating unity, breaks it 
into pieces.”
418  As such, the person’s attempt at reproducing a self in “the 
language” of their reflection ultimately proves fruitless, because whatever 
subjectivity exists within his or her mind is reproduced just as it is in the glass.  
Splintered, unknowable, and without form, it casts the body back to Lacan’s 
hommlette, and to the wreckage reflected in the “gibbous/ Mirrored eye of an 
insect”.
419
However, when a subject is fractured inside the mirrored body of a 
dominant symbol such as the cyborg, its broken parts are contained within the 
physical and contextual framework of that form.  The subject’s broken pieces 
occupy the interior of that body, and thus become tied to it, because a person’s 
amorphous feelings, as well as his or her experiential sense of self, are now 
bound to a subject that is not his or her own.  This point is especially true in 
regards to filmic representations of the human-machine amalgamation, because 
more often than not the reflection of the onlooker will actually appear trapped 
within, or grafted onto the man-machine’s symbolic surface, as if sutured to 
the curves of its mirrored body.  For instance, in Cameron’s T2 the face of the 
copter pilot is reflected in the bulb, or head, of the T-1000; creating a visual 
link that immediately bonds the two individuals physically.  This scene thereby 
complicates the psychic drama of the warped mirror by establishing a visceral 
connection between the two characters, since for a single moment the shifting 
parts of the cyborg body directly correspond to the pilot’s reflections within 
that body.  As though the pilot himself was momentarily grafted onto the 
figure of the Terminator; thereby framing the man’s shattered likeness in the 
cyborg’s near-shapeless form.  Its ill-defined edges encircling his ‘soul’ the 
way the land encircles the sea. 
The boundaries of the T-1000 surround those disparate human elements 
composing the mind and body of the unfortunate pilot.  They contain him and 
bind his broken parts by adding a background on which his fractured self can 
rest.  As a result, the borders of that creature, however unclear, govern the 
reorganization and operation of the pilot’s entire being.  They add context and 
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meaning to a ruined self: a body, which would otherwise reject the unity 
imposed by such ideas.
420  Moreover, with the individual’s free-floating 
hommlette now tied to something structural, as well as something semi-human, 
it becomes so much more than a smattering of empty parts, and is transformed 
rather, into something that resembles a cohesive whole, since each of those 
disparate parts now begin to fill the boundaries of a specific, and well-defined 
interior.  Thus, the mirrored surface of the cyborg body becomes the centre 
around which everything is organized.  It becomes the plane upon which the 
shattered pieces reflected therein are congealed into a meaningful collection of 
interrelated elements. 
This is a complex scenario to be sure, because if the previous theorem 
is correct, then logically this formulation would also suggest that the ego of the 
viewer is still intact—however tentatively.  And that the illusion of selfhood 
normally produced by the mirror phase is still maintained, even in the face of 
such profound fragmentation.  Consequently, the warped surface of the cyborg 
body would have little effect on its function as an object which facilitates the 
formation of the ego, because all the rules inherent to Lacan’s theory of 
identity formation are still in play.  An ego-ideal is still stamped over the 
disparate parts of the experiential self by the body of the cyborg itself, which 
in turn, provides the appearance of a well-organized whole.  Indeed, one could 
argue that the glass body of the man-machine is primarily responsible for 
creating this feeling of conformity and for enforcing the “armour of an 
alienating identity” where one should not exist.  Under such a system, it is the 
human shape of the cyborg body, that not only holds the disparate pieces of the 
onlooker’s persona together, but which in turn, provides the necessary pattern 
on which the normal processes of ego formation can occur. 
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Subsequently, the man-machine is not, as Haraway contends, 
predicated upon notions of fracture, but is instead a body in perpetual search of 
unity.  This, of course, creates a rather strange opposition at the very core of 
the cyborg, because even though the physical borders of that figure provide the 
creature with a loose sense of wholeness and conformity, the glass form of the 
hybrid’s body also holds an enormous amount of fracture.  In fact, even though 
the bodily boundaries of the cyborg manage to bond the shattered parts of the 
onlooker’s psyche, the reflections held within that figure are invariably warped 
just as they are in Mazzola’s mirror.  Thus, the image of a glass cyborg filled 
with the shattered pieces of a person’s identity quickly becomes a perfect 
analog for the subject formed as a result of Jacque Lacan’s mirror phase, 
because within the physical limits of the man-machine there is nothing but a 
collection of fragmentary parts held together by a fragile unity facilitated by 
the physical form of the cyborg itself. 
Of course, given these extremely strong Lacanian connections, the 
cyborg as dominant cultural metaphor, would also invariably function as a 
dominant cultural mirror, and would therefore act as a vessel not only for 
general reflections of Western culture, but also for the varied psychologies 
produced therein.  The man-machine would in turn, carry all of our 
inadequacies, instabilities, insecurities, and fractured parts tightly within its 
mirrored frame, while simultaneously providing its onlookers with a fragile 
sense of totality garnered from that frame.  Despite the cyborg’s tentative 
unity, there would remain an unavoidable sense of the uncanny, as well as a 
massive and very visible feeling of inadequacy connected to the broken images 
contained within the warped surface of that body.  Allowing the fractured 
pieces enclosed inside to manifest themselves both literally and symbolically, 
since that sense of disunity and lack found within the physical body of the 
man-machine would reflect the usual feelings of disintegration and 
inadequacy, which the ego strives to mask.  Producing psychological dis-ease 
that not only creates a very visible impression of failure, insufficiency, and 
anxiety, but which ultimately carries over to complement the nature of “cyborg 
politics,” as well as the disposition and behaviour of cyborg representations. 
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5: Body of Glas: 
Cyborgs, Subjectivity, and the Fallacy of the Posthuman 
 
“The motif of the limit, of the frontier, of the parting line will furrow the whole 
sequence.  From one mother to the other.”
421
 
5.1 Boundary 
 
Beyond the psychological qualities and connections inherent to the cyborg’s 
representation as a mirror, there is also the potential to examine cultural 
representations of human-machine amalgamations outside the framework 
provided by Lacan.  Because while the previous readings certainly support the 
argument that ‘we’ as a culture are looking toward the cyborg for a new sense 
of identity, that sense of separation necessary for the formation of the subject is 
also almost absent.  In other words, we as Westerners have apparently failed to 
distance ourselves from that which came before, so that a new sense of self, as 
well as a new sense of selfhood, can be produced in the face of the glass.  
Instead, Western culture still clings to the figure of its humanist ‘mother’ even 
as it whispers weakly for a body of its own.  In fact, even if such a profound 
psychological change is eventually granted, and even if we do in the end, 
choose to alter our underlying nature and break away from the past in order to 
create something we “must helplessly call [posthuman]”, one is left to wonder 
whether such a transformation could ever be a success, or if the act would 
simply become a matter of exchange.
422  As Neil Badmington writes: 
 
Posthumanism…needs theory, needs theorizing, needs above all to 
reconsider the untimely celebration of the absolute end of ‘Man.’ What 
Jacques Derrida calls the ‘apocalyptic tone’ should be toned down a little, 
for, as Nietzsche once pointed out, it is remarkably difficult to cut off the 
human(ist) head through which we (continue to) ‘behold all things.’
423
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Badmington continues: “While I am not for one moment interested in preserving humanism, 
keeping its head firmly on its shoulders, I do think that it is worth remembering the tale of the 
Lernaean hydra (the mythical beast that, of course, re-members itself).  ‘The hydra throve on 
its wounds,’ Ovid recalls, ‘and none of its hundred heads could be cut off with impunity, 
without being replaced by two new ones which made its neck stronger than 
ever’…Apocalyptic accounts of the end of ‘Man,’ it seems to me, ignore humanism’s capacity 
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Badmington’s point is well taken, and by a work once removed, so is 
Derrida’s, since “thought always takes place within a certain tradition”.
424  
Subsequently, thought itself is bound to bear some trace of that tradition.  Like 
the Cold War politics of the cyborg body, “[n]o one can think…entirely” 
outside the boundaries of time and space, or in trying, escape the politics and 
behavior which have influenced one’s perspective, because by 
 
‘affirming an absolute break and absolute difference’ from established 
anthropocentric thought [from humanism to posthumanism].  Such 
‘transgressions,’ Derrida points out, can all too easily become ‘false exits,’ 
as the ‘force and the efficiency’ of tradition effect a stricter and more naive 
reinstatement of ‘the new terrain on the oldest ground’.
425
 
5.2 Transition 
 
As a basic hybrid of human and machine, the cyborg is consistently seen as the 
boundary separating one ethos from another; dividing specifically, those 
thoughts and ideals which were spawned by the Enlightenment, and those 
which were born from the subsequent destruction of that particular liberal 
humanist philosophy.  Indeed, today, conventional wisdom states that the 
foundations of humanism are being torn away by the invasive nature of 
modern technology, and by its ability to penetrate and merge with the body 
                                                                                                                                           
I want to insist, the glorious moment of Herculean victory cannot yet come, for humanism 
continues to raise its head(s).” 
424 Neil Badmington, “Theorizing Posthumanism,” p. 13. 
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attention…The familiar, easy announcements of a complete change of terrain, a pure outside, 
need to be complemented by work that speaks to humanism’s ghost, to the reappearance of the 
inside within the outside. Both halves of the signifier in question demand attention: 
posthumanism, as I have argued elsewhere, is as much posthumanist as it is posthumanist.”  
Neil Badmington, “Theorizing Posthumanism,” p. 15.  For more on Badmington and 
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itself.  Certainly, the ever increasing relevance of such a troubling, 
claustrophobic, and fragmented sense of self is in direct opposition to the free, 
whole, holy, impenetrable, white, and ultimately unsullied organic body at the 
centre of the Enlightenment; producing an opposition that, if feasible or even 
existent, could conceivably trigger a radical posthuman transformation within 
contemporary Western society.  Superficially, the validity of this prior, and 
very popular formulation seems stable enough, since as Jonathan Crary writes; 
“what determines vision at any given historical moment is not some deep 
structure, economic base, or world view, but rather the functioning of a 
collective assemblage of disparate parts on a single social surface.”
426
Today, the body is that surface, and the cyborg is nothing if not a 
relatively new way to conceive of and represent that form.  Thus, if our bodies 
are the battleground for conflicting socio-political, cultural, and aesthetic 
philosophies—for new ways to see—and if they do indeed operate as the site 
of evolution and change, then naturally such a radical reconsideration of the 
human form, especially one which would designate it as something other than 
simply human, would cause the entire world to adjust in turn.
427  To quote 
Michael Blitz and Louise Krasniewicz: 
 
We experience the world through our bodies and these experiences are 
modified by the body’s shape and age and decoration and form.  Bodies 
provide the canvas on which we paint ourselves to share with the world, 
and they can help or hinder our social functioning on so many levels.
428
 
Yet, given the gendered nature of the cyborg body, as well as the racialized, 
patriarchal, and extremely damaging political affinities contained therein, does 
it really matter if the white male bodies saturating the Western imagination are 
slightly less ‘solid’ than their white male predecessors?  Do such small 
changes to our self-image hold any real significance when faced with the 
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continued inequalities inherent in our ideological make-up?  And considering 
the obvious similarities between humanist, and allegedly posthumanist 
representations, is the latter different enough from the former to be considered 
a separate opposing ideology? 
If the posthuman body is in actuality, a cyborg body, or if it is indeed 
best symbolized by the image of the cyborg, as Chris Gray and N. Katherine 
Hayles contend, then the politics of the posthuman are synonymous with the 
previously explicated politics of the man-machine.
429  The two should be one 
and the same, since both are porous, fragmented, unstable, inadequate, and 
corrupted.  On the other hand, if the cyborg does not symbolize an irrevocable 
“change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge” then what does the 
image represent?
430  After all, even though the man-machine both embodies 
and enacts the very worst aspects of liberal humanism, the cyborg itself is still 
fundamentally different from all previous articulations of the human form as 
expressed under the philosophies of the Enlightenment.  Subsequently, the real 
question is this: if the mirrored surface of the cyborg body does not provide us 
with a blueprint for a new sense of self, a new way to be human, and a new 
way to think, then what are the alternatives?  What does it do instead?
431
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5.3 Anxiety 
 
So far, we have seen how man-machine imagery merely reinforces the goals 
and ideals of an already pre-existing political system.  More specifically, of the 
time period in which the cyborg itself was named, defined, and finally 
transformed into a closed black box.  It was during the Cold War that the 
cyborg finally became a ‘cyborg,’ and was thus confirmed as a real and 
relevant entity with an embedded political agenda.  Yet, concurrent to this 
articulation, and the cyborg’s many connections to the shattered and 
fragmented mirror, there remains another way to both interpret and investigate 
the strange glass bodies which spring from the amalgamation of organic and 
inorganic, while still remaining true to many of the cyborg’s previously 
explicated political leanings, and related ontology. 
One of the most productive concepts by which to examine the nature 
and function of the cyborg body is found in the work of former paediatrician 
turned psychoanalyst, D.W. Winnicott.
432  In particular, within Winnicott’s 
celebrated theory of the ‘transitional object’: a term which refers specifically to 
a special childhood item, the “first not-me possession”, and indeed, “the first 
possession.”  In other words: that thing which is “neither wholly other, nor 
simply part of the self.”
433  As analyst Michael Eigen writes, the transitional 
object “is not a hallucination, but an actual object filled with meaning…it is 
my own with bits of me and my mother and itself blended in a way that does 
not fit any single category.”
434  It is a “temporary construction which aids the 
infant in the early stages of developing a sense of reality and [in] establishing 
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his [or her] own individual identity.”
435  As such, it is an object “of positive 
value in monitoring growth and expansion”, and is later “dispensed with 
when…no longer needed.”
436
Film critic Fred Glass employs Winnicott’s theory to great effect, and 
proposes that transitional objects can not only be used as a means by which to 
examine and understand the child’s production of “an individual identity”, 
specifically one which supersedes “the merged fluid baby/mother relationship 
of infancy”, but more importantly, one which can also be employed as “a 
model for understanding broader cultural issues.”
437  In fact, Glass labels the 
man-machine as a transitional object throughout his argument, drawing on 
Winnicott’s own tentative formulation that there could be a “parallel between 
individual psychological development…and the collective metamorphoses of 
groups within a society faced with change.”
438  Glass writes: 
 
Characters in situations in theater, paintings, storytelling, or films might 
reveal something of the collective psychological processes that occurs 
when an audience engages with [what can only be called a] ‘cultural 
transitional object,’ [in this case the cyborg,] especially in periods of social 
conflict [and/or] structural transformation of a culture.  [In fact, it was 
Winnicott’s] hope that cultural theorists might take up the idea and apply it 
to their work in ways that, as a non-specialist, he could only intuit.
439
 
In discussing the cybernetic bodies of Paul Verhoeven’s Robocop and Total 
Recall, as well as the futuristic built environments which surround and reflect 
those bodies, Fred Glass begins his argument with a brief exploration of a very 
specific—and very Winnicottian—Sci-Fi sub-genre, he calls “The New Bad 
Future” (NBF). 
In general terms, NBF is a prevalent subsection of Science Fiction 
filmmaking which specializes in telling “stories about a future in the grip of 
feverish social decay.”
440  According to Glass: 
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The NBF scenario typically embraces urban expansion on a monstrous 
scale, where real estate capital has realized its fondest dream of cancerous 
growth.  Amnesia-stricken characters and advanced gadgetry tangle against 
the backdrop of a ruined natural environment, while drug gangs compete 
with private security forces to provide the most plentiful opportunities for 
employment…many NBF films tilt toward an intelligent, leftish politics, 
leavened with a sense of (black) humor.  Human/machine interfaces figure 
prominently, often through androids or cyborgs didactically presented as 
more human than human characters.  Indeed, central to the concept of the 
NBF is the question of what is human, with moral, political, and 
philosophical discourses spinning round that axis.
441
 
Glass goes on to state, that in addition to creating a fictionalized and dystopic 
future based on the social, political, and economic conditions of the present, 
NBF films such as Robocop,  Alien, and Blade Runner also play a role in 
providing 
 
viewers with an unconscious vehicle for dealing with the collective issues 
raised by the transition, under capitalist control, from a relatively stable 
national, mechanical/industrial society to a new and uncertain transnational 
information technology order.  The social anxiety of job dislocation 
through the wanton destruction of the old industrial base of the American 
economy is compounded by the felt experience of millions of workers who 
have to retool themselves to survive.
442
 
This statement, of course, boasts a number of parallels with Donna Haraway’s 
descriptions in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” and in particular with her articulation of 
a relatively new economic change already well underway by the mid-1980s.  
Specifically: one responsible for transforming the fields of telecommunications 
and biotechnology into the new Godheads of the 21
st century.  Each these areas 
has not only redefined who we are individually, as well as what we are 
collectively, but also what we have access to as both separate people and 
discrete social groupings.  As Haraway writes: 
 
The ‘New Industrial Revolution’ is producing a new world-wide working 
class, as well as new sexualities and ethnicities.  The extreme mobility of 
capital and the emerging international division of labour are intertwined 
with the emergence of new collectivities, and the weakening of familiar 
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groupings.  These developments are neither gender—nor race neutral.   
White men in advanced industrial societies have become newly vulnerable 
to permanent job loss, and women are not disappearing from the job roles 
at the same rates as men.  It is not simply that women in the Third World 
countries are the preferred labour force for the science-based 
multinationals in the export-processing sectors, particularly in electronics.  
The picture is more systematic and involves reproduction, sexuality, 
culture, consumption, and production.
443
 
In both instances the world’s recent socio-political and economic shift from a 
nationalist, mechanical-industrial, commodity based capitalist system to one 
founded primarily on the acquisition, trade, and production of information-
content is producing—or has produced—changes both positive and negative, 
which have not only transformed the nature of commerce, but also redefined 
the terms for an individual’s fiscal and physical survival.  For both Haraway 
and Glass, the cyborg as “part human part computer, struggling to achieve a 
meaningful identity, in this context becomes a character with which a sizable 
fraction of the population can identify, albeit mostly at an unconscious 
level.”
444  Thus, the cyborg not only becomes an object through which a 
multiplicity of social fears are channeled, but also one through which these 
collective psychological anxieties can be excised, organized, understood, and 
expressed.
445  In other words, like Winnicott’s object, the cyborg in Fred 
Glass’s New Bad Future, as well as within Donna Haraway’s seemingly ‘New 
Bad Present,’ becomes a “vehicle to aid expression and orientation” on a 
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massive scale.
446  Serving as the “bridge between that which is comfortably 
familiar and whatever is disturbingly unfamiliar [until] it facilitates the 
acceptance of the latter.”
447
After all, there is “a necessity existing in every culture that leads it to 
produce a perfect, all inclusive metaphor for itself.”
448  Music journalist, Greil 
Marcus maintains that Elvis Presley was one such metaphor in the 1950s and 
60s, and even past his death in 1977, “because he provided numerous ways to 
talk about authority, sex, repression, and guilt in an era that had just begun to 
develop widespread outlets for [those discussions].”
449  Most recently, Michael 
Blitz and Louise Krasniewicz have argued that Arnold Schwarzenegger’s 
Terminator now fills a similar role, and that his spell as the cybernetic assassin, 
is now an example of what “anthropologists call a dominant symbol: [a sign 
appearing] in many contexts and guises, [performing] many cultural tasks, 
[condensing] many meanings into one image, and [providing] a window onto 
the rest of the culture.”
450  On the other hand, while Blitz and Krasniewicz are 
absolutely correct in relation to certain contexts, like that of the 2003 
gubernatorial recall election in California, the locus is misplaced when 
discussing the Terminator in a larger cultural context.  Instead, it is more 
accurate to label the more inclusive image of ‘cyborg’ as the dominant symbol, 
rather than one specific incarnation of that concept.  The Terminator functions 
as a leading cultural metaphor mainly because it is a cyborg; a brutal, yet 
seemingly liminal figure, that consistently straddles the line between 
apocalypse and utopia, “the future and the past, reality and fantasy, reality and 
film, beginnings and ends”, organic and inorganic.
451
However, whether one labels the Terminator as the dominant symbol, 
or the larger concept of human-machine amalgamation as both a dominant 
symbol  and a cultural transitional object, is largely irrelevant.  The fact 
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remains that the body of the cyborg, no matter what its appearance, always 
represents either a form of social reflection, modification, or outright 
evolution, because even if one discards the obvious mix of skin and steel 
inherent to most manifestations of organic and inorganic, the image of glass—
or of glass-like characteristics—consistently remains the same.  Indeed, even 
when one considers the nature of Winnicott’s theory in direct relation to the 
cyborg, the qualities of the transitional object also share a number of 
similarities with the mythical and symbolic properties of the mirror, and thus 
with the glassy properties of most human-machine representations, because 
like the symbolic surface of the looking-glass, Winnicott’s object also stands in 
as a kind of door.  As an image which not only marks a liminal space between 
two ostensibly different spheres, but one which also facilitates a one-way 
passage between each realm. 
 
5.4 Penetration 
 
Jean Cocteau’s 1949 film, Orphée, is a model for the mythical and symbolic 
properties of the looking-glass.  In fact, within Cocteau’s text, the mirror is not 
the only the image which separates life and death, but also the watery door 
connecting both (Figure 29).  It is a solid surface capable of transformation, 
transition, and passage, allowing Cocteau’s protagonist to journey back and 
forth through the plane of the mirror-pool into a surreal and chaotic 
underworld; a place where motion, time, direction, and distance are confused, 
illusory, and entirely unstructured.  Beyond the glass, reality is imprecise and 
incoherent.  It is a world where fragmentation and disorder govern science, 
action, and subjectivity, where logic is non-existent, and where wholeness is 
not just an illusion, but also a known falsehood, since traversing the plane of 
the mirror leads only “to the incommunicable—to confusion and void.”  As 
Melchior-Bonnet writes: 
 
The world loses its intelligibility and, in this chaos, the self perceives its 
own fragmentation.  The unity and independence of the subject are only a 
momentary and relative illusion.  Indifference and decomposition replace 
the humanist aim of ‘Know Thyself.’
452
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The same, of course, can also be said of the cyborg, because if one breaches 
the surface of that warped and mirrored plane, the transgressor can also find 
him or herself faced with the same sense of inadequacy, fragmentation, and 
inscrutability, which the combination of organic and inorganic strives to mask 
and contain.  Within the context of the man-machine, Cocteau’s re-imagining 
of the Orpheus myth not only expounds upon the mythical properties of the 
mirror, but in a weirdly prescient way, also parallels the role of the cyborg in 
contemporary culture with a remarkable amount of accuracy.  After all, just as 
the mirrors of Orphée stood between life and the underworld, the cyborg might 
also stand in-between: dividing and yet closely linking, two distinct 
subjectivities.  Its body sitting atop a kind of “no man’s land”, a place where 
humanity’s past memories and beliefs are not only probed and exposed, but 
also destroyed and discarded.  Like Winnicott’s theory of the transitional 
object, it too could represent a kind of chaotic limbo, where old ideas are 
rendered immaterial, and where we as a culture are broken, and forced to begin 
anew: 
 
Orphée: Where are we? 
Heurtebise: Life is a long death…This is no man’s land…Here are men’s 
memories and the ruins of their beliefs. 
Orphée: Does every mirror in the world lead here? 
Heurtebise: I suppose so.  But I’d not like to be in your gloves…
453
 
In one respect, this act of fracture facilitated by the mirrored surface of the 
cyborg body could prove to be a positive point, because all previous 
subjectivities produced under the gaze of humanism would now be fractured to 
the point of irrelevance, and would therefore become ripe for remoulding.   
Bear in mind, since the cyborg itself is primarily a symbol of what Bruce 
Grenville calls, “our own anxiety and desire to give meaning to the 
technological ethos,” the persistent and consistent penetration of that image in 
all areas of cultural production could therefore function as a metaphor for 
change.
454
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In Glas by Jacques Derrida, borders, both material and ideal, are played 
with and explored.
455  Even the design of each page is geared toward the 
investigation of limits both literal and linguistic, as two different essays in two 
distinct columns, stand side by side on each leaf of Derrida’s book.  With one 
on G.W.F. Hegel, and the other on Jean Genet, the interplay of words and 
ideas not only reflects the incongruities and similarities within each respective 
column, but more importantly, each seemingly discrete discourse slides into, 
colludes with, and speaks to its partner, as the textual boundaries which define 
the columns are continually eroded by their proximity, as well as by the 
inevitable, desired, and required wandering of the reader’s eye from one article 
to the other.  As such, the value of Glas is not derived from each individual 
pillar, but is instead found within the tension derived from their subsequent 
interaction; from the space that lies between them.  As Gayatri Spivak writes in 
her 1977 review of Derrida’s text: “As the father’s phallus works in the 
mother’s hymen, between two legs, so Glas works at origins, between two 
columns, between Hegel and Genet.”
456
Reading such a text is difficult in itself, but unpacking such a densely 
layered work is completely impractical and ultimately unnecessary for the 
purposes of the following chapter.  Yet, having said that, it is very important 
that we note not only Derrida’s methodology, but also his parallel explications 
of what it means to cross a border, to penetrate a boundary; whether real or 
illusory.  Not to mention the kinds of thoughts and feelings which make the 
experience both unique and necessary in exposing the constructed-ness of 
philosophy, thought, and writing, as well as the value gained from the process 
of deconstruction, and from recognition.  For under such a system, all acts of 
penetration become acts of recognition, acknowledgments of an image or 
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symbol without which the penetration of a boundary is impossible.  As Derrida 
writes: “From the moment it suspends and traverses, penetration is never of 
anything but an image”.
457  Thus, if one accepts Derrida’s idea as truth, or 
conversely, as something which approaches the idea of truth, then images are 
at the core of every border.  They stand on the front lines, on the thresholds 
dividing nations, desires, theories, and philosophies.  If one decides to 
penetrate their surface, that person must believe in the power of the image and 
the idea it represents.  Without this belief one cannot pass, because to dismiss a 
boundary whether personal, political, or cultural is to invite refusal. 
Derrida plays with the idea of passage, movement, and transition within 
a few brief paragraphs detailing the parallel but respective travels of both 
himself and Genet between Poland and the former Czechoslovakia.  In this 
scene, the thoughts of each man are saturated with a myriad of problems and 
meanings inherent to such an event, such an act of “penetration,” because even 
though he asks the following question only once, the entire section seems to 
pulsate with the problem: “What is it to pass from Czechoslovakia into 
Poland?”
458  What does it mean to move from one state to the next?  Derrida 
writes: 
 
Penetration is crossing a limit, that is, (with) a march separating two 
opposed places.  And which, however naturally continue, like 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, resemble each other, regard each other, 
separated nonetheless by a frontier all the more mysterious, concealed in 
the crossing, because it is abstract, legal, ideal…
459
 
For both, the border is an obvious abstraction, a construction, and in many 
ways, almost a quaint irrelevancy separating two areas which can never be 
divided, because each is part of the same “naturally continuous element”.
460  
Conversely however, the line that divides these “two lands…separated by a 
name or a law” is in turn absolutely real, since passing through such a 
boundary is not only fraught with corporeal consequences, but as a matter of 
course, requires a great deal of psychic and social conditioning on the part of 
the transgressor.  As the enigmatic chauffeur of Jean Cocteau’s Orphée 
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remarks quite plainly to the film’s namesake in the moment immediately prior 
to their passing through the looking-glass: “It is not necessary to understand.  It 
is necessary to believe.”
461
The act of passage is not only real, in the sense that such an event both 
occurs and produces consequences within the material world of reality, but is 
also totally imaginary in the sense that one never steps over an existing 
boundary or line, but rather over the illusion of that line; an image carried in 
our collective heads.  Like a plate of glass, the border may be literal and 
existent, but it is also invisible, and as such, only recognizable by a few 
specialised signs which indicate one’s entrance or one’s departure.  To miss 
these signs, or to pass without ever seeing or recognizing such symbols, is to 
miss both the border, and the idea of the border.  Without recognition passage 
becomes impossible, because either one is not allowed to cross, or because one 
is not aware of crossing.
462  In other words, without something to insist on the 
border’s permanence, that line does not exist. 
Then again, most borders, especially those demarking incorporeal 
limits, like those of an ideology or philosophy, are not so easy to penetrate, 
because instead of recognizing a direct image, such as “military apparel 
[appareil]” or a physical wall, the penetration of a theoretical limit requires the 
recognition of image patterns within the culture that generates them.
463  To put 
it simply, within the popular culture of any given society, especially one on the 
verge of transformation, specific motifs will recur again and again within its 
artistic, scientific, literary, and intellectual products.  If a society wishes to 
change, and therefore discard an obsolete subjectivity for a system promising a 
new mode of thinking, then the recognition and understanding of these cultural 
motifs is absolutely essential to its transformation.  Otherwise, the point of 
embarkation becomes unclear, and the direction of progress increasingly 
uncertain. 
The incredible power and astonishing ubiquity of the cybernetic body 
in contemporary Western culture has obviously branded the man-machine as 
one of West’s dominant motifs.  Forever labelling the image as a theoretical 
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limit, and thus as a point of departure for that which comes after humanism.  
Consequently, many cyborg theorists have come to believe that as members of 
a society on the verge of transition, we have in a sense, already begun to walk 
with Derrida.  Feeling the “affect of…passage: [of that] singular emotion born 
from penetration”, and that like him we too are marching over the brink, 
through an invisible border “separating two opposed places” bound by one 
“naturally continuous element.”
464  Writers like Moravec, Graham, and Hayles 
certainly believe that the ethos shaped under the sign of the ‘human’ is quickly 
transforming into that of its ‘post,’ because like the mirrors of Orphée, cyborgs 
also seem to operate as a halfway point, or dividing line, where elements of 
each ethos meet.   
On the surface, such a formulation makes absolute sense, since the 
problems which come from traversing through the mirror seem very similar to 
the qualities inhabiting our current lived experience.  Namely: those produced 
by the broken, unstable, punctured, and supposedly posthuman subjectivity, 
which again, parallels the same shattered sense of identity enveloping the 
whole of Western culture, while mimicking, as well as compensating for, the 
same illusory sense of cohesion and wholeness that is so central to humanist 
discourse.  Then again, theories which frame the cyborg as a transitional object 
that gently weans us away from the old, while replacing it with something 
new, are also the absolute ideal.  Representing at best, not only an unstable 
state of being, but perhaps also a kind of psychical scrambled self with enough 
potential and pliability to be moulded into something more appropriate for 
current age.  Like the child searching for identity and self-definition in the 
surface of the mirror, Western culture could also be construed as a society 
“working through” the process of producing a new subjectivity through 
identification with its own reflection in the mirrored surface of a dominant 
symbol.
465  Perhaps, the West is redefining itself through the dual process of 
looking and being looked at by its reflection; an introspective face-to-face 
encounter that “is not only the passive perception of an appearance, but a 
projection, a circling from desire to reflection and from reflection to desire.”  
As Melchior-Bonnet writes: “To observe oneself, to measure oneself, to dream 
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oneself, and to transform oneself: these are the diverse functions brought into 
play by an encounter with the mirror.”
466  This act of identification, and self-
definition in the face of the cyborg, belies an “over investment [in] the mirror 
image [that] goes hand in hand with [the] devaluation of the subject,” as well 
as with “a growing and renewed demand for identity.”
467  Specifically: one 
which ultimately speaks volumes for our desire to penetrate an ideological 
frontier and to emerge on a “new soil, [under] a new power, a new law”.
468  
Because just as the child looks to the mirror to split itself from its mother, we 
could also be looking toward the cyborg as a way to separate ourselves from an 
obsolete state of being, and to erect a new subjectivity, a new feeling of unity 
and order, upon the ruins of the past. 
Yet at worst, the mirrored image of the cyborg body can also 
completely elide the psycho-transitional properties of the looking-glass, as well 
as the transformative properties of both Winnicott and Glass’s cultural 
transitional object, in favour of something which is not only far more 
menacing, but also far more plausible given the violent sexual tendencies 
inherent to such a dangerously patriarchal image with such rigid right wing 
politics.  According to Michael Eigen, even though transitional phenomena 
“may be soothing, insofar as they stand [in] for the breast or mother”, and even 
though they may “expand” into areas of “art, science, religion, and culture”, 
they can in turn, “contract” into the voracious, insatiable, and sometimes brutal 
nature of “addictions and fetishes.”
469  Thus, transitional objects such as the 
cyborg can not only “emphasize separation”, but as a consequence, also “stand 
[in] for an endless gap they forever try to fill”, because while these objects 
“may carry forward the richness of experience” the man-machine can also 
function as “a place marker for an experience never had.”
470  Or conversely, 
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for an experience one wishes to endlessly recreate; often through the most 
violent methods imaginable. 
 
5.5 Fetish 
 
Obviously, the connection between the fetish and the transitional object is not 
a new one in the field of psychoanalysis.  Contemporary literary critics like 
Carl Eby, as well as more established members of the American 
psychoanalytic community like Phyllis Greenacre, have been drawing links 
between these two concepts since the mid-20
th Century.
471  Indeed, two of 
Greenacre’s more significant scholarly works directly compare the similarities 
and differences found between these two ideas.  Specifically, her 1969 paper 
“The Fetish and the Transitional Object,” as well as her essay of the following 
year, “The Transitional Object and the Fetish: With Special Reference to the 
Role of Illusion.”  In both compositions Greenacre explicates the overlap 
between Winnicott’s theory and the fetish very clearly, stating: “The 
transitional object and the fetish resemble each other in certain formal aspects: 
both [reference] inanimate objects adopted and utilized by the individual to aid 
in maintaining a psychophysical balance under conditions of more or less 
strain.”
472
Both the fetish and the transitional object are rooted in real existent 
items or phenomena, which placate the child while providing a sense of 
satisfaction and security.  Moreover, and most importantly, each item plays a 
mirror-like part in the subsequent construction of identity, either by producing 
the initial conditions on which to build a sense of selfhood, or by striving to fill 
the holes left after the production of that person’s individual subjectivity.   
Despite these similarities, however, there are a few marked differences which 
distinguish the two concepts with regards to their individual origins and roles.  
                                                                                                                                           
open to interpretation, and criticism (152).  For example, as Freud explains rather 
problematically at the end of his paper: “In conclusion, we may say that the normal prototype 
of man’s fetishes is a man’s penis, just as the normal prototype for inferior organs is the 
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Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21, trans. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1961). 
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The transitional object “appears in and belongs to infancy, and is generally 
relinquished when infancy merges into childhood”, whereas the fetish is 
“commonly adopted as a necessary prop or adjunct to insure adequate sexual 
performance in adult life.”
473  On the other hand, while the fetish certainly 
manifests itself “under the demands of adulthood,” we must always remember 
that like its transitional counterpart, it too has “roots in disturbances in 
infancy.”
474  According to Greenacre, there are times when the transitional 
object itself is transformed or perverted in the eyes of the infant, because he or 
she has been deprived of the necessary emotional support normally garnered 
from his or her family.  Indeed, “as Winnicott (1953, 1957, 1965a, 1965b) has 
repeatedly emphasized” throughout the course of his career, “the transitional 
object develops in its most typical form where there is a good or at least a 
‘good-enough’ mother.”
475  Thus, in order for the transitional object to become 
manifest and perform its primary function, the infant’s supply of parental love 
and guidance must be great enough, as well as good enough, to meet that 
particular child’s needs.  If he or she “has suffered unusually severe 
deprivation or mistreatment…the hostile elements in [the child’s] aggression 
appear in mounting tension from frustration, and the energy cannot be 
sufficiently used in the forward movement of growth.”
476  As Greenacre 
writes: 
 
It then finds discharges in rages, or it may become body-bound, gradually 
causing premature sadomasochistic eroticization associated sometimes 
with precocious genitalization under strain…[Nevertheless] even under 
favourable conditions…some degree of frustration is inevitable in the 
process of separation from the mother.  Such autoerotic activities as may 
develop in situations of severe deprivation and frustration are more 
constricted and less plastic in form than is true in the case of the 
uncomplicated transitional object.  They betray more focal defensive 
function in expressing tension and assume more or less automatized 
patterns.  [Thus, even] when an object outside the body has been selected, 
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its form and use are more concretized and may take on the character of an 
infantile fetish.
477
 
Initially, all this talk of the infantile and the fetishtic might seem like a 
very long way from the figure of the cyborg body, since representations of 
human-machine amalgamation are always distanced from images of 
infancy.
478  In fact, the nature of the cybernetic body itself would seem to 
make all issues related to parental love, or the lack thereof, appear all the more 
alien in relation to the apparently parentless man-machine, since the 
production and subsequent interpretation of that image is in every way 
different from the acts of procreation and child-rearing described by 
Greenacre.  However, when the general concept of the fetish is accepted as a 
serious possibility, the cyborg’s subsequent affiliation with many of 
Greenacre’s theories quickly becomes apparent, because suddenly the man-
machine’s overwhelming need to compensate for some ineffable sense of 
inadequacy and lack through either violent domination and/or endless 
ejaculation, seems all the more reasonable.  Moreover, the connection becomes 
perfectly logical, since it even provides the basis for a far more accurate model 
by which to examine and understand the nature and function of the cyborg 
body than, say, any of the constructions mentioned previously, because even 
though D.W. Winnicott’s idea is extremely useful in broadening our 
understanding of human-machine amalgamation, it is still not entirely accurate 
in explicating most representations of that image.  Instead, the theories of 
                                                 
477 Phyllis Greenacre, “The Transitional Object and the Fetish: With Special Reference to the 
Role of Illusion,” p. 336.  Greenacre continues: “It may be significant, too, that even in those 
cases in which the contrast between the fetish and the transitional object is clear, the fetish 
leading to perversion has become manifest at just those age periods when the transitional 
object is ordinarily losing functional importance.  This would suggest a possible reciprocal or 
even overlapping relationship between the two phenomena which might increase in condition s 
of severe infantile stress, such as is not true in the bulk of cases with Winnicott’s ‘good-
enough’ mothers” (337). 
478 Usually, the cyborg is characterized physically as a mature adult, or is represented mentally 
as non-childlike, even though it may appear childlike in form.  Ghost in the Shell is a prime 
example of a cyborg which is child-like in appearance, but adult in both physical bearing and 
emotional maturity.  For example, at the end of the film, two mortal enemies willingly 
combine their separate personalities/consciousnesses to form one entity held within the cyborg 
body of a 5 year-old girl.  The symbolic implications of this very young body are obvious, of 
course, since their merger signals the beginning of a new race/species/state of being, but the 
actual entity within that body holds none of the emotional or mental qualities associated with 
its new form.  Ghost in the Shell, dir. Mamoru Oshii, VHS (Manga Video, 1996).   175
Winnicott do not account for some very strong, and very visible contradictions, 
in the way cyborgs are often produced, represented, and politicized. 
After all, if the mirrored surface of the man-machine is in truth a 
positive point, in the sense that all previous subjectivities produced under the 
gaze of humanism are now fractured by the mirrored plane of its glass body, 
and therefore subject to major renovation under the guidance of an allegedly 
posthuman ethos.  How does one explain popular representations of the cyborg 
body over the last century?  Representations that more often that not, purport a 
hyper-masculine body-type and/or attitude, whether they are male or female, 
and which are constantly striving to exert and assert such a violent brand of 
patriarchal privilege at every opportunity.  How does one explain not only the 
cyborg’s decidedly humanist slant, but also that body’s forcible assertion, and 
subsequent perpetuation of, some of the most dangerous and destructive socio-
political repercussions to spring from and be supported by that particular 
philosophy?  Namely: the politics of racism, patriarchy, and exclusion, as well 
as the hierarchical constructs which continue to guarantee the power of those 
terrible social, cultural, and political ills. 
One answer could be found within “Totally Recalling Arnold: Sex and 
Violence in the New Bad Future,” in which author Fred Glass refines all 
previous theories regarding the nature and function of the cultural transitional 
object, in order to account for a number of contradictory elements left 
unexplained by his appropriation of Winnicott’s work.  Specifically, the 
surprising lack of social acceptance, and real psychological change, garnered 
from a number of so-called cultural transitional objects found within films 
such as Paul Verhoeven’s NBF blockbuster, Total Recall.  As a representative 
of the New Bad Future, Total Recall and the gaggle of human, mutant and 
machine-made characters contained therein, should function as a collection of 
Winnicottian objects; as transitional phenomena which allow their viewers to 
watch, absorb, understand, and manage many of the existing socio-economic 
shifts ripping through their own lives at the end of the 1980s.  As Glass writes, 
the movie should share the same “social-psychological project [inherent to all 
NBF films]: helping to ease their audience’s entry from shattered past 
expectations of the future (personal and social) into what the future is turning   176
out to be.”
479  Yet, such a formulation is clearly incorrect, because instead of 
easing any existing psycho-social tension, Total Recall is a text in which the 
massive physique of Arnold Schwarzenegger actually eclipses—and/or 
engulfs—almost every aspect of Verhoeven’s film, including the purportedly 
positive social-psychological functions inherent to Glass’s NBF genre.  In fact, 
the film exploits the overwhelming size and strength of Arnold’s masculine, 
cybernetic, and decidedly Aryan form to such a degree that his muscles 
actually render the meaning and purpose behind Winnicott’s potentially 
valuable transitional object perpetually invalid.  Negating not only every 
constructive, transformative, and/or reconciliatory property inherent to such a 
politicized subgenre, but also dominating them totally through Arnold’s own 
personal project to perpetually recreate the fascist politics lacing both Leni 
Riefenstahl's glossy black bodies, and early Olympic ideals.
480  Indeed, the 
highly racialized, not to mention highly sexualized, nature of 
Schwarzenegger’s massive Aryan muscles efface more than just the New Bad 
Future’s previously explicated cultural transitional qualities, but in point of 
fact, supplant them entirely with a far more menacing “twin to Winnicott’s 
suggestive category”.  Namely: “one with less benevolent implications for 
understanding the social psychology of audiences” who ultimately buy into 
this mode of mass entertainment.
481
Even though Schwarzenegger’s machine-made form can “act as a 
temporary palliative for social fears”, it does so only as a “patch”, because 
within the viewer’s attempt to “alleviate anxiety” through identification with 
Schwarzenegger’s pumped-up physique, reality is not acknowledged and 
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explored, but rather “disavowed and distorted”.  His muscled-plated body 
merely reinforces pre-existing “patterns of behaviour that can lead fears of 
social disempowerment (castration anxieties) to their realization in social 
decay”.  As Glass writes, the “persistent (if cartoonish) violence and hormonal 
responses of the viewer to the action continuously threaten to wash away 
[Total Recall’s] progressive political themes.”
482  Thus, the politics and the 
“action-adventure format of” this and other similar 
 
NBF films war internally with each other, a meta-narrative battle that for 
most viewers (since most are teenaged, with relatively unsophisticated 
politics) ends with a victory for the wrong side.  Schwarzenegger’s wish-
fulfillment heroics, rather than an appreciation of the worldview of the 
NBF, attracts these viewers, and remains the focus of their attention.  If a 
political message is absorbed, it keeps closely to the shadows of their 
unconscious, where the fears and hopes on which political manipulation 
thrives tend to stay in our depoliticized culture.
483
 
Clearly, a theoretical model such as Winnicott’s cultural transitional object 
does not apply under such circumstances, since the consequences of such an 
idea are nowhere in sight.  Nothing about this or other similar texts, and their 
subsequent effects on the psychology of the audience, is in any way 
transforming, transitional, and/or reconciliatory, either on a personal level, or 
in a larger socio-political sense, because instead of lifting “an individual 
through his/her fear of social conflicts to an alleviation of the internal anxiety 
corresponding to the threatening social entity,” NBF films like Total Recall 
“may in the long run act more as cultural fetish objects” than as instances of 
Winnicott’s own cultural transitional object (Figure 30).
484
Glass’s refinement of Winnicott’s original theory, and its subsequent 
appropriation of Greenacre’s work, is of course useful, as well as smart, 
considering popular representations of the cyborg body are often in direct 
conflict with the nature of the transitional object.  Indeed, the notion of a 
cultural fetish object not only explains quite a lot about cyborg behaviour, as 
well as the fractured nature of our image with that surface, but in turn provides 
a complementary facet to glassy images of human-machine integration 
everywhere, since the fetish itself can also be seen as both a reflection and a 
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mirror.  For example, a fetish echoes individual desire, while simultaneously 
exposing the profound sense of inadequacy and lack which can often fuel one’s 
desire.  Unfortunately, under such a system one does not pass through the 
mirrored surface of the man-machine, but is instead bounced off of, or 
reflected by it in the same manner that a mirror returns a likeness.  As such, 
there are no psycho-social changes because there is no penetration, no 
transition, and certainly no transformation, but only reflection and the 
perpetual reinforcement of that which is already there.  Thus, there is only a 
body soothed by the everlasting lies of Jacques Lacan’s mirror phase, and a 
broken subjectivity disguised beneath the illusion of misrecognition.
485
The fetish not only reflects what is existent within the ‘body’ of the 
audience in relation to sexual longing, female objectification, physical 
violation, and patriarchal privilege, but also what that audience might wish 
were there; namely, power, purity, order, and superiority.  All of which are 
then melded together to produce both an overriding sense of bodily unity and 
subjective control, as well as the subsequent illusions of transition, penetration, 
and passage as explained by Winnicott, Derrida, and Genet.  More importantly, 
one must always remember that in terms of the fetish, an overriding sense of 
unity and control does not exist, but must instead be achieved through the act 
of fetish fulfillment, which the fetish not only longs to create, but also to 
endlessly recreate.  To do otherwise, is to allow the lack that lies within to 
become even stronger, and to force the emptiness therein to feel all the more 
poignant and all the more terrible, as it spills out to efface whatever fragments 
remain. 
Needless to say, such a dim view of human-machine integration does 
not reflect well on Haraway’s previous assertions that organic-inorganic 
amalgamations not only embrace fragmentation and liminality, but also ally 
themselves with the female and the feminine.  Because if the cyborg is indeed 
a cultural fetish object and a glass body, then the political and ontological 
consequences derived from such a devastating series of equations not only 
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places the man-machine within very dangerous territory, but also within a very 
unstable subjective state.  Specifically: one, which could conceivably force the 
cyborg to perpetually reassert and/or reform a sense of subjective and bodily 
unity through the violent expression of its own overt and threatening 
masculinity. 
There are innumerable filmic, aesthetic, and textual examples 
stretching from Epstein to Arnold, from Ashby to Ash, which demonstrate that 
no matter how different each instance is in relation to their individual origin 
and form, all cyborgs still hold fast to the same three fundamental points 
explicated throughout the course of the four previous chapters.  Points that, in 
my opinion, actually further define these characters as cyborgs, since each 
aforementioned component not only plays a significant role in the consistent 
representation of the man-machine and its politics, but in turn, also perpetuates 
those conditions, and further cements all future manifestations of that image.  
As Sue Short writes: 
 
popular mass art responds to audience and the concerns of the period in 
which it is made, and although this contention makes a great deal of sense, 
some necessary reservations have to made because popular cinema may not 
simply reflect prevailing concerns and attitudes, but have some 
contribution in their construction also.
486
 
Allusions to glass, a sense of lack, and the destructive nature of the forever-
coming phallus are constantly connected to popular representations of bio-
mechanical integration.  The connection is so powerful and so pervasive that 
one would be hard pressed to find a cyborg which exists outside the confines 
of this particular trinity.  Either because it is; a) represented directly as a body 
of glass; or b) because it represents the idea of glass—of reflection and 
doubling. 
The consequences derived from such an important ontological point are 
never absent from most cyborg texts, but instead play a major role in both 
shaping cyborg behaviour, and in moulding the relationship which exists 
between the fetish object and the observer.  Any person, social grouping, or 
culture which looks toward that warped and glassy creature for a sense of 
identity and purpose, and thus for a confirmation of self, will be completely 
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affected by the physical and symbolic properties of that body, and see nothing 
but the disturbingly meaningless scramble of the Lacanian hommlette.   
Moreover, even if one were to reframe or conceptualize the shattered 
subjectivity contained within the body of the man-machine as the building 
blocks for a new mode of being, that person would still be confronted with the 
potentially devastating consequences inherent to the penetration of any 
reflective surface.  Bear in mind, according to Melchior-Bonnet, the “mirror, 
‘matrix of the symbolic,’ accompanies the human quest for identity.”
487  It 
reflects a seemingly whole and complete self, while our gaze in the mirror 
ideally “confirms [our] integrity in the face of concerns about mutilation and 
dismemberment.”
488  However, once we pass through that image, our basis for 
self-reflection and self-identification becomes unclear.  We begin to lose our 
integrity, and as such, our normally organized subjective state becomes 
fractured and unstable, thereby reinforcing the very problem we seek to solve.  
As such, any succeeding sense of inadequacy or lack must be now masked, 
effaced, and/or counteracted for the sake one’s own sanity.  A task most 
frequently accomplished through massive overcompensation, or to be more 
specific, through endless ejaculation, everlasting orgasm, and perpetual fetish 
fulfillment.  All of which are designed to satiate the decidedly masculine form 
of the cyborg body. 
 
5.6 Opposition 
 
At best, these fragments, these pieces of us which are lodged in the centre of 
the cyborg, “engender the hope of being reborn again on the other side, in the 
world of dream and imagination that is also of art.”
489  They represent a search 
for stability; a fractured and distorted figure in need of a new identity, a new 
way to be human.  They are, after all, broken segments of a larger body which 
has ultimately been denied the illusion of cohesion, and are therefore, perhaps 
representative of a culture in search of itself, of a society in the midst of a 
massive identity crisis played out in the mirrored surface of the man-machine.  
To quote Sue Short: “The cyborg’s greatest value may thus be to shed light 
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upon the difficulty we have in making sense of contemporary identity, 
particularly given the analytical tools at our disposal.”
490  At worst, however, 
the cyborg becomes something far more menacing than a simple transitional 
object, and/or a facilitator for identity formation.  Instead, it becomes the 
means by which everything dangerous and existent is once again reaffirmed, 
while in turn, not only presenting the viewer with the illusion of change, but 
also with the impression of progress, improvement, and evolution. 
Unfortunately, the latter option is consistently the most applicable 
given the connections between the cyborg body, the politics of the present-day, 
and the time period in which the man-machine was initially named, defined, 
and tossed into the world as a real existent being with a clear political agenda.  
To be blunt, the “expectation has far exceeded the level of progress,” because 
over the decades there has been an unmistakable dearth of social and 
subjective advancement, even as the merger between technology and the body 
has gained greater visibility, ubiquity, and acceptance from both men and 
women alike.
491  After all, despite Michel Foucault’s assertions that, it “may 
be comforting to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two 
centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear…as 
soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.”
492  It  is a lso  eq u all y  
unnerving to realize that despite nearly fifty years of supposed improvement, 
we have “progressed without advancing ourselves, without breaking through, 
to the surface of an image…sewn…into the general web of the [cultural] 
text.”
493  And that as a civilization, Western society has failed to recognize the 
symbol at the base of its alleged transformation, and that as a people, the West 
has not developed or improved, but only dragged the culture’s previous 
attitudes and ideas with it; remaking each new space into a refurbished version 
of the old. 
In a global sense, one overarching Cold War has been replaced by 
varied and numerous ‘Hot Wars,’ all of which are now huddled together under 
a single ideological struggle against Terror; not Communism.  Old metaphors 
of containment, protection, and isolation such as Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars 
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program have been resurrected under the Bush administration as the obsolete, 
and highly impractical Missile Defence Shield.
494  Furthermore, Clynes and 
Kline’s dream of an independent, imperialist, and biologically superior male 
hybrid continues to persist, because even though a “radically modified variant 
of the [human] species” has not become a reality, fictional images of similar 
creatures continue to endure in almost every sphere of Western culture.
495  
While at the same time, an existing version of the same body is perpetually 
echoed on the battlefields of the Middle East and Central Asia, as American 
soldiers become increasingly reliant on high-tech communications and military 
weapons technologies to essentially keep them alive.  Moreover and most 
importantly, however, even if one places the current crisis in international 
relations aside, the lack of social progress in both a global and a domestic 
sense is still very striking, because even though working women have gained 
greater social and political protection over the years, as well as greater 
flexibility in the job markets of Europe, North America, and Asia, they are still 
subject to many of the old lies perpetrated upon them mere decades before.  
Nowhere is this point more evident than in the countless Hollywood starlets 
and reality TV clones selling disturbing dreams of a better body through 
medical technology.
496  Their smiling hosts hocking breast implants, stomach 
staples, and facial reconstruction to unhappy women, and insecure teens 
robbed of a healthy self-image from the very beginning.
497
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Strangely, Donna Haraway maintains that only women of color pushed 
to the margins of society by their special combination of gender and race 
constitute “real-life cyborgs”, because these are the female bodies in the midst 
of quiet resistance through their production, and subsequent adoption of 
“oppositional consciousness.”  These are the ones struggling against the 
totalizing impressions of a perfect language pushed on them by the Western 
logos of Phallogocentrism.
498  And these are the liminal figures 
 
actively rewriting the texts of their bodies and societies [as they] refuse the 
ideological resources of victimization s o  a s  t o  h a v e  a  r e a l  l i f e .   T h e s e  
cyborgs are the people who refuse to disappear on cue, no matter how 
many times a ‘Western’ commentator remarks on the sad passing of 
another primitive, another organic group done in by ‘Western’ technology, 
by writing.
499
 
Yet, while such a formulation is certainly not incorrect, and while any 
comparable model for a new feminist subjectivity could prove invaluable in 
granting greater power, privilege, and autonomy to a much wider range of 
women, while remaining open to new philosophies, new methodologies, and 
new technologies, there is also a far more disturbing truth underpinning Donna 
Haraway’s bright idealism.  Are not the thousands of women who have 
willingly subjected themselves to the sharp cut of a scalpel, valid participants 
in this movement toward cyborg subjectivity, and cyborg politics?  Are not 
their claims to the man-machine’s subjective and political stance just as 
convincing as those made by Haraway’s sweatshop workers? 
Whether or not one chooses to accept or deny the following truth, the 
fact remains that even at the most basic level these women constitute real-life 
cyborgs.  Moreover, they hold even greater claim to that specific title than any 
                                                                                                                                           
Balsamo, stating: “many women claim to feel emancipated by their ability to alter their image, 
exemplifying the fact that, as consumers of technology, women’s motivations are becoming 
increasingly complicated.  Going under the knife would seem to be a drastic means of 
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of their contemporaries, since each woman is not only melding her body with 
what is more often than not, several unnecessary prosthetics, but in many cases 
each is also embracing the dangerous trinity attached to so many 
manifestations of human-machine amalgamation: glass, lack, and the phallus. 
For instance, even though the women who undergo such procedures 
are not represented in film, art, and literature as possessing a body of glass per 
se, they are still subject to the power of the male gaze, and thus to the 
overwhelming image of their seemingly inadequate bodies in the face of the 
mirror.  This is a glass forced upon them by a society that not only worships 
the phallus, but one which also craves the constant gratification of that phallus.  
In the case of cosmetic surgery, the image of the mirror finds its fullest 
articulation in the eye of the plastic surgeon, because just as scholar Caroline 
Spitzack points out in her essay, “The Confession Mirror: Plastic Images for 
Surgery,” the physician’s eye operates as a kind of “disciplinary gaze situated 
within apparatuses of power and knowledge that construct the female figure as 
pathological, excessively unruly, and potentially threatening of the dominant 
order.”  As Anne Balsamo writes, the doctor’s eye “then disciplines the unruly 
female body by first fragmenting it into isolated parts, and then redefines those 
parts as inherently flawed or pathological.”
500  Foucault defined the basis for 
such an argument in his book, The Birth of the Clinic, stating: 
 
For us, the human body defines, by natural right, the space of origin and of 
distribution of disease; a space whose lines, volumes, surfaces, and routes 
are laid down in accordance with a now familiar geometry, by the 
anatomical atlas.  But this order of the solid, visible body is only one 
way—in all likelihood neither the first, nor the most fundamental—in 
which on spatializes disease.  There have been, and will be, other 
distributions of illness.
501
 
One of these distributors is the “anatomical atlas” of the man-machine, because 
like Foucault’s clinic, the cyborg too is “about space, about language, and 
about death; it is about the act of seeing, the gaze.”
502
For many women, the easiest way to manage the mirror is to surrender 
oneself to the expectations presented by both the image and the idea of one’s 
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own reflection, and as such, to accept one’s reconstruction into what 
contemporary culture considers a whole and palatable being by means of a 
three-fold process involving inscription, surveillance, and confession.  After 
all, in “the scenario” which unfolds in “the cosmetic surgeon’s office, the 
transformation from illness to health is inscribed on the body of the patient” by 
the gaze of the doctor.  As Spitzack writes: 
 
The female patient is promised beauty and re-form in exchange for 
confession, which is predicated on an admission of a diseased appearance 
that points to a diseased (powerless) character.  A failure to confess, in the 
clinical setting, is equated with a refusal of health; a preference for disease 
[a preference for fragmentation].
503
 
Such a formulation is devastating to any possible feminist reworking of the 
clinic, as well as to any and all potential theories which strive to grant greater 
power and autonomy to the female cyborgs who enjoy and employ those 
clinics, because if “women are often the intended and preferred subjects of 
such discourse and men are often the agents performing the surgery”, a 
medical procedure like plastic surgery “is not simply a discursive site for the 
‘construction of images of women,’” but according to Balsamo, it is “a 
material site at which the physical female body is surgically dissected, 
stretched, carved, and reconstructed according to cultural and eminently 
ideological standards of physical appearance.”
504  In other words, the female 
cyborg is once again restored to a state of “organic wholeness” by means of 
her own deconstruction, since she has now been rendered attractive, and 
therefore worthy of a culture which simultaneously negates her prior self, 
while producing the lie of a seemingly younger, slimmer, tighter, and more 
sexually appealing new body. 
Sadly, the lips and mammories of the contemporary porn star seem to 
constitute the true face of Haraway’s manifesto.  Their surgically enhanced 
bodies revealing the unhappy truth harboured by an image that allegedly seeks 
“a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and 
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our  tools  [pun intended] to ourselves.”
505  With such a sexualized and 
objectified woman representing the politics of the cyborg, as well as the 
likeness of a huge “swollen penis throbbing its way through the receptive 
material” of most man-machine narratives, manifestations of bio-mechanical 
integration are rarely seditious.
506  They do nothing to broaden, distinguish, or 
“define different political possibilities and limits from those [already] proposed 
by the mundane fiction of Man and Woman.”
507  Instead, the many fetishized 
faces of the cyborg body only personify the problematic power issues held 
within those stories.  Their amalgamated forms offering mere versions on a 
single narrative which has been told and retold; a story that not only 
undermines and discredits feminist politics and female resistance, but one 
which also perpetuates the patriarchal fantasy of “peace, justice, and blue 
skies” through the spectacle of the atom bomb, the male orgasm, and the 
subsequent coupling of an exploding cyborg, and the expulsion of that figure’s 
internal contents all over the bodies of its victims.
508
Some theorists, like Anne Balsamo, have expressed concerns over 
Haraway’s ideas, arguing that an actual female cyborg “merely exacerbates the 
need to be extra cautious about the uses to which technology is put”, 
stressing:
509
 
The challenge is how to harness the power of technological knowledge to a 
feminist agenda while struggling against an increasing industrial 
imperialism that eagerly assimilates new techno-workers to labour in the 
interests of private enterprise.  The question is how to empower 
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technological agents so that they work on behalf of the right kind of social 
change.
510
 
Furthermore, Monica J. Casper challenges the very foundations of Haraway’s 
manifesto in her essay, “Fetal Cyborgs and Technomoms on the Reproductive 
Frontier,” writing: 
 
If we are all cyborgs then the analytical value of this concept in 
differentiating cyborg from other identities and subject positions becomes 
diminished.  Further, despite a proliferation of cyborgs, there are many 
ways in which contemporary social actors both accept and resist the cyborg 
image.  By suggesting that we are all cyborgs, there is a danger in losing 
sight of these resistances, as well as of possible differences among 
cyborgs.
511
 
Even Haraway herself, in subsequent interviews about her work, has expressed 
a certain degree of caution in relation to her articulation of the cyborg and its 
applicable political implications, declaring: 
 
It is entirely possible, even likely, that people who want to make cyborg 
social realities and images to be more contested places—where people 
have different kinds of say about the shape of their lives—will lose, and are 
losing all over the world.  One would be a fool, I think, to ignore that.
512
 
Clearly, one cannot discount such a devastating point.  Especially if one 
considers the extent to which most people are losing the struggle to resist any 
and all appropriation of even the most subversive technologies to the interests 
of capitalism.
513  Thus, Haraway’s “informatics of domination” not only 
continues to exert their influence over all aspects of ‘Western’ society, but in 
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many ways also manages to maintain their control, due in large part to both the 
politics of the cyborg body, and the patriarchal-humanist social structures 
which surround and support that image.
514
However, despite this rather bleak outlook, all is not lost, because 
while proponents of Sandoval’s “oppositional consciousness” and Haraway’s 
cyborg feminism continue to lose on a large scale, and while their struggle to 
allow for multiple readings and meanings even within an image as rigid and 
entrenched as the man-machine is still met with resistance from all corners of 
our culture; their struggle is never futile.  Rather the reverse.  As Haraway 
states: 
 
that doesn’t mean we have to give away the game, cash in our chips, and 
go home.  I think those are the places where we need to keep contesting.  
It’s like refusing to give away the notion of democracy to the right wing in 
the United States.  It’s like refusing to leave in the hands of hostile social 
formations tools that we need for reinventing our own lives.  So, I’m not in 
fact, all that sanguine…I know that there’s a lot going on in technoscience 
discourses and practices that’s not about the devil…that promises 
interesting kinds of human relationships, not just contestatory, not always 
oppositional, but something often more creative and playful and positive 
than that.
515
 
Yet, if Haraway’s suggestion is correct, and if “technoscience worlds” are 
indeed “full of resources for contesting inequality and arbitrary authority”, and 
if those who resist and adopt such worlds continue to lose terribly; then 
logically, it is not because Haraway’s dream of the cyborg feminist is 
irrevocably flawed, but because there has not been enough effort on the part of 
feminism to wean the image away from its atomic, space-based, imperialist, 
colonial, fascist, patriarchal, oppressive, and generally destructive roots.
516  
Part of the issue, as we have already seen throughout each of the prior 
chapters, has been a total and consistent misrecognition of the image.  As 
every cyborg body since the publication of “Cyborgs and Space”—indeed, 
from the initial construction of Epstein’s Rock Drill—has been treated 
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ontologically as something akin to a sacred cow, an inviolate construction; a 
black box.  Producing a perspective, which has led inexorably to a long series 
of acute misreadings, allowing the social, cultural, and political constructs 
which surround and support the cyborg to remain both immovable and 
immutable. 
In other words, the cyborg is not the wrong image or metaphor by 
which to start a revolution, form affinities, and resist tyranny, but it is an 
extremely problematic one, and perhaps far more difficult to control than even 
Haraway’s most vehement critics are prepared to admit.
517  After all, any 
theory that successfully incorporates Chela Sandoval’s oppositional 
consciousness remains an invaluable resource for all those who would wish to 
resist hegemony while continuing to perpetuate and maintain their own distinct 
value system without compromising those of other people, other races, or other 
social groupings.  As Sandoval writes: 
 
A scholarly and feminist consciousness of science, then, of 
objectivity…means, according to Haraway the development of a different 
kind of human relation to perception, objection, understanding, and 
production…akin to Hayden White’s and Jacques Derrida’s use of the 
‘middle voice’, for it will demand the scholars situatedness ‘in an 
ungraspable middle space’—where everything is seen with both a 
‘generous and suspicious’ eye.
518
 
Despite my somewhat damning investigation of the man-machine, the notion 
of ‘cyborg feminism’ can accomplish such a task, simply because the term 
itself is self-negating.  Indeed, elements of self-cancellation are central to 
Haraway’s point, because in adopting such a radical form of consciousness one 
must be both “generous and suspicious” not only in regards to how one views 
other political perspectives and agendas, but also to how one navigates such 
markers as well.  One must remain open but guarded; accepting, but at the 
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same time forever vigilant, as he or she examines and incorporates differing 
ideas and perspectives into his or her own subjectivity, no matter how 
offensive or contradictory each one may appear.
519  The “metaphor ‘cyborg’ 
[can represent] profound possibilities for the twenty-first century”: possibilities 
which, according to Sandoval, could conceivably “bring the politics of the 
alienated white male subject into alliance with the subaltern politics of U.S. 
third world feminism.”
520  Unfortunately, Haraway’s attempt to create a new 
myth, and to thereby escape the oedipal “power[s] of a truly totalizing dogma 
that can include all stories”, has sabotaged the power and applicability of her 
own ideas.
521  Because while adopting the cyborg as the metaphor for her own 
decidedly techno-version of Sandoval’s oppositional consciousness is not 
fundamentally incorrect, Haraway has failed in her attempt to fully connect 
that consciousness to the image of human-machine integration.  Instead, her 
attempts to explicate the qualities which define the cyborg as a ‘cyborg’ are far 
too narrow for any such application, because even though her efforts to “come 
up with a creature that [isn’t] about Oedipal subjectivity” is both 
understandable and necessary, Haraway’s unrelenting idealism ultimately 
undermines the most valuable aspects of her work.
522
For example, despite her assertions that an image such as the cyborg 
rejects “bisexuality, pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other 
seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of all the parts 
into a higher unity”, it is patently obvious to anyone who examines the 
evidence, that a body like the man-machine does not exist outside the 
psychological constructs of “Freud, Levis-Strauss, and Lacan”, but is instead 
                                                 
519 Cornel West articulates a similar sentiment in his paper, “A Matter of Life and Death,” 
writing how the older universalist projects of the Left have been shattered.  “So there must be 
strategies and tactics that cut across identity politics, cut across region, and gender, race and 
class.  Class is still around, even though it has been unable to constitute an identity that has the 
saliency and potency of other identities.  And we must attempt to think about how we create 
and sustain organizations that acknowledge this.  Because we are in the bind we are in partly 
because we have been unable to generate the transgendered, transracial, transsexual orientation 
of social motion, social momentum, social movement.”  Cornel West, “A Matter of Life and 
Death,” The Identity in Question 61, (Summer 1992), pp 23. 
520 Chela Sandoval, “New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the 
Oppressed,” p. 409. 
521 Constance Penley, Andrew Ross, and Donna Haraway, “Cyborgs at Large,” p. 14. 
522 Ibid   191
deeply entrenched within those stories.
523  Moreover, while it is not incorrect 
to state that the cyborg is composed of two differing parts, it is absolutely 
inaccurate to assume that such a body not only resists wholeness, but embraces 
fragmentation.  The fact is, it does not.  Furthermore, even though the cyborg 
was not born in a garden, it does not exist outside “salvation history”, or the 
patriarchal and problematic constructs of psychoanalysis.
524  As we have 
already seen, such an assumption is not simply false, but more importantly, it 
is also extremely destructive since the goal of cyborg feminism, and thus of 
oppositional consciousness, is not to impose qualities upon any one person, 
group, or construct, but rather to accept any existing differences, and then to 
embrace the reality presented while remaining simultaneously critical of their 
origins and effects. 
In this sense, the cyborg is the perfect metaphor for both Haraway 
and Sandoval, because it forces all feminists to not only locate themselves 
within “the belly of the monster”, and thus to accept their place in “techno-
strategic discourse” composed of “heavily militarized technolog[ies]”, but to 
also acknowledge the “bankruptcy” of placing oneself outside those constructs.  
After all, embracing “the idea of nature as resistant” is a patriarchal construct 
in itself.
525  It is a theoretical dead end in which one can only criticize from a 
position outside the intended target, because individuals must make their stand 
in a space that patriarchal capitalism readily rapes and destroys anyway.  On 
the other hand, while Haraway may have begun her manifesto by “adopting” 
an “illegitimate and frightening sign”, one which is “perhaps more able to 
remain attuned to specific historical and political positionings and permanent 
partialities without abandoning the search for potent connections”; she has also 
ignored other less savoury aspects of the cyborg’s many associations, and as 
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such uprooted the very subjectivity she was striving to nurture.
526  In fact, in 
one devastating move, she has extricated herself from the monster’s “belly” by 
denying both the internal reality of that monstrosity, and by situating herself in 
what Neil Badmington calls, “the pure outside”; or, that unreal place beyond 
the constraints of time, space, and the reach of one’s own culture.
527
Such a position is extremely damaging to Haraway’s ideas, because by 
removing herself from the centre she has not only chosen to disregard the non-
existence of Badmington’s “outside,” but also decided not to “lodg[e] [herself] 
within [Derrida’s] traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it.”
528  
Subsequently, she has chosen not “to reveal the internal instabilities, [and] 
fatal contradictions that expose how humanism is forever rewriting itself as 
posthumanism.”
529  Instead, Haraway has dislodged herself and her politics 
from the reality of the world in what amounts to an inadvertent attempt to 
preserve it.  There is nothing oppositional about a consciousness that 
disregards all things contradictory in favour of ideas which are less 
problematic and more palatable to one’s goals.  Such a perspective borders on 
totalizing, and upon the very things Haraway’s manifesto is striving to avoid. 
The cyborg is not an especially liberating image, but is instead a very 
dangerous, destructive, and deeply patriarchal body, because in spite of 
Haraway’s inclusive dream, there is a “drive in cyborgs to produce total 
theory”.
530  As such, any attempt at oppositional consciousness in the name 
and body of the man-machine must accept and recognize this fact, because 
only by accepting its faults can one truly understand the nature of human-
machine amalgamation, and therefore formulate not only a possible mode of 
resistance, but perhaps also an alternative feminist subjectivity bearing 
genuinely subversive political values.  Thus, while Haraway’s assumptions 
about the cyborg’s alleged embrace of ego fragmentation, and about its so-
called distaste for notions of organic wholeness due to the combinatory nature 
of its own unique form are very appealing, the truth is all potential 
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combinations of human and machine also carry the building blocks for one 
single overarching image: glass.  Producing a surface with absolutely 
indestructible links to wholeness, the ego, and more importantly, to the 
production of a subjectivity directly contrary to articulations of a resistant and 
fragmentary self.  To ignore that, is to ignore the essence of the image, as well 
as any potential social, cultural, or political value inherent to that creature, 
because by accepting these less utopian realities, one can in turn, not only 
recognize the cyborg for what it truly is, but also better understand the nature 
of that image, while reconciling with, as well as attempting to, more 
vigorously redefine the subjective and political value of the body itself.  In 
doing so, perhaps we as both individuals, and a socio-political collective, can 
begin to correctly process a way out of the “maze of dualisms” so toxic to any 
potential change.  Indeed, perhaps in recognizing the mirror, we can then begin 
to shatter the glass, penetrate an ideological frontier, and truly emerge on a 
“new soil, [under] a new power, a new law”.
531
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Figure 1: The Trinity Marker 
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Figure 2: Skin eruptions and irradiated eyes, Hiroshima mon amour (1959)   196
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Figure 3: 2001: A Space Odessey (1968); monument marking the hypocenter of the 
atomic bomb in Nagasaki, Japan 
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Figure 4: Archival photo pictured in Nuit et brouillard (1955) 
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Figure 5: Melted Coca-Cola bottles, Hiroshima mon amour (1959); Andy Warhol, Green 
Coca-Cola Bottles (1962), Whitney Museum of American Art, New York 
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Figure 6: Andy Warhol, Brillo (1964) 
London, Tate Collection 
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Figure 7: Khrushchev and Nixon, “The Kitchen Debate” (1959)   200
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Figure 8: Schwarzenegger’s entrance, T3: Rise of the Machines (2003)   201
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Figure 9: Abstraction through C3I, Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 10: “Angel of Death,” Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 11: Black Hands, Dr. Strangelove (1964), Metropolis (1926)   203
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Figure 12: Moloch, Metropolis (1926) 
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Figure 13: Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia prefigured, Metropolis (1926)   204
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Removed due to copyright restrictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: General Jack D. Ripper, shot from below, Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 15: General Buck Turgidson; potent male and mistress, Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 16: Simulacra and Simulation; Scientist, President, Soldier, Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 17: Ash rapes Ripley, Alien (1979) 
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Figure 18: Ripley in the closet, Alien (1979)
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Figure 19: Kane’s “homosexual oral rape,” Alien (1979) 
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Figure 20: Amy Taubin’s “little-dick-with-teeth,” Alien (1979)   208
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Figure 21: Ash, Alien (1979) 
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Figure 22: Major Kong’s prelude to ‘wargasm,’ Dr. Strangelove (1964) 
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Figure 23: R.F. Babcock, Join the Navy (1917) 
American WWI Poster 
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Figure 24: Russell Crowe as the glass eating cyborg, Sid 6.7 
Virtuosity (1995) 
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Figure 25: Parmigianino, Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (1524), 
Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum
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Figure 26: Photograph of the Trinity Test taken 0.025 seconds after detonation.  Could this be the beginning of our 
self-portrait in an atomic mirror? 
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Figure 28: Terminator as mirror, T2: Judgment Day (1991) 
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Figure 27: The Terminator emerges from the atomic blast 
T2: Judgment Day (1991) 
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Figure 29: Orpheus entering the mirror-pool, Orphée (1949) 
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Figure 30: Fetishtic eruptions, Total Recall (1990) 
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